Comments on the Central Briefing Forwarding Information on the Campaign to Root Out Hidden Counterrevolutionaries Conducted by the Beijing Military Region and Other Units (July 20 and 21, 1955) 1. To be read by Liu, Zhou, Deng, Peng Dehuai, and Tan Zheng [1]; to be sent by telegraph to Shang Kun [2]. Issued by Mao Zedong on July 20, based on the manuscript.

2. To the Shanghai Bureau, the CPC committees of all provinces and municipalities directly under the central government, and the party committees of autonomous regions: We are now forwarding one copy of “The Situation Regarding the Campaign to Struggle Against and Eliminate Hidden Counterrevolutionaries Launched by the Beijing Military Region, the Public Security Forces, Various Specialized Arms, and Other Units” [3] for your reference. With regard to the work of eradicating hidden counterrevolutionaries, we hope that you will maintain contact and coordination with the local military organs and provide them with assistance. When your five-member groups convene meetings, invite appropriate representatives from the military organs to attend. Issued by the Central Committee on July 21, 1955, based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Notes [ ] 1. Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at that time served as Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. Peng Dehuai was then a member of the CPC Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defense. Tan Zheng was Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army. 2. Shang Kun refers to Yang Shangkun, who at that time held the positions of Deputy Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Central Office.

3. According to a situation report dated July 14, 1955, issued by the Cadre Investigation Office of the General Political Department of the PLA, from late May to early June, units including the Beijing Military Region successively carried out study sessions on the struggle against Hu Feng. Based on these studies, they conducted inspections and initially uncovered certain problems and leads. However, the previous phase of work had not been thorough enough, generally remaining at the stage of studying documents. The reasons were as follows: First, leadership had been complacent and overly inclined to the right, failing to fully recognize the seriousness of this struggle and the extent of internal impurity. Second, there had been insufficient mobilization of the masses, owing to fears of “leftist” deviations. Third, some unit commanders had not personally taken charge. In light of these circumstances, the General Political Department convened an emergency meeting on July 8 involving leading cadres from directly affiliated units and troops stationed in Beijing, beginning to reverse the previous lack of momentum and the tendency to remain stuck in general study sessions, and expanding the struggle against Hu Feng into a broader campaign targeting all counterrevolutionary elements. The arrangements made by various units for this movement can be broadly divided into three stages: the first stage involves studying relevant documents and making ideological, organizational, and material preparations; the second stage consists of launching a campaign encouraging self-confession and denunciation; and the third stage transitions into cadre investigation, drawing conclusions, and taking disciplinary action.