Instructions on the Campaign to Eliminate Counterrevolutionaries[1]
(August 8, 1955)

Comrade Tan Zheng:[2]
This document seems suitable for forwarding. Do you read all such reports? You should read them all, select the important ones for forwarding, and provide timely guidance to all localities. Every month and a half, an army-wide meeting should be convened for discussion once.

Mao Zedong
August 8

--- Notes

[1] This instruction was written on a briefing report on the situation of the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, submitted by the Kunming Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to the General Political Department on August 1, 1955, and concurrently sent to its subordinate units. The briefing stated that the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries in the major units directly under the Military Region had entered the stage of linking with reality, launching struggles, and making concrete exposures. Among the problems exposed, the more serious ones included: (1) Some counterrevolutionary elements had already been discovered. (2) All units had exposed some small clique activities. (3) Quite a few units had exposed some serious incidents of leaking secrets. (4) All units had exposed a considerable amount of reactionary speech. (5) Some intellectuals had begun to reveal problems of being influenced by Hu Feng's ideology and of admiring Hu Feng elements. During this period, the five-member groups of the Military Region and at all levels paid attention to guiding and controlling the conduct of small group meetings, and gained some experience and insights: 1. Whenever reality could be concretely linked, especially linking reality based on the professional characteristics and prominent problems of the unit itself, the small group meetings were vivid and vigorous. 2. The small group is a combat unit; importance should be attached to raising the leadership level of the small group leaders. 3. The forms of small group meetings can be flexible and varied, so as to achieve confrontation. 4. For certain units with complex situations, when it is determined that the target indeed has problems and the mass struggle is about to reach a deadlock, the leadership should grasp the timing and change tactics.


[2] Tan Zheng, then serving as Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.