Commentary by the Central Committee on the Report of the Party Committee of State Organs Concerning the Launch of a Campaign to Root Out All Concealed Counterrevolutionaries (July 4, 1955)  To the Shanghai Bureau, the Party Committees of all provinces and municipalities directly under the central government, the various ministries and commissions of the Central Committee, and the Party leadership groups of all state organs:  We are now transmitting herewith one copy of the special report dated June 30, 1955, from the Party Committee of State Organs in Beijing concerning the launch of a campaign to eradicate all hidden counterrevolutionaries [1], for your reference. Should similar biases exist in your respective areas, please take note and correct them promptly.  Issued by the Central Committee on July 4, 1955, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.  Reviewed by Liu and Deng [2]; forwarded by telegram to Shang Kun [3]. ··· Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript on July 4.

Note [1]: This report points out that among the fifty-three units under the Party Committee of State Organs, thirty-six have already had leading comrades deliver mobilization speeches to all cadres of their respective organs, calling for the thorough elimination of all concealed counterrevolutionaries. The remaining units are also actively making preparations. In those units where public mobilization has taken place, the morale of the masses is high, and the arrogance of counterrevolutionary elements has been severely undermined. However, there are still shortcomings in the campaign, primarily the extremely uneven development across different units and the fact that the leadership of the movement has not kept pace with the evolving situation. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to address the following issues: First, resolutely overcome the lingering rightist complacency and indifferent attitude toward the campaign that still persists among some leading cadres; this is currently the main obstacle to advancing the movement. Second, firmly rectify the tendency in certain units to fail to actively mobilize the masses and to be hesitant to encourage them to engage in ideological struggle during group meetings. Third, establish command structures for the struggle at all levels, proceeding from top to bottom. Each ministry and bureau must set up five-person working groups as the core, around which broad ranks of active participants can rally under the leadership nucleus.  [ ] Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at that time served as Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. [3] Shang Kun refers to Yang Shangkun, who at that time held the posts of Deputy Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Central Office.