Central Instructions on Forwarding the Ministry of Foreign Trade’s Report on the Campaign to Root Out All Concealed Counterrevolutionaries (August 11, 1955)  To the Shanghai Bureau, the Party Committees of all provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the Party Committees of the autonomous regions; also to all departments of the Central Military Commission:

The anti-counterrevolutionary experience of the Ministry of Foreign Trade [1] is highly instructive. It is hereby circulated for your reference and may be further transmitted to all units for implementation. August 11, 1955, Central Committee Liu, Chen, and Deng [2] have reviewed this document. Shangkun [3] will transmit it by telegraph and send copies to all departments of the Central Military Commission; separate printed copies will be distributed to all members of the CPC Central Committee currently in Beijing. Printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.

Notes [1] Refers to the experience outlined in the report submitted on August 1, 1955, by the Party Group of the Ministry of Foreign Trade to the Party Committee of State Organs, as well as to the Central Committee and Mao Zedong, concerning the campaign to purge all concealed counterrevolutionaries. The report states that the anti-counterrevolutionary campaign within the Ministry of Foreign Trade was broadly divided into three phases: (1) The first phase, from June 6 to June 21, was primarily devoted to preparatory work prior to the launch of the campaign. (2) The second phase began with a general meeting of all staff on June 22. Key lessons learned during this phase were as follows: First, fully mobilize the masses, emphasizing practical application, exposing wrongdoings and malicious actors, and systematically “stripping away” layers of deception to ultimately isolate and expose counterrevolutionaries. Second, ideological struggle within small groups must be carefully prepared; great importance should be attached to gathering and analyzing relevant materials, so as not to engage in unprepared confrontations. Third, once the ideological struggle within the groups had reached an adequate level, proceedings should promptly be transferred to special investigation teams for further examination and confrontation. (3) Starting in late July, the third phase commenced, focusing on further deepening mass mobilization to solve cases and eliminate enemies. The main lessons from this stage were: First, continued opposition to rightist tendencies and enhanced concrete guidance were essential. Second, leadership of the special investigation teams needed to be significantly strengthened to achieve breakthroughs in case-solving and the elimination of counterrevolutionaries. Third, after small-group ideological struggles had stripped away the disguises of counterrevolutionaries, a more thorough examination of their past records and social connections proved highly effective in revealing their true nature and in educating cadres. [2] Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Chen refers to Chen Yun, who at the time served as Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at the time held the posts of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. [3] Shangkun refers to Yang Shangkun, who at the time was Deputy Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Central Office.