On the Cooperativization of Agriculture
(July 31, 1955)

Source: Xuanji, V, pp. 168-191. Other Chinese Texts; RMRB (Oct. 17,
1955), 1-2; Xuandu A, pp. 295-317; Guanyu nongye huozuohua wenti, pp.
1-38; Buyi, pp. 42-62; Gaizan wenji, Ul, pp. 9-30. XHYB, 11 (Noy. 28,
1955), 1-13; ZFYJ, 6 (Dec, 1955), 1-10. Available English Translations: SW,
V. pp. 184-207; SR (1971). pp. 289-420.

Minor variations exist among the various Chinese versions listed here, particularly
between the Xuanji and the RMRB versions,

Mao's speech on the coopeérutivization of agriculture marked a decisive inter-
Vention in the struggle over agricultural vollectivization, Aldwugh the struggle
had been going on within the CPC since land reform had been basically com-
Pleted in 1953, the layying agricultural growth rates through 1956 ~ the miilpoing of the First Five-Year Plan — forced the ixsit af agricultural policy te the
forefront. During this struggle, many within the CPC national leadership.
tneluding Liu Shoogi, hed argued thar in this period the need for accumulation
from agricultural prodaction to finance industrial development could bext he
met by relying primarily on consolidating the rich peasant economy, 16. pp
vidiny the conditions that would allow the most skilled and best equipped py
ants ia increase production most rapidly, and only secondarily an collectiyis
tion. Thus in line with the pasition of the Soviet Union at that time, they appree
that collectivization must be postponed umil mechanization of agriculture )
at least been begun.
Mao, to the contrary, argued that such a policy could lead to increased pp
ization in the countryside. This, although these policies might allow Jor ra
accumulation, they would do so in such a way as to develop the comiditle
the reemergence of classes in the countryside Therefore, he argued for p
reliance on a rapid cooperativization of agriculture’ anal for the fire time ¢) m
lenged the previailing Soviet madel of socialist development,
In July 1955 the opposition to Mao had the upper hand, The plan adopred b
the NPC in July called for postponing collectivization until the ny
capable of producing sufficient machinery and the other requisite fiw
allow for full-scale mechanization of agriculture, and until 70 10 BO per oe
the peasantry had become rich peasants.
Mao strongly opposed this approach and the consequences to which he fea re
“t would lead, Therefore, on the day following the NPC, he addresyed ae
ence of secretaries of provincial. municipal, and awonomous region Party coy =a v
mittees ~ who, he felt, would be more supportive of his position than the ra
Committee — with his position on agriculniral cooperativization. Heargeeta
immediate and rapid collectivization would not only increase accumulation, bi
would do so in a way favorable to the development of the further revolutic
tion of China's economy.” Subsequently, in October 1955, al un enlarged mi
ing of the Central Committee — which was artended by 338 regional Party see re
faries, as opposed to only 38 Central Committee members und 25
Committee alternative members — the “Resolution on the Question of
tural Cooperativization,” which was based largely on Mao's position.
passed. Bul victory in the struggle for acceptance of this position did not mean
that Mao's suggestions were carried out as planned. Once the country
caught up in the struggle for rapid collectivization, the pace i faigey's peanticint
far outstripped anything suggested etther by Mao himself or by the Res ae ,
Mae's preoccupation with the problem af agricultural coaabralivecntina
remainder of 1955 and 1956 ts evident in the many speeches and WritngX On Es
subject in this period. As we shall see, the issue was not merely a major
program of the transformation of the agricultural base of the Chinese econam
which it was, but also a problem of ideological and policy struggle in Chinert”
Society at large (with “conxervative” intellectuals such as Liang Shuming) a
within the Party (with, far example, Lin Shaogi and the Rural Work Depart —
ment), On this issite, the CPC published wo major sets of documents:
1) Shi Jingtang, Zhang Lin, Zhou Ginghe, Bi Zhongjie, eds, Zhongguo nongye
hezuohua yundong shiliao (Materials on the History of the Movement for the
Couperaivization of Agriculture in China) (1957, Sanlian chubanshe, &
2 volumes, with vol. I concentruting on pre-Liberation conditions and yol, 200
the situation fram 1953 to 1955;
2) Nongyeshehui zhuy | gaizao wenji (Decumenss an the Socialist Transformation
of Agriculture) (1955, Caiheny Jingji chubanshe, Shanghal), 3 volumes
(Herein abbreviated ay Gaizao wenji.) This article iy contained in vol. 3 of thiy”

latter set, pp. 9-30.
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A high tide in the new socialist mass movement will soon sweep across the
ural areas throughout the country. Some of our comrades, however, are tor
ering along like a woman with bound feet,’ complaining all the time about
others, saying: |You're] going too fast, [you're} going too fast. [They are
given to] excessive nitpicking, unwarranted complaints, endless worries, and
countless taboos and take this to be the correct policy for guiding the socialist
mass movement in the rural areas,

No, this is not the correct policy; it is a wrong policy-

At present, the high tide of the social transformation of cooperativization in
tbe countryside is already evident in some areas and will soon engulf the
whole country. This is a large-scale socialist revolutionary movement involying @ runt! population of over five hundred million and hits tremendous worldwide significance. We should give this movement active, enthusiastic, and
well-planned leadership, rather than dragging it back by ull sorts of means-
That there are some deviations in the movement is unavoidable. It is understandable and also not hard to rectify. Shortcomings and errors that exist
among cadres and peasants can be overcome or corrected provided we
actively help them. The cadres and peasants are advancing under the leadership of the Party, and the movement ts basically sound. In some places, they
have made mistakes in their work. For example, on the one hand, [some] poor
peasants have been prevented from joining the cooperatives in disregard of
their difficulties; on the other band, [some] well-to-do middle peasants have
been forced to join the cooperatives in violation of their interests.’ On all of
these things people should be educated and corrected instead of simply being
reprimanded, Blunt reprimands cannot solve problems, We must guide the
movement boldly and not fear dragons ahead and tigers behind. Both cadres
and peasants will remold themselves through their own experience in struggle. We should let them get down to doing the work, and they will draw lessons and enhance their talents while doing it, In this way, large numbers of
Outstanding people will come to the fore. The attitude of fearing dragons
abead and tigers behind is not conducive to the making of [good] cadres,
Large numbers of cadres with short-term training miist be sent to the countryside from the higher levels to guide and assist the cooperativization movement, but even cadres sent down from higher levels can only team how ta do
their work by being in the movement [themselves], They may not necessarily
know how to do their work just by atlending a training class and listening to
af instructor lecture on several dozen points:

In short, the leadership should not fall behind the mass movement. Yet, as
things stund now, it is the mass movement that is running ahead of the leadership, and the leadership is unable to catch up With the movement. This situation must be changed,

it}
The nationwide cooperativization movement is now moving forward on 4


392 | MAO ZEDONG

giunt scale, and yet we still have to argue Such questions a5 whether the —
eratives can develop and Whether they can be consolidated. As Tar as cap
commades are concerned, the crux of the matter seems tw be their worry gy
whether the several hundred thousand existing semisocialist and) wenes
rather small cooperatives (averaging twenty-odd households each) can b =
solidated." If they cannot be consolidated, their development is, ‘of eo -:
out of the question. Despite the record of the development of jagreniy
coopenttivization in the last few years, certain comrades still remain shone:
they still want to see how things develop during this year, 1955_ The
even want to wait and see for another year in 1956, Only if more cogpe
are consoilidated will they be truly convinced that agricultural ope
zahon i6 feasible and that the policy of the Central Committee of ¢
is correct. Therefore, the work in these owo years is of crucial jp
lance.
In order to prove the feasibility of agricultural cooperativization and the
fectness of our Party Center's policy regarding agricultural cooperativigay
it is perhaps not without benefit for us to review the history of the ap:
coopenitivization movement in our country. 7
During the twenty-two yeurs of revolutionary wars prior to the founding:
the People’s Republic of China, our Party had already had the experience p
guiding the peasants, after the land reform, in forming agricultural pri
mutual aid organizations containing the rudiments of socialism. Att
[these organizations included] the mutual aid labor groups and plowing tes
in Jiangxi Province, labor-exchange teams in northern Shaanxi, a r
uid teams in northern, eastern, and northeastern China,’ At that bine
zations of semisocialist or socialist agricultural producers’ cooperafit
also come into existence already in isolated cases. For example, att
(ural producers’ cooperative of a socialist nature came into being in
\jan in northern Shaanxi during the time of the War of Resistunce a
Japan.” But this type of cooperative was not popularized at that a
It was after the founding of the People’s Republic of China that our Party}
the peasants in setting up agricultural producers’ mutual-mid teams on
extensive scale and in starting to orgunize agricultural producers” cooperal
in large numbers on the basis of [these] mutual aid teams, Nearly sin
years has since been udded to the history of this work.
By December 15, 1951, when our Party Center adopted the first Draft Re
Ntion on Mutual Aid and Cooperativization in Agricultural Product
which had first been issued to local Party organizations and carried out On)
eXpenmental basis in various areas (this document wus not published . 5
press int the form of formal resolution until March 1953),"" more trait)
agricultural producers’ cooperatives had already come into being- a Le
later, when our Party Center issued its Resolution on Agricultural P ry
Cooperatives on December 16, 1953.!' the number of agricultural o¢
tives had grown to more than 14.000, a 46-fold increase in the course

http://d


JULY — SEPTEMBER 1955 | 593

‘This resolution pointed out that between the winter of 1953 and the autumn
jarvest season of 1954, the number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives
was (0 increase from more than 14,000 to over 35,800; that is to say, an
increase of only 150 per cent was contemplated. As it turned out, the number
of cooperatives actually rose to 100,000 during this one year, representing
more than seven times [the figure of) over 14,000 cooperatives.

in October 1954, the Central Committee of our Party decided on an increase
of a further 500 per cent, from 100,000 to 600,000 cooperatives; as it turned
out, 670,000 cooperatives were established. By June 1955, after a
prelimmnary readjustment, the number decreased by 20,000 to 650,000, or
50,000 cooperatives more thun the planned figure. A total of 16,900,000
peasant households joined the cooperatives, with an average of 26 households
in cach cooperative.

These cooperatives are (o be found mostly im the several northern provinces
ihat were liberated early. As for most of the provinces in the country that were
liberated later, a number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives have been sel
up in each of them. More cooperatives have been set up in Anhui and
Zhejiang provinces, but there are not many in other provinces,

‘These cooperatives are generally small, but there are also a few large ones
among them, some with 70 to 80 households, others with over a hundred and
still others with several hundred.

These cooperatives are generally semisocialist [in nature}, but there are a
few among them that have developed into higher-stage cooperatives of a
socialist nature,"

Simultaneous with the development of the cooperativization movement in
agricultural production among peasants, a small number of socialist state
farms have already come into being in our country.’ By 1957, the number of
State farms will reach 3,038, with a total of 16,870,000 mu of cultivated land.
Of these, the number of mechanized farms will reach 141 (including those
already in existerice in 1952 and those to be set up during the period of the
First Five-Year Plan), with a total of 7,580,000 mu of cultivated land. and the
Humber of nonmechanized state farms funder) local [administration will
reach] 2,897, with a total of 9,290,000 mu of land under cultivation, State-opcrated agriculture will undergo a large-scale development during the period of
the second and third five-year plans.

In the spring of 1955, our Party Center decided that the number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives should increase to one million, This figure,
compared to the original [pumber) of 650,000 cooperatives, [represents] an
Nerease of only 350,000, or only a lithe over 50 per cent. It seems to me that
the increase may be a bit too small. Probably the figure of 650,000 existing
SOoperatives should be roughly doubled, that is, increase the number of coop-
“Titives to approximatcly 1.3 million so that the 200,000-odd xiang in the
Sountry, except in some of the border regions, may each have one or several
Small agricultural producers’ cooperatives of a semisocialist nature to serve as
Miels. These cooperatives will haye experience and become old coopera
tives after a year or two, and other people will [strive to} learn fron y
There are still fourteen months to go between now and the autunn hares -
October 1956; the realization of this plan for establishing cooperatives shows
be possible. I hope that he comrades responsible for this in the various yy
inces and autonomous regions will go back and study this matter, ni
priate plans in accordance with concrete circumstances, and report to thee
tral Committee within two months, We will then discuss the matter agaiq
make a final decision, al
The question is whether [the cooperatives) can be consolidate
people say that last year’s plun to establish 500,000 cooperatives wa
and was adventurist and that this year’s plan to establish 350,000 ce
is also too big and adventurist. They suspect thal so many cooper
established, cannot be consolidated.
Can they be consolidated or not? ;
Of course neither socialist industrialization nor socialist transformation §
easy job, There are indeed many difficulties involved in getting some 10a
lion peasant households to switch from individual farming to collective fa
ing and then to proceed to accomplish the technological transformatioy
agriculture. Nevertheless, we must haye confidence that our Party is capa
of guiding the masses in overcoming these difficulties.
As far as the question of agricultural cooperativization is concemed, 1 thit
we should be confident, first, that the poor peasants and the Jowerr
peasants among both the new and old middle peasants” who, cithe! 2cal
they are in a difficult economic position (as in the case of the poor peasants
because, even though their economic position has been improved in com
son with that before Liberation, are still not well-off (as in the case of the Id
er-middle peasants), have a certain enthusiasm about taking the socialist
and are enthusiastic in responding to the Party's call for cooperativizatio
particular, those among them who have a higher level of political conse!
ness have even more of this kind of enthusiasm. a
Second, I think we should be confident that the Party is capable of leat
the people of the whole country into socialist society, Since our Purty has
cessfully led @ great people’s democratic reyolution’® and established #98
ple’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class, it can certainly eae
people of the whole country in basically accomplishing socialist indasta!
tion and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft mdUsiiee.*”
capitalist industry and commerce in the course of roughly three TIVE
plans. We already have powerful and convincing proof of this in wgnew
as in other fields. Witness [the fact that] the first batch of 300 coapertit®®
the second batch of 13,700, and the third batch of 86,000, three hatches :
ing 100,000 cooperatives, were all established before the autumn of 199%
have all been consolidated, Why, then, should it not be possible for the! r
batch of cooperatives (550,000) established between 1954 and 1955 ane
fifth batch of cooperatives [to be established] between 1955 und 1956 (ET
tative control figure is 350,000, yet to be finally determined) to be CO®

dated as well’? h “P d
We must have faith in the masses, and we must have faith in the Party,
These are two fundamental principles, lf we doubt these two principles, we
won't be able to accomplish anything.

il

in order to accomplish, step by step, cooperativization throughout the rural
areas of the country, we must conscientiously reorganize the existing cooperauves-

We must stress paying attention to the quality of cooperatives and oppose
the tendency to pursue only [the increase in) the numbers of cooperttives and
of the peasant households [in them) without regard to quality. We must therefore pay attention fo the work of reorganizing cooperatives.

Reorganization of cooperatives is not to be done once a year, but rather two
or three times a year. A certain number of cooperatives went through a reorguntzation in the first half of this year (in certain places, the reorganization
seems to have been very cursory, conducted without yigorous effort); I suggest (hat a second reorganization be carried out in the autumn and winter of
this year, and a third in the spring and summer of next year. Of the 650,000
cooperatives now in existence, there are 550,000 that are new ones established last winter and this spring, including a batch of so-called “first category
cooperatives””° that are more consolidated. If we add to these the previous
100,000 old cooperatives that are already consolidated, the number of cooperatives already consolidated is by no means small, Can these cooperatives that
are already consolidated lead those yet to be consolidated to achieve gradual
consolidation? The answer should definitely be that it is possible.

We should treasure and not thwart any small bit of socialist enthusiasm on
the part of the peasants and cadres. We should throw in our Jot with the members and cadres of the cooperatives and the cadres of the xian, districts, and
xiong and pot thwart their enthusiasm,

Cooperatives that are determined to dissolve are only those in which all, or
Nearly all, the members are determined not to carry on. In a cooperative, if
only some members are determined to quit, let those people withdraw while
the majority stay in and carry on. If the majority are determined to quit while
only a minority want to carry on, let the majority withdraw and the minority
stay in and carry on. Even if this should happen, it will still be a good thing.
There isa very small cooperative of only six households in Hebei Province in
Which three households, [made up of] former old middle peasants, were determined to quit and were consequently allowed to withdraw, while the three
households of poor peasants’ showed that they wanted to continue on no
Matter what. As a result, they stayed in, and consequently the organization of
the cooperative was preserved, Actually, the direction indicated by these three
households of poor peasants represents the direction that the five hundred million peasants of the country [will follow}, All peasants [now] operating indi-
Vidually will eventually take the road resolutely chosen by these three households of poor peasants.


386 | MAO ZEDONG

The policy of so-called “resolute reduction” adopted in Zhejiang" yp Ag.
decision made by the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committec) resulted ya
dissolution atone stroke of 15,000 cooperatives, comprising 400 .000 pe:
houscholds, out of 53,000 cooperatives, causing great dissatisfaction gp
the masses and cadres. This was very unsound. This policy of “ei
tion” was decided on when they were gripped by a mood of panic. [ty
ansound to make such a major move without the approval of the ©
mittee, Moreover, in April 1955 the Central Committee had already ig
warning: “Don’t repeat the error of dissolving large numbers of cooper
as committed in 1953 or you will have to make self-criticism again
some comrades turned a deaf ear [to the Waring).

It seems to me that there ure two undesirable (tendencies) in the face of
tory. First, that victory makes one dizzy and makes one’s head swell so mye
that one commits “leftist” mistakes. This, of course, is bad. Second, that we
tory scares one silly so as to cause one to call for a “resolute redus F
commit rightist mistakes. This is also bad, The present situation ™
the latter category; some comrades have been scared silly by seven hile dre
thousand small cooperatives.

IV

Good preparatory work must be done Seriously before cooperatives -
established. ‘
The quality of cooperatives must be emphasized from the very beginning,
and the ey to solely seek [the increase of] their numbers p

Fight no battle without making preparations for it; fight no battle
being sure of [winning) it. This was the well-known slogan of our F
past during the period of the Revolutionary War, This slogan coe ise
applied to the work of building soctalism. To be sure of success, one 0
prepared, and be adequately prepared. A great deal of preparatory wor
be done before 4 new batch of agricultural producers’ cooperatives Cal
established in a province, a special district, or axian, Such work, in thet
consists of [the following]: (1) criticizing erroneous ideas and summ
work experience; (2) systematically and repeatedly publicizing
peasant masses our Party's principles, policies, and measures on agric
cooperativization; in doimg so, we should not only explain [to the p
the advantages of cooperativization, but should also point out the ¢
likely to be encountered in the course of cooperativization so that the pe
can be well-prepared mentally; (3) drawing up a comprebensive P
developing agricultural cooperativization throughout each province, [5
district. xian, district, or xiang in light of the actual situation and form
an annual plan out of it; (4) training cadres for running cooperanyes @
short-term [courses]; (5) developing agneultural mutual aid teams On:
scale and in large numbers, and wherever possible prevailing upon
teams to join together in organizations of united mutual aid teams 60 4519 ™
a good foundation for uniting them further <p cooperatives.

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jy (hese requirements are met, it will be possible fo basically solve the probjem of uniting quantity and quality in the development of cooperatives; however, it is Still necessary to follow the establishment of each batch of cooperayves by going immediately into the work of reorganization.

Whether a batch of cooperatives, once established, can be consolidated or
not depends first on whether the preparatory work before their establishment
is done well and second on whether the reorganization work after their estabjishment is done well.

We must rely on the xiang branches of the Party and Youth League™ for the
work of establishing and reorganizing cooperatives. Therefore, the work of
establishing and reorganizing cooperatives must be done in close coordination
with that of building and rectifying the Party and Youth League organizations
in the rural areas.

Whether in establishing cooperatives or in reorganizing them, the local
cadres in the rural areas should be the main force. They should be given
encouragement and be held responsible for the work. The cadres sent from
above should be the auxiliary force. whose function is to provide guidance
and assistance and not to take everything into their own hands.

V

in production, the agricultural producers’ cooperatives must achieve higher
crup yields than “going-it-alone” households and mutual aid teams, On no
account should [the cooperatives’) ourput remain at the same level as that of
“guing-it-alone” households or mutual aid teams. Otherwise it would mean
failure, and then what would be the point in having cooperatives at all? Stll
less should crop yields be allowed to fall, Over eighty per cent of the 650,000
agricultural producers” cooperatives that have already been estublished have
increased crop yields. This is an excellent situation; it proves that members of
agricultural producers’ cooperatives have great enthusiasm for production and
that cooperatives are superior to mutual aid teams and even more superior to
peasant households farming on their own.

To increase crop yields it is necessary: (1) to adbere to the principles of voluntary [participation] and mutual benefit; (2) to improve management (planning of production, management of production, organization of labor, etc.);
(3) to improve farming techniques (deep plowing and intensive cultivation,
Close planting in smal} clusters, increase in the area of multiple cropping.
introduction of improved seed strains, popularization of new types of farming
implements, the fight against plant diseases and insect damage, etc.); and (4)
ty increase the means of production (land, fertilizer, water conservation facililies, draft animals, farming implements, etc.). These are the few indispenste conditions for consolidating the cooperatives and ensuring growth in pro-

UCtion.
are fairly priced when they are turned over to the cooperatives, oon hethe;
not the payment period is too long; (2) whether or not the ratio betwee 9
payment for land [shares] and the payment for labor is appropriate; ‘Oh
the funds needed by the cooperatives are to be raised; (4) whether or nop
tain members of the cooperatives may use part of their labor in certain ty
sideline occupations (since the agriculwral producers’ cooperatives we
now establishing are generally still semisociulist in nature, care must be ta
to salve the above-mentioned four problems properly so that the principley
mutual benefit between the poor peasants and the middle peasants is not y
lated, and voluntary [participation] can only be realized on the paar el
benefit); (5) how much [land] members of the cooperatives shook
private plots;”' and (6) the question of the class composition of o
membership, and 50 on.

Let's take up the question of the class composition of the coop
membership. | think that, in the next year or two, wherever populariz; tio
cooperatives has just begun or has taken place recently, as in the case ¢
areas of the country al present, [the cooperatives] should be {made me
active elements among the following sectors; (1) poor peasants, (2) Jow
middle peasants among the new middle peasants, and (3) lower-middh
ants among the old middle peasants. We should get them to org
Those among the members of these sectors who are not yet active
the time being should not be dragged in against their will. The coo
can admit them in groups when their level of [political] consciousness ti
risen and they have become interested in cooperatives. People in these sector
have a rather similar economic status. They cither are still living a hin
({as in the case of] poor peasants who have been given land and are much)!
ter off than before Liberation, but whose lives ure still difficult owing 1)
shortage of human resources, draft animals, and farming implements) oF
still not well-off ([as in the case of) lower-middle peasants). Theref
have the enthusiasm (o form cooperatives. Even so, their enthusiasm
degree for a yuriety of reasons; some of them are very enthusiastic.
not So enthusiastic yet, and still others prefer to wait and see. Ther
must take a period of time to educate all those who do not want to join
atives yet, even though they may be poor or lower-middle peasants; ,
patiently wait for them to become [politically] conscious, and we must me
violate the principle of voluntary [participation] and drag them in against the
will.

As for the upper-middle peasants among the new and old middle peasat
that is, all the middle peasants who are economically relatively well-a™s
except for some who already have the [political] consciousness fo take ™
socialist road and are really willing to join the cooperatives, and can be aGH®s
ted, the rest should not be admitted into the cooperatives for the time DEMe
and we certainly should not drag them in against their will. This is bee
they do not yet have the [political] consciousness to take the socialist (#8
they will make up their minds to join the coopertives only when the maje™
of people in the rural a: when the p idztse pad th

ry] ,
LS ) EY

.
aves has reached or even surpassed that of these well-to-do middle peasants
and they feel that it is to their disadvantage in all respects to continue to go it
gione and that it is in their interest (6 join the cooperatives.

So those who are economically poor or not well-off (approximately sixty to
seventy per cent of the rural population) should first be grouped according to
their level of [political] consciousness and should form cooperatives in
various batches within a few years, and then the well-off middle peasants will
be drawn in. In this way We can avoid commandism,”

For the next few years, in all areas where cooperativization has not been
basically completed, landlords and rich peasants should resolutely not be
gecepted into the cooperatives. In areas where cooperativization has basically
been completed, those cooperatives that are already consolidated may, under
certain conditions, admit by stages and in groups former landlord and rich
peasant elements who have long since given up exploitation and who engage
in labor and abide by the laws and decrees of the government, and may allow
them to participate in collective labor while continuing to reform them
through labor.

Vi

As far as the development [of cooperativization] is concerned, the question
al present is not that of criticizing adventurist advance. It ts wrong to say that
the present development of cooperatives has “surpassed what is practically
possible” and “overtaken the level of | political) consciousness of the masses."
This is how things stand in China: [the country has) a vast population,
insufficient cultivated land (there are only three mu per capita on the average
in the country, and one mu or even less in many areas of the southern prov:
inces), frequent natural calamities (every year Jarge areas of farmland suffer
to varying degrees from flood, drought, windstorm, frost, hail, or insect
Pests) and backward methods of management, Consequently. though the life
Of the broad masses of peasants has improved or greatly improved since the
land reform, the life of many of them is still difficult; many are stil! not welloff, and well-off peasants are, relatively speaking, in the minority, Therefore,
the majority of the peasants are enthusiastic about taking the socialist road,
Their enthusiasm is being daily heightened by our country's socialist industrilization and its achievements. For them there is no way out other than social»
sm. Peasants in this situation make up sixty (o seventy per cent of the coun-
'ry's rural population. In other words, the only way for the majority of the
Peasants in the country to attain the goal of shaking off poverty, improving
their livelihood, and resisting natural calamities is to unite and advance along
the high road of socialism. This feeling is mpidly growing among the broad
Masses of poor peasants and peasants who are not well-off. Well-to-do or
fairly well-to-do peasants, who make up only twenty (to thirty per cent of the
“untey's rural population, are wavering, and some [of them) are bent on following the capitalist road. As I said earlier, many among the poor peasants
4nd those not well-off, because of their low [politicul] consciousness, still


on) | MAO ZEDONG

take a wail-and-see attitude for the time being, and they, loo, are wy
Nevertheless, compared with the well-to-do peasants, it i¢ relatively ,
them (to accept socialism. This is the actual existing situation, Yet some »
commides jgnore this situation and choose to believe that the several ty hur
thousund newly formed small and semisocialist agricultural pce
eratives have already * ‘surpassed what is actually } possible” and “ove
level of the masses’ [political] consciousness.” This is fhecaaaaats CV) ae
looking only at the comparatively small number of well-to-do peasany ak
neglecting the overwhelming majority —the poor peasants and those pegs
who are not well-off. This is the first kind of wrong thinking.

These comrades also underestimate the strength of the of ie bea
leadership in the countryside and the wholehearted support of the b
ses of peasants for the Communist Party. In their view, since it frie
enough as it is for our Party to consolidate the several hundred
small-scale cooperatives, big expansion is inconcerable, Th
pessimistically describe the present state of the Party's work of leadingyy
cultural cooperativization as having * “outstripped the level of ee ei
experience.” Truc, socialist revolution is a new revolution. In the p
only had experience in bourgeois democratic revolution but not ins
revolution. Yet how can we gain such experience? Will we gain uy it
buck and doing nothing or will we gain it by plunging into the si :
socialist revolution and learning amidst the struggles? How aa
experience in industrialization if we do not carry out the Five-Year
do not engage in undertaking the work of socialist industrialization? A)
tural coopefativization is incorporated in the Five-Year Plan, if we pe no
guide the peasants in forming one or a few agricultural cooper ae
siang or yillage, let me ask you, where will “the level of baa
ence” come from and how will it be mised’ Evidently, the idea th
ent development of the ugricultural producers’ cooperatives has ”
the level of the cadres’ experience” is a wrong onc. This is the second
wrong thinking.

The way these comrades look at problems is wrong. They do not le
essential or principal aspects of the problems but emphasize things thar are cc
essential of principal in nature. [t should be pointed out that problerns ti
not essential or principal are not to be overlooked but they must be re
one by one, However, we should not take them to be |something off &
or principal [importance] and thereby get our bearings confused.

We must have faith, first. ee
tuke, step by step, the socialist road under the leadership of the Party at *
vod, that the Party is capable of leading the peasants in taking the S06 a
road. These two points are the essential and principal aspects of the MaRS
Without this faith we would be unable to basically accomplish the builtin
socialism in a penod of about three five-year plans.

Vil .

‘The Soviet Union's great historical experience of completing the const

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JULY — SEPTEMBER 1955 | 60!

yon of socialism inspires the people of our country and gives us full
confidence in building socialism in our country. However, there are divergent
yiews even on this question of international experience, Some comnades disapprove of the Party Center's policy of keeping the steps taken toward our
country’s agricultural cooperativization at pace with those taken toward the
country’s socialist industrialization, even though this policy has been proven
to be a correct one in the Soviet Union,” They believe that as far as industrialization is concemed, the speed set at present may be adopted, but that agricultural cooperativization should proceed at a particularly slow pace and need
pot keep in step with industridlization. This is to ignore the experience of the
Soviet Union. These comrades do not realize that socialist industnalization
cannot proceed in isolation from the cooperativization of agriculture. by the
first place, [as] we all know, the present level of production of commodity
grain” and industrial raw materials is very low, whereas the state's need for
{hese materials grows year by year, This is a sharp contradiction. If within the
period of roughly three five-year plans we cannot basically accomplish the
solution of the problem of the cooperativization of agriculture, that is t say,
{if we cannot bring about] @ leap in agriculture from small-scale farming with
animal-drawn farming implements to large-scale mechanized farming, including large-scale state-organized [projects for] migration and resettlement of the
|peasant| population and land reclamation involving the use of machinery (the
plan is to reclaim 400 to 500 million mu of wasteland in the course of three
five-year plans), We will not be able to resolve the contradiction between the
annually increasing need for commodity grain and industrial raw materials
und the generally very low output of staple crops af present, and we will
encounter extremely great difficulties in our cause of socialist industrialization
and will be unable to accomplish it, The Soviet Union once faced the same
problem in the course of building soctulism und solved it by guiding and
developing agricultural Cooperativization in a planned way, and we can only
solve the problem by the same method. In the second place, some of our comrades have not considered the following two matters in Connection with each
other; namely, heavy industry, the most important branch of socialist industrialization,” with its production of tractors and other farm machinery, its production of chemical fertilizer, its production of modem means of transportation, oil, electric power for agricultural use, etc., all of this can be utilized, or
Utilized extensively, only on the basis that agriculture bas achieved Jurge-seale
Cooperativization. We are now engaged not only in a revolution in the social
AyStem to transform private ownership into public ownership, but also in a
revolution in technology to change from handicraft production to large-scale
moder mechanized production, and these two revolutions are interrelated.
Under the conditions that prevail in our country, agriculture must go through
Sooperalivization before it can adopt the usage of large machines (in capitalist
countries, [this is attained) through the development of agriculture in a capilalist way). Therefore, we should on no account separate industry and agricul-
{ure or socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of agriculture, or
tegard them as (Wo maticrs isolated from each other, and on no account
should we emphasize the one at the expense of the other. On we!
Soviet experience has also indicated the direction for us, and yet sp
comrades pay no attention and always see these matters as isolated ay
nected. In the third place. some of our comrades have also not considers
following two matters in connection with each other; namely, large ame,
of funds are needed to accomplish national industrialization and the (rine,
mation of technology in agriculture, and a considerable portion of them -
be accumulated in the area of agriculture. Apart from directly levying tay
Agnculture, this is [fo be achieved by} developing production in Be:
[to produce] in lange quantities consumer goods needed by the p
exchanging them for the peasants’ commodity grain and mw yp
light industry, so that the material needs of both the peasants and ‘ioe
be met and funds can also be accumulated for the state, Fhe
scale development of light industry requires not only the deve
heavy industry, but of agriculture as well. This is because taree-aa ae
ment of light industry cannot be realized on the basis of a small peas:
omy, but depends on large-scale agricultural [operations], which in 6
ry means socialist cooperativized agriculture, This is because only th
of agriculture can give the peasants » purchasing power | don’t knoy
many times greater than the present [level], The Soviet Union hus algo
nished us with experience in this matter, but some of our comrades pay
attention [to it], They always take the stand of the bourgeoisie, the rich pe:
ants, or the well-to-do middle peasants with spontaneous: tendencies tows
capitalism and look after the interests of the comparatively few. They ne
take the stand of the working class and look out for the interests of the wh
country and people.
vu

Some comrades have also found a rationale from the history of the Comm
nist Party of the Soviet Union for their criticism of what they call im
and adventurist advance in the present work of agricultural cooperit
in our country. Does not A Short Course on the History of the Cop
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolxheviks)™ tell us that during a certain pene
time many of the [Soviet Union's] local Party organizanons come immed
error of impetuosity and adventurist advance” on the question of the pi
cooperativization? Should we not pay attention to this international ©
ence?

I think we should pay attention to this Soviet experience and must 0
any impetuous and adventurist thinking that foregoes preparation and
gards the level of political consciousness of the peasant masses, but we SHO@"
not allow some of our comrades fo use this Soviet experience a5 & 5"
acreen (o cover up their idea of moving at a snail's pace.

What is our Party Center's decision on how to carry out agricultural €
tivization in China?

First, 1 is prepared (0 basically accomplish this plan in eighteen yeu

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JULY — SBrIbMbEK 14D | TAD

riod of a little over three years from the founding of the People’s Republic
of China in October 1949 to 1952 was devoted to accomplishing the task of
restoring the economy of our country. In the sphere of agriculture during this
period, in addition to carrying out such tasks us the land reform™ and the resjoration of agricultural production, we greatly expanded the organization of
agricultural producers’ mutual aid teams in all the old liberated areas” and
also began to organize agricultural producers’ cooperatives of a semisocialist
jature and gained some experience. This was followed by the First Five-Year
plan, Which began in 1953 and has been in operation for nearly three years
now, [during which time] our agricultural cooperativization movement has
been Spreading on a nationwide scale and our experience has likewise
increased, The period from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to
the completion of the Third Five-Year Plan covers eighteen years, dunng
which time we plan to basically uccomplish the socialist transformation of
gericulture together with the basic completion of socialist industrialization
and of socialist transformation of handicraft industry and capitalist industry
and commerce, Is this possible? Soviet experience tells us that this is entirely
possible. In the Soviet Union the civil war came to an end in 1920; the sevenicen years from 1921 to 1937 brought the cooperativization of agriculture to
completion, and the main part of the work of cooperativization in their case
was accomplished in the six years from 1929 to 1934. Although, as stated in A
Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), when some local Party organizations in the Soviet Union once committed the so-called error of being “dizzy with success,”” it was quickly corrected. By a great effort the Soviet Union eventually accomplished the
socialist transformation of its entire agriculture successfully and at the same
time brought about a tremendous technological transformation in agriculture,
This road traveled by the Soviet Union is our very model.

Second, we have adopted the method of step-by-step advance in the socialist
iransformation of agriculture, As the first step, we called on the peasants, in
accordance with the principles of voluntary [participation] and mutual benefit,
to organize in the countryside agricultural producers’ mutual aid teams that
had only certain rudimentary clements of socialism and comprised a few to a
dozen or so households each. Then as the second step, we called on the peasants to organize, on the basis of these mutual aid teams and still in accordance
with the principles of voluntary [participation] and mutual benefit, small agricultural producers’ cooperatives that are semisocialist in nature and characterized by the pooling of landholdings as shares and by unified management,
Only later, as the third step, will we call on the peasants to combine further
and organize, on the basis of these small semisocialist cooperatives and in
accordance with the same principles of voluntary participation and mutual
benefit, Jarge agricultural producers’ cooperatives that are fully socialist in
nature," (These steps] make it possible for the peasants to gradually raise
their level of socialist consciousness through their own experience and to
gradually change their way of life so as to lessen their feeling of an abrupt


(4 / MAO ZEDONG

change in their way of life. Taking these steps will basically allow iy gy
a drop in crop production during a period of time (say, the | first} Oe
years); instead of a drop, it must ensure an increase in production ew
and this can be done,” Of the 650,000 existing agricultural producer® a
eratives, more than eighty per cent have increased production, while oy 1
per cent haye not had any increase or decrease in production, and 4 fe
cent have shown a decrease. Things with the two latter catevore.
going well, particularly the category with a drop in production, ana
effort must be made to reorganize [them]. Since more than eighty pe
the cooperatives have increased production (the margin of ine:
to thirty per cent), while over ten per cent of them, though ify ing
increase nor decrease in production in the first year, may increase f
in the second year after going through reorganization, and since e
per cent with a drop in production may increase production or b
through reorganization, the development of cooperativization ison
healthy and can bayically guarantee an increase in production enka r
decrease. Moreover, these steps constitute a good course for training ead
by [carrying out] the steps, management and technical personnel for the co
eratives cun be gradually trained in Jarge numbers,
Third, each yeara control figure” for the growth in agricultural cooperauly
zation must be worked out in light of the actual situation, and the cooperati!
zation work must be checked several times. In this way concrete steps |
annual expansion [of cooperativization) in each province, xian, and «i
be decided on according to changes in the circumstances und the quulity &
[their respective) achievements. In some areas [expansion] can be hal cd m r
porarily while reorganization is being carried out; in other areas, ¢:
and reorganization can be carried out simultancously. Some membe J
in cooperatives may be allowed to withdraw, and in individual cases
erative may be allowed to be dissolved temporarily. In some areas new 0
eratives should be set up in large numbers, while in others it will
increase the number of peasant households in the existing cooper
every province or stan, after establishing a batch of coopératives, th
be a period of time in which expansion is halted and a reorganization can
out before proceeding with the establishment of another batch of
tives. The idea of not allowing any patise or intermission is wrong. AX wrth
work of inspection of the cooperativization movement, the Party Center
Party committees of every province. autonomous region, municip
[special] district must take a firm hold of the work and see that [inspection
done not only once but several times a year As soon as a problenr erope™
tackle it right away; don't let problems pile up and then try to resolve (hem!)
at once. Make criticism in good time; don't get into the prictice off eo
criticism after the fact. For instance, in the first seven months of this yearn
Central Committee alone called three conferences, including thts one,
rades in responsible positions from the localities to discuss the quesvOM™
agricultural cooperativization. Using this method of taking such measur

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JULY — SEPTEMBER 1955 / G5

yre suitable to local conditions and of giving timely guidance ensures that we
ynake fewer mistakes and that, when mistakes are made, they will be quickly
corrected.

Judging from the conditions described above, can it not be suit that the guiding principle of the Party Center on the question of agricultural cooperativipation is a correct one and therefore one that ensures the healthy development
of the movement? I think we can and should say so; to evaluate this principle
ys “adventurist advance” is totally incorrect,

IX

Proceeding from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, or the
well-to-do middle peasants With a spontancous tendency toward capitalism,
jome comrades have taken a wrong view on the eXtremely important question
of the alliance between the workers and the peasants. They believe that the
cooperativization movement is presently in a very dangerous situation, and
(hey advise Us to “get off the horse quickly,” [halting our advance} along the
road of cooperativization that we are presently taking, They have wamed us;
“If [you] don’t get off the horse quickly, (you) run the risk of disrupting the
alliance of the workers and peasants.” We believe the very opposite [to be
rue], that if [we] don't get on the horse quickly, there will be the risk that the
wiliance of workers and peasants will be disrupted. It appears that there is the
difference of only a single word here. One is to get off the horse while the
other is to get on it, Yet it indicates the difference between two lines. As
everybody knows, we already have a worker-peasunt alliance built on the
busis of the bourgeois democratic revolution, a revolution that opposed imperialism and feudalism, that took the land from the landlords and distributed it
to the peasants to free them from [the bondage of] feudal ownership. But this
revolution is now over, and feudal ownership has been abolished. What exists
in the rural areas today is capitalist ownership by the rich peasants and individual ownership by peasants as extensive as a vast ocean, It is evident to all
that the spontaneous forces of capitalism in the rural areas have been growing
weadily in the lust several years, new rich peasants are emerging cverywhere,
and many well-to-do middle peasants are striving to become nich peasants.
Because of insufficient means of production, however, many poor peasants
are still bogged down in poverty. Some of them are in debt, and others have
sold or rented out their land. If this situation is allowed to develop further,
polarization in the countryside will become more and more serious every day.
Those peasants who lose their land and those who still [live] in poverty will
bear 4 prudge against us, and they will complain that we are not coming to
their rescue when they ure in peril, not helping them overcome their
difficulties. Those well-to-do middle peasants heading in the direction of capttalism will also be dissatisfied with us, for their demands will never be met if
Wwe do pot intend to tuke the capitalist road. Can the alliance of the workers


606 | MAO ZEDONG

along with the gradual realization of socialist industrialization and 6f ene).
transformation of handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce, 1p a
say, Carrying out cooperativization and eliminating the rich peasant pepe
system and the individual economy system in the countryside so at
people in the rural areas will become well-off together. We believe th
in this way can the alliance between the workers and peasants be tq
dated. Otherwise, this alliance runs the risk of being disrupted. Th Bee eC
rades who advise us to “get off the horse” are completely wrong es
ing.

x

It is inevitable that there will soon be a nationwide high tide of so
transformation m the countryside. This must be recognized right ne
spring of 1958, the end of the last year of the First Five-Year Plan i
beginning of the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, there will be al
250 million people or about 55 million peasant households (okies
half persons per household as an average), that is, half of the total ru
lation, in semisocialist cooperatives. By that time, semisocialist transform
Gon of the agricultural economy in many xian and some provinces will r
been basically accomplished, and a small number of cooperatives in eve
part of the country will have developed from being ors int
fully socialist . By 1960, [toward the end of] the first half of the §
Year Plan, we shall have basically completed the semisocialist trar
of [that part of | the agricultural economy that involves the tbe
rural population, By then, the number of cooperatives changing fro
semisocialist into being fully socialist will have increased. During the
of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, social reform will remnals idl
cipal [aspect] of the reform in the countryside. and technical transfo
will be the secondary [aspect]; the number of large-scale ay
machines will certainly increase, but not by any large margin, Dui
period of the Third Five-Year Plan, social reform and technical tran
tion will proceed simultancously in the reform of the countryside: wil
be an increase each year in the use of large-scale agricultural machines, J ne
the field of social reform, from 1960 on, semisocialist cooperatives will rm
ually develop by stages and in batches into fully socialist ones. Not until)
socialist transformation of its social und economic system has beet
completely accomplished and, in the field of technology, machinery is i "
all sections and places where operation by machinery is applicable, Wi
social and economic outlook of China change completely. In light 0
country’s economic conditions, the period of technological tranfe ™
be longer than that of social reform. It is estimated that it will take ‘om
four to five five-year plans, or twenty (o twenty-five years, to tails
plete the technological transformation of agriculture on a nationwide 3
The whole Party should strive for the fulfillment of this great task.

XI

There must be overall planning, and leadership must be strengthened.
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(here must be plans for the staged realization of cooperativization in the
whole country and throughout every province, [special] distnet, xian, district,
und xiang. Moreover, plans must be constantly revised in light of the actual
conditions of progress in the work. The Party and Youth League organizations
at each level of province, (special) district, xian, district, and xiang must pay
<erious attention to rural problems and earnestly improve their leadership in
rural work. Comrades in major positions of responsibility in the local Party
and Youth League organizations at all levels must get a firm grip on the study
of the work of agricultural cooperativization and become knowledgeable
about it, In short, we must take the initiative, we must not be passive: we must
strengthen leadership, we must not abandon it.

xi

in August 1954 (this is no longer news), the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reported:
Along with the formation and expansion of the upsurge of rural cooperativization, mutual aid, and cooperative organizations of various types
and the masses of people of various strata in the rural areas have all, to
varying degrees, started to move [ahead], The existing agricultural producers’ cooperatives are planning and fermenting [a drive] to expand
their membership. and the agricultural producers’ mutual aid teams that
are the targets for the formation of cooperatives are also planning and
fermenting [a drive) to increase the number of thew [member] households; even those mutual aid teams lacking the prerequisites [for cooperativization] are anxious to develop further and move up to a higher level.
Some [people among the} masses are busy trying to jon new coopera
tives, others to join existing ones. Those who are not prepared to join
cooperatives this year are nevertheless actively preparing to find a slot
for themselves in mutual aid teams. The scope of activity is very broad,
and 4 mass movement has already been formed, This is a new and outstanding feature in the great development of agricultural conperativization. But because some leading comrades in certain xian and districts
have nol been able to keep pace with this new feature and strengthen the
leadership in time, certain unhealthy phenomena have begun to arise ina
number of Gut and nim (note: in Heilongjiang Province the cun is an
administrative unit corresponding (o the xiang in the provinces south of
the Great Wall, and the run, which is not an administrative unit, is equivalent to the village in the latter provinces), such as, in the masses” selfmotivated search for targets [i.e., people to bring into cooperatives as fellow members], “the strong seck out the strong, ostracizing peasants who
art hadly-off,” “disunity is being fermented through competition to
recruit backbone elements and members,” “backbone elements are sticking together blindly,” and “the nch peasants and those well-to-do peasants with a fairly strong capitalist way of thinking seize the opportunity
to organize lower-level mutual aid teams or rich peasant cooperatives.”
and so on, All this anply demonstrates that. under the conditions in
which ugricultural cooperativization is undergoing great developmen,
is no longer enough to think only in terms of and within the confines -
establishing new cooperatives when implementing the Party’s pe
guiding the movement. It is necessary to think in terms of the e
(note; that is, the entire wang) and of promoting the agricultural ¢¢
hivization movement in its full scope, and to give consideration
expanding the old cooperatives and to establishing new ones, |
developing the cooperatives and to raising the level of the r
teams, and both to [the work for) this year and to [the work fort
year, and even the year after. Only in this way can the Party's py ;
implemented in its entirety and the agricultural cooperativization me
thent pushed forward in a healthy manner.
We mentioned here that “some leading comrades in certain xidn and distri
have not been able to keep pace with this new feature and strenyt
leadership in time.” Is this the case i Heilongjiang Province only! Is th
case in certain xian and districts only’ As I see it, it is possible to find in:
leading organs across the country people who typify this grave situa’
which the leadership lags behind the movement.
‘The report of the Heilongjiang Provincial [Party] Committee also said:
Xigin cun in Shuangeheng xian has carried out overall planning
cun as a [basic] unit by adopting the method of combining lew
with voluntary participation of the masses, This is an innovation ip
ing the big expansion of cooperativization, Its important effect lies
in the fact that through [such] planning the Party's class Jine in th
tryside has been fully implemented, the unity between the poor ai
dle peasants has been strengthened, and a vigorous struggle has bee
launched against the rich peasant tendency, Backbone elements hia)
been properly deployed in the interests of overall cooperativi
agriculture. Relations between the [various] cooperatives anid t
the cooperatives and the [mutual aid) teams have been read ssid
strengthened so that the agricultural cooperativization movemen
advanced in a planned way and with an overall approach,
through such planning, the work of developing agricultural coope!
zation on a large scale has been allocated through specific assignmer
the leadership at the basic level and to the broad masses so that
branches at the cunt level have understood how to give guidances, th
cooperatives have understood how to keep on advancing, the new ©
eratives have understood how to establish themselves, and the mv
aid teams have understood the direction in which they must golor
to a higher level, Thus the initiative and enthusiasm of -_
branches at the cun level and of the broad masses have been f
brought into play, and the correct principle of relying on the F
branch and on the experience and wisdom of the masses has been MUN
carried out. Finally, it is precisely through such planning that it 15 pe =
ble to acquaint [Oneself] further with the true situation in the country Sl@®

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and (o carry out the Party’s policy in a concrete and comprehensive manner. Hence, it has been possible to avoid impetuosity and adventurist
advance as well as conservatism and the [the practice of] letting things
drift along on their own, so that the Center's policy of “active leadership
and steady advance’’ has been correctly implemented.

How were the various “unhealthy phenomena’’ mentioned in the report of
the Heilongjiang. Provincial [Party] Committee tackled? The provincial
|Party) committee's report did not answer this question directly, But a report
of the Shuangcheng xian [Party] committee was appended to the report of the
provincial Party committee, and this report did answer the question. This
report said:

Asa result of carrying out overall planning by combining the leadership
of the Party branch and the voluntary participation of the masses,
the deviation of barring the households that are badly off from the cooperatives has been corrected, the problem of excessive concentration of
backbone elements in one place has been solved, the phenomenon of
competition in recruiting backbone elements and members has disappeared, the relations between the cooperatives and the mutual aid teams
have grown closer, the rich and well-to-do peasants have failed in their
altempt (o organize rich peasant cooperatives or lower-level [mutual aid)
teams, and the plan of the Party branch has been basically fulfilled. Two
old cooperatives have expanded their membership by forty per cent, the
frameworks of six new cooperatives have been set ap, and wo mutual
aid teams have been reorganized. It is estimated that if everything is
done well, the whole cun will be cooperativized neat year (ie., in
1955). At present, the masses in the entire cun ure actively engaged in
fulfilling this year’s plan for expanding agricultural cooperativization
and doing a good job of increasing production and ensuring [a good] harvest. The cun cadres all share the opinion: “It's lucky we've done it this
way; otherwise things would have been in a mess. Not only would things
have been in bad shape this year, but next year would have been affected
as well.”

in my opinion, let us just do things that way.

Overall planning and strengthening of leadership — this is our policy.

Notes

| For more information on these struggles, ste tear 1960 Reading Noves, note 9; K. Walker
(Aprilsfine 1966), pp, 216-243; Kang Chao (1970); CR. 884 (uly 18, 1969), 663; and Su Xing
(1965) (trans. in JPRS, 324/14, 32420, 32793)

2. See R. Levy (1976), pp, 108-522

4. See K, Walker (Apritdimne (966), and R. Lewy (1976), pp. 122 19

4. Maw was referring to the common practice i cuditional Chiru for the fect of women of the
Upper ane middie classes (en te botind in auch a way that their growth is artificially and forcibly
Sunwe and they in fact hecome mikshapen. According tn ancient documents such as the yuefle
(hallocds) of the carly Han dynasty (ew. 3nd-2nd century Caclaciatee lnc talon
ancient thines; I was popularized in courtly and nobility circles in the tate-temth o¢
the rulet of thie-state. of she Southern “Teniy. (reigning 961-976)! and since: thas
common characteristic of upper-class women in Chinese sociwty. tyler:
Chinese wamen in madera times as a mark of the nppressiveness and sckina)

“‘feudaliic™ suciety. Though it was romantically deseribedl tn clissical thecaari i
lian, of golden lotus, Was coined for the practice) it is generally condemned ii tedern devs
though it was not officially cultawed by the government until the cstablishremt of ihe fe

5. For some indication of what these classifications mean in the carly 19506, See t at
12, 1950, notes | ant 2. For agricultural provlucers’ cooperatives (APCs) see beat Oct 15,
sote 2. .

6, See text Aug. 12, 1953, note 9

7, Between 199) and 1934, land redistnbution and low-level mutual aid Organi:
or peels erica! ncaa ace paseo aU he. \
aimed at activating the peasants and solving the problem of agricultural labor
ep on el ini oan me =
labor exchange teams in Norther Shaanxi and nvutual aid in North China, East Chins
Northeast is ter the situation during the period of the War of Resistance against

&, This refers to the formation of twelve-household agricultural producem® cooper
als called collective farms) in Miaodianzi, af No.5 xiang, in the Gaogtan district of A
early 1944. Lt enutiled the collective concenrated wilization of labor and fertilizer
other technologicul innovations,

9. The Draft Resolution on Mutial Aid and Cooperatrvizabon in Agricultural Ppa
adupted on December 15, 1951, Oy te Ceaerat Co haedo be CC Ca
Party branches at all fevels 10 be implemented on a selective experimental basis, (See M
cular to Party units, text Dec, 15, 1951.) On Febniary 15, 1953, these resolutions w
amended on ihe basis of experience gained in practical implementation anid
officially by the Central Committee, For a translation of this document see T. Chen (I
218-221. The doctiment itself was first published in RATRA (March 26. 1953), and
(April, 1953), 118-121. See also SR, p. 41K, note 2. According to the Xuanfi po
soually took part in the drafting of this draft resolution, See text Dec, 15, 1951, 0 note

10. Here the RMRA version has February intead of March There appears tp be sii
sion in terms of dating in other secondary commentaries a5 well, See 7, Chen (1967), py:
Kang Chao (1970). We believe the SW, V, duting of Murch to be correet. (See previo

1}, This refers vo the “Resolution on the Development of Agricultaral Producers’
tives,"’ December 16, 1953. It was published tn XHWYB (Feb. 1954), 143
in transiation in 4 supplement to People's China (April 1, 1954). For # be
cussion of the debate within the CPC over the issue of agricultural :
between 1951 and 1953, sce Kang Chae (1970), pp. I-18. Also see SM,
note 3.

12. See text Oct, 15, 1953, note 2.

13, See text Mar, 19, 1953, note 4.

14. “Dung the cooperative transformation lear .£.. cnoperativzation| of agriculture,
who were formerly poor peasants bul rose to middle peasant status after the apranan [edt
land) reform were called new middle peasants Those who were formerly meiddle 7 1
whose economic status remained unchanged were called old middie peasancs. (SW. Vf
noe 1.)

This differentiation wes clarified in considerably paler devil in the September 1964 Re
Drafi ef the “Provisions of the Ceotral Comuniti¢e of the Communist Panty of China ©
Certain Specific Policies Regarding (he Socialist Exlication Movement in the Rural Are -
Shaogi was the main architect of this docurneat and the policies advocated in general in the aes"
ment were later severely criticized by Mao. pr acl penetra tay
antry on the Whole was not affected, For a discussion of this last document sec K Baum amt Fad
Telwes (196%).

wy

ptt
“—

=

rj Ts ,


JULY — SEPTEMBER 1955 / 45/1

15, See teat Jan. 15, 1953, note 2,

16, “Atthat time, agnculfural cooperatives which wore well run, middling and poorly run were
yuually called Class 1, Class 1 sr Class Ill cooperslives respectively.” (SW, V, p, 207, note 2.)
The descriptions of these three types, or classes, of cooperatives sugged that the chissification
was done with rather impressionitic standards (SR, p, 419, note 7), Accewtfing to un articte in the
journal Xwexi (Study), 12 (1955), 32, these demarcations differed also from place to place

(7. “The three poor peasant houscholds here referred to were thase of Wang Yu-kun [Wang
Vukun], Wang Hsiao-chi (Wang Xisoqi| and Wang Hsiao-pang [Wang Xivopang] in Nanwanclneang [Nunwanzhuang| village, Anping County [xian] of Hopei [Hebei] province, ‘The agricul:
\ural producers’ cooperative they set up was the predecessor of the present Nanwangchuany
|Nanwanziuang] Brigade of the people's commune of the same mame." (SW, V, p. 207, note 3.)
ior a slightly more detailed description of the situation se¢ SR. pp, 419-420, note 8. Sce alse text
Dec. 27, 1955(2), note 9.

18. The “resolute reshiction” policy mentioned Were and in the next two paragraphs refers to the
policy of “halting, reduction, and reorganization” advocated by the faction ted by Lin Shacryt at
the Third National Conference on Rural Work in May 1955, From the autumn of 1954 1 the
spring of 1955, the number of cooperatives grew frm abuut 100,000 to about 650,000, and in the
spring of 1955, the Central Committee of the CPC resolved to have the number of cooperatives
increased! 10 | million before the autumn trarvest of 1956. The Liv faction then argued that the
establishenent of cooperatives had gone beyond the limits of practicability and had gone ahead of
ihe bevels of the masses” socialist consciousness and the standard of the cadres’ experience. Arbiwarily they called for, and in certain localities carried out, the reduction of the number of cooperarives. It was later claimed that in the two months between May and July 1955, over 200,000
cooperatives were disbanded. This policy was not limited to Zhejiang but spread across the counry and was conducted in many, though not all, areas after its promulgation by the Third Nutional
Conference on Rural Work.

19. We have no concrete data on the dimensions of this “cuthack" iy 1953 mentioned here by
Mac. The formal launching of the cooperativizating movement (that is, the establishment of agricultural producers” cooperatives |APC's}) did not begin until the end of 1953 und early 1954,
However, mutual aid tears were established on a national scale after the promulgation of the first
Draft Decision on Mutual Aid and Cooperativization in Agriculture (December 195). This docision was ratified in finalized form in February 1953. According to RMSC (1952), pp. 356-357,
many of the mutual aid teams, by becoming year-round mutual aid units, had already transformed
themselves into cooperatives of a transitional nature. These were Jater Known as lower-level ur
elementary APC"s. (See text Oct, 15, 1953, note 2.) There ts therefore evidence of considerable
growth in the establishment of clementary APC’s in 1953 which undoubtedly would have elicited
aignificant response. While we do not have concrete or statistical data regarding the form anc!
dfimensians of this reaction, we de have some conments dbout the situation, (See F, Schurmann
11971), pp, 439-440, and Mao's own speech on the subject of cooperativization to the members
of the Rural Work Deparrment of the Central Committee of the CPC - teat October 15, 1953, and
SW. pp, 133M),

20. See text Feb. 18, 1951, mote %, and text June HW), 1953, source note,

21. This refers to small plots of tand that belonged to members of cooperatives and were
retained by them in view of their need to grow vegetables and other garden produce not subjected
(0 taxation of planned unified purchasing of the cooperative system. Their existence was affirmed
(n the “Model Regulations for an Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative” of late 1955, In 1958, at
the beginning of commune establishment, they were abolished; they were later reinstituted, their
(otal area being limited to 5 per cent of the land within the cormune jurtediction. Since then the
iasues of the existence, size. roles, und consequences of “private plots” have been a focus of considemble struggle.

22. See text June 6, 195041), note 11.

23. Mao's reference to the Soviet experience bere is quite imporum as the Soviet Umon's
experience in coordinating agricultural and ymdustrial development was (perceived quite
differently by different groups in the leadership. Mao Was referring 1 the Soviet experience jn
order to counter the general understanding of thar experience held by those coalesced -
Shaogi, Deng Zihui (director of the Party's Rural Work Department), and others,
ins with te ptfidnl Sco ix pontisn thes a Savdeh weparitnee tame eceene ae
operativization mast he preceded by the mechanization of the agricultural means ofp
that this was the necessary sequence of the two developments. Mao argued to the co %
Soviet experience in fact demonstrated that agricultural cooperutivization had! taken p ecw be
agricultural mechanization and this was the commect sequence. See Mao's “Reading Ny
Soviet Textbook on Political Economy" (text 1960 Reading Notes), For more oo the pe
between agricultural and industrial development in the Soviet Unina during the 1920» am tio
see C. Bettelheim (1978).
24, “Commodity grain” refers to grain produced for exchange, not for dineot ©
the’ produces, that, the amount of pein thal. producers could panduce abeve tes
needed for their own food and seed supply. Thus this amount of commodity grain would h
smount that could be counted on as the basis of food supply for urban areas and poor areas

# potential basis for international trade, /
25. The relationship between heavy and light industry and Mao's concept of each is: bo
his. speech “On the Ten Major Relationships” (text April 25, 1956). See also F pr
(1968), p. 80
26, In 1938, under Stalin's direction, a new history of the Communist Party of the Soviet t
was compiled and published to bring the past into fine with the purges within the
resulted in the Shar Course itr the History of the CPSU (Bolshevik), which was in
Stalin's Problem of Leninism bat which also appeared in separate form as the £
Comnnmist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), Shurt Caurre,
27, See text Aug. 12, 1953¢1), note 22,

28. See text Feb. 18, 1951, mote 2.

29. See text June 6, 1950(1), note 7.

30. Short Course (see note 26), English translution (International Publishers, 1951
472.

JL, See text Oct, 15. 1953, note 2.
32. For an analysis of how Mav's approach to collectivization anticipated yeurly ine
production. see J. Gray (1974),

33, See text Oct. 15. 1953. note 6