Editor’s Note: The publication of the first and second batches of materials concerning the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary clique has aroused intense indignation among the broad masses of the people across the country. People are demanding that the political background of the Hu Feng group be thoroughly investigated. They ask: Who, after all, is Hu Feng’s master? On this question, the People’s Government has already obtained a large body of evidence. A portion of this evidence is presented here in what we call the “Third Batch of Materials.” Hu Feng and many leading members of his clique have long been loyal lackeys of imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party. They maintained close ties with imperialist and Nationalist intelligence agencies, spent years masquerading as revolutionaries while secretly infiltrating progressive circles to carry out counterrevolutionary activities.

In the following documents, the people can see the true faces of A Long—whom Hu Feng had lauded as a “revolutionary writer who had pursued revolution for more than ten years”—and of Hu Feng himself, who claimed to have followed the revolution for twenty years. In a letter to Hu Feng, A Long expressed “unbounded optimism” about Chiang Kai-shek’s nationwide counterrevolutionary civil war, launched in July 1946; he believed that the People’s Liberation Army’s “main force” could be “defeated within three months” and “completely wiped out within a year.” Moreover, he shamelessly extolled Chiang’s “directives,” claiming that “his confidence” had “further inspired everyone.” A Long regarded the revolutionary forces of the people as “pus” that would inevitably have to be drained, and insisted that any attack on these forces must be resolute and thorough—“do it once and for all!”

Why were they so adamant? It turned out that Hu Feng, A Long, and others were individuals with ulterior motives and sinister pasts.

A Long, whose real names were Chen Yimen and Chen Shoumei, was a native of Zhejiang Province. He had originally been an officer in the Nationalist army. Early in the War of Resistance Against Japan, he managed to gain admission to the Yan’an Anti-Japanese Military and Political University for a few months, but instead of going to the front lines, he went to serve as a major and military instructor in Hu Zongnan’s “Fourth Training Corps.” The letter published here was written by him in July 1946 from the Land Force Academy in Shandong, Chongqing, where he had been transferred from Hu Zongnan’s unit for further training and was subsequently appointed as an instructor in tactics. Shandong was not only the site of Chiang Kai-shek’s Land Force Academy but also his residence during his stay in Chongqing.

Hu Feng, whose real name was Zhang Guangren, also known as Gu Fei, came from Hubei Province. During the First Domestic Revolutionary War, he had joined the Communist Youth League. In 1925, while living in Beijing under Duan Qirui’s White Terror regime, he became so frightened that he firmly requested the Party to allow him to resign from the League. Later, he engaged in anti-Communist political work within Jiangxi’s “bandit-suppression” forces, then spent some time in Japan, where he carried out several clandestine and nefarious activities. Upon returning to China, he infiltrated leftist cultural organizations in Shanghai and conducted various divisive and destructive operations from within. During the Wuhan and Chongqing periods, he maintained close contacts with numerous Nationalist intelligence chiefs. A letter from Hu Feng to A Long, included here, also reveals his relationship with Chen Zhuo, one of those intelligence figures. This brief historical sketch of Hu Feng has only recently been uncovered, as he had skillfully concealed his past, thereby deceiving many.

Prior to the nationwide liberation, the Hu Feng clique fervently pinned its hopes on Chiang Kai-shek’s victory in the anti-people civil war and on the defeat of the revolutionary forces. However, when Chiang’s forces collapsed and national liberation was achieved, they went underground on the mainland, continuing their counterrevolutionary activities with even more insidious double-dealing tactics.

They harbored a deep-seated hatred toward the new society established after liberation and toward the people’s revolutionary government, openly declaring, “I detest this social order,” and cursing the revolutionary regime with such phrases as “may it perish” and “may it come to nothing!”

After our newspaper published the first and second batches of exposé materials, some still argued that the Hu Feng group was merely a small clique of ambitious individuals within the cultural sphere, lacking any significant reactionary political backing. Those who made such claims were either genuinely sympathetic to them on class grounds, or lacked political acumen and viewed matters too naively. Still others were covert reactionaries themselves, or even members of the Hu Feng group, such as Lü Ying in Beijing.

Now is the time to fully expose the true nature of this counterrevolutionary gang led by Hu Feng. The Chinese people will no longer tolerate their deceptive maneuvers! The entire nation must remain vigilant. All hidden counterrevolutionaries must be brought to light, and their counterrevolutionary crimes must be punished accordingly!

Note: These letters demonstrate that the Hu Feng group was not a mere “literary” organization, but rather a counterrevolutionary political clique disguised under the banner of culture. They bore a profound hatred toward all revolutionary forces of the people. Hu Feng member Zhang Zhongxiao stated that he “almost hated everyone.” Many had assumed that “Hu Feng was just a cultural figure, and the Hu Feng affair was merely a matter for the cultural community, having no bearing on other sectors.” After reviewing these materials, they should now realize the error of such notions!

Note: The two letters above reveal the true character of Lv Yuan, a key member of the Hu Feng group. The core of this clique was composed of individuals like him. In May 1944, Lv Yuan was “transferred” to work at the “Sino-American Cooperative Organization.” Commonly referred to as the “Sino-American Special Technical Cooperation Office,” this sinister and shadowy intelligence agency was jointly operated by U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime. American agents trained and dispatched spies on behalf of both the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, conducting direct terrorist operations, notorious for its brutal torture and mass executions of Communists and progressive elements. Who could possibly “transfer” someone like Lv Yuan to such an organization? And which individuals did the agency itself select for “employment”? The answer is self-evident. In a subsequent letter, dated September 1947, Lv Yuan was still denouncing the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary forces as “the wicked bandits.” Yet by early 1948, he had already been introduced as a Communist Party member by another Hu Feng stalwart, Zeng Zhuo, and infiltrated an underground Party cell. Shortly thereafter, Lv Yuan suddenly absconded. Upon the liberation of Wuhan, however, he reappeared, together with Zeng Zhuo, proclaiming themselves “Communists” and taking over the Dagang Daily. In 1950, he again managed to slip back into the Party (see item 28 of these materials). This, then, was how members of the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary clique “followed the revolution” and wormed their way into the Communist Party.

Note: A Long’s letters show that Hu Feng members possessed a sophisticated understanding of the tactics involved in underground counterrevolutionary work. He advised against “firing the first shot before one’s position is sufficiently fortified,” stressing instead the need to “primarily prepare conditions—more conditions, and still more conditions!” One should “work diligently among the masses, build a solid mass base,” and only then “target the major objectives,” striking directly at the very heart of the revolution. When launching an offensive, he urged frequent consultations with “friends,” carefully organizing and refining one’s arguments, while ignoring minor details and trivial matters. Counterrevolutionaries are far from clumsy; their strategies are cunning and vicious. All revolutionaries must never underestimate them or become complacent. Only by greatly enhancing the political vigilance of the people can we effectively confront and eradicate them.

Note: Lu Dian’s strategy of attacking to defend was indeed later adopted by Hu Feng: his arrival in Beijing to request employment, his petition containing 300,000 characters laying out his grievances, and finally, his exploitation of the Literary Gazette issue to launch a full-scale assault. Representatives of exploiting classes often resort to such tactics when placed at a disadvantage—to safeguard their immediate survival and secure future gains. They may fabricate falsehoods out of thin air, seize upon superficial phenomena to attack the essence of matters, praise certain groups while vilifying others, or seize upon a pretext to “break through a gap,” thereby putting us in a difficult position. In short, they are constantly studying ways to counter us, “scouting for openings,” in the hope of gaining the upper hand. Sometimes they even “play dead,” waiting for the opportune moment to “strike back.” With their long experience in class struggle, they engage in both legal and illegal forms of struggle. We revolutionaries must understand their methods and study their tactics if we are to defeat them. Under no circumstances should we be overly idealistic or view the complex reality of class struggle with undue simplicity.

Note: It is precisely because some of our own revolutionaries have become complacent or negligent, or have focused solely on practical tasks while neglecting politics, that many counterrevolutionaries have managed to “penetrate deep into our very core.” These are not limited to Hu Feng members; numerous other spies and malicious elements have likewise infiltrated our ranks.

Note: Members of the Hu Feng group, along with many other hidden counterrevolutionaries, generally employ the dualistic tactics described in this letter, particularly points (2) and (3), which can easily deceive large numbers of people. Nevertheless, their schemes always contain weaknesses that can be exposed—a fact amply demonstrated by the exposure of the Hu Feng group itself. Especially as public awareness and vigilance continue to rise, their duplicitous strategies become increasingly vulnerable to detection.

Note: This also underscores the importance and necessity of our struggle to criticize Hu Shi’s bourgeois idealism. Some claim to believe in Marxism-Leninism yet dismiss the struggle against idealism, asserting either that they themselves are free from idealistic tendencies or that they have no connection to Hu Shi and therefore prefer to avoid the topic altogether. In contrast, the Hu Feng group took this struggle very seriously, actively studying ways to counter it. “There are contradictions and difficulties here.” Indeed, the critique of idealism posed “contradictions and difficulties” for the Hu Feng group, proving the correctness of our approach. Shouldn’t the ranks of the revolutionary forces likewise encounter “contradictions and difficulties”?

Note: The fact that a large number of Hu Feng members managed to infiltrate the Chinese Communist Party and obtain Party membership should draw the attention of all Party organizations. For example, Lv Yuan had previously slipped into our underground Party organization before the liberation but lost his membership due to his escape. In 1950, this counterrevolutionary submitted “three reports to our Party organization, each more detailed and sincere than the last.” Aside from issues related to literary thought, “everything else was broadly acceptable,” and he was subsequently readmitted as a Party member. Shouldn’t such occurrences prompt all Party organizations to take heed? These counterrevolutionaries had exhausted every possible means of deception before climbing their way into the Party; they regarded this as a “struggle,” emerged victorious, and gained entry!

Note: When the liberal tendencies of a Communist Party member are criticized, those associated with the Hu Feng group are said to have “received a blow.” If the individual demonstrates “poor resolve”—that is, does not cling to a liberal stance but is willing to accept the Party’s criticism and correct their course—the Hu Feng group has little hope of swaying them. However, if the person possesses “strong resolve” in upholding their liberal views, they run the risk of being co-opted. Hu Feng members will certainly “test the waters,” having already begun referring to such individuals as “comrades.” Shouldn’t this serve as a cautionary tale? What attitude ought Communist Party members with ideological or political errors adopt when subjected to criticism? There are two paths available: either rectify one’s mistakes and become a good Party member, or descend further down the slippery slope and even fall into the abyss of counterrevolution. The latter path is all too real, and counterrevolutionaries may well be beckoning from below!

Note: These kinds of letters should serve as a wake-up call, reminding us not to let such individuals “slip through.”

Note: As evidenced by these letters, counterrevolutionaries hiding within the ranks of the revolution dread rectification campaigns, clearly demonstrating their beneficial nature. Of course, not all those who fear rectification are counterrevolutionaries; the vast majority—over ninety percent—are individuals with certain ideological or political shortcomings, and the appropriate response is to help them correct their errors. However, genuine counterrevolutionaries dread rectification, as it provides an opportunity to further root out their subversive roots. The true nature of the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary clique was gradually revealed through several rectification campaigns both before and after liberation—through successive ideological struggles. It was precisely these campaigns that led to divisions within the Hu Feng group and forced it to adopt a strategy of attacking to defend: the submission of a 300,000-character petition, culminating in the ultimate exposure of the group.

Note: These letters illustrate that, in the face of the powerful people’s revolutionary forces—the people’s democratic dictatorship—even if this dictatorship succeeds in raising the masses’ consciousness and adopts sound policies, no matter how many hidden counterrevolutionary cliques exist or how strict their internal discipline and solidarity may be, there will always be individuals who break away. Such splits ultimately benefit the people. The case of Shu Wu’s defection from the Hu Feng group dealt a severe blow to the clique, serving as clear proof of this point. Recently, many Hu Feng members across the country have been confessing voluntarily or under pressure, surrendering secret documents and revealing inside information—an ongoing development in this struggle.

Note: These letters also reveal that there are individuals within our organs, troops, enterprises, and other organizations who steal state secrets. These are none other than counterrevolutionaries who have infiltrated such institutions, often with the tacit support of certain liberal-minded elements. Shouldn’t this grave situation compel all staff members and the general public to pay close attention?

Note: This letter shows that the Hu Feng group vehemently opposed the literary line set by the Chinese Communist Party and held an extreme hatred for Comrade Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art.” The Party and Comrade Mao had called on literary workers to glorify the workers, peasants, and soldiers and to expose their enemies, whereas the Hu Feng group itself was an enemy of the working people. They feared that exposing the enemies of the working people would jeopardize their own survival, “slaughter” their “creatures,” and “crush” their “new things.” Yet they dared not openly oppose these talks; instead, Hu Feng instructed his followers to outwardly “go along with them,” sometimes even quoting specific passages. These were all masks used by Hu Feng members to disguise their true intentions. In this confidential letter, however, their hatred of the talks and their counterrevolutionary nature are fully laid bare. Zhang Zhongxiao declared: “This book [referring to Mao Zedong’s Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art] may have been useful in Yan’an, but I now believe it is no longer applicable.” “It is no longer applicable”—aren’t there still some in the literary world who say the same? To those who hold such views, we urge you to carefully read Zhang Zhongxiao’s letter! Of course, some who make such statements are simply adhering to bourgeois literary perspectives and thus fail to grasp the significance of these talks. However, Zhang Zhongxiao, as a counterrevolutionary, keenly understood that after national liberation, these talks would gain wider influence among the masses and exert a devastating effect on all reactionary literary ideologies. It was precisely for this reason that they were so eager to prevent and disrupt the expansion of the talks’ influence—their claim that “it is no longer applicable” today stems from this very rationale.

Note: These letters reveal that counterrevolutionaries’ attacks on specific individuals are merely pretexts, a calculated tactic. Their real aim is to leave “not a single patch of clean ground.” Consequently, they deliberately “prolong and intensify the struggle.” Since King Wu of the Han Dynasty invented the famous strategy of urging the emperor to execute Chao Cuo, the chief advisor to Emperor Jing, in order to remove corrupt officials from the court, countless ambitious schemers have cherished this tactic. The Hu Feng group has likewise inherited this tradition. In their 300,000-character petition, they attacked only a handful of individuals—Lin XX, He XX, Comrade Zhou X—and claimed that these few were ruining everything. Some, moved by instinctive sympathy for Hu Feng, have even echoed this narrative, insisting that “this is merely a personal power struggle between Zhou Yang and Hu Feng.” In our ongoing campaign to purge Hu Feng members and other counterrevolutionaries, we must pay particular attention to this point.

Note: In their 300,000-character petition and other public pronouncements, the Hu Feng group appears to focus solely on opposing Communist writers while seemingly sparing others. While they never directly attack Chiang Kai-shek or other Nationalist figures—except for occasional token criticisms intended to create a diversion (“small scoldings to achieve big results”)—their claim of neutrality toward other individuals is false. This is confirmed by numerous secret letters from Hu Feng members, which reveal that they uniformly scorned, vilified, and opposed such revolutionary and democratic figures as Lu Xun, Wen Yiduo, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Ba Jin, Huang Yaomen, Cao Yu, and Lao She. Isn’t this precisely the modus operandi of Chiang Kai-shek’s fascist Nationalist Party?

Note: Just as we regularly assess the balance of power in international and domestic class struggles, our enemies are likewise constantly gauging the situation. However, our adversaries are backward, decaying reactionaries destined for extinction. They fail to comprehend the objective laws of the material world, relying instead on subjective and metaphysical modes of thinking. As a result, their assessments are invariably flawed. Guided by their class instincts, they tend to believe that they themselves are formidable, while revolutionary forces are perpetually weak. They consistently overestimate their own strength and underestimate ours. We have witnessed the downfall of numerous counterrevolutionary regimes—the Qing dynasty, the Beiyang warlords, Japanese imperialism, Mussolini, Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek—each succumbing one after another. All of them committed inevitable ideological and strategic errors, and today’s imperialist powers are likewise bound to make similar mistakes. Isn’t this ironic? According to Hu Feng members, the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people under Communist leadership are “doomed to collapse,” reduced to “withered leaves” and “rotting corpses.” Meanwhile, the counterrevolutionary forces represented by Hu Feng—though “some fragile sprouts may be crushed”—are seeing “numerous buds bursting forth” and poised for vigorous growth. Even if royalist representatives still sit in France’s National Assembly today, it is quite possible that, decades after the complete demise of all exploitative classes on Earth, remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek regime might continue to operate in various regions. The most die-hard among them will never acknowledge their defeat, for they need to deceive not only others but also themselves; otherwise, they cannot sustain their existence.

Note: This particular Hu Feng member is rather pessimistic. He suggests that “perhaps” it will take “another few decades” before “there can be harmony among people”—meaning that it will require several decades before there is any prospect of restoring the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Once that happens and all revolutionary forces are crushed, then “harmony among people” will finally be achieved. “Human dignity and authenticity will remain intact,” though this “humanity” refers exclusively to counterrevolutionaries, including Hu Feng members, and excludes revolutionaries. “Today in China, people still do not respect one another…” Here, “those above” refers to revolutionaries, while “those below” denotes counterrevolutionaries. Even when writing confidential letters, Hu Feng members often produce text that is riddled with inconsistencies. This too is determined by their class nature; they simply cannot clarify their thoughts as neatly as we manage to annotate their words for them.

Note: The phrase in this letter—“those feudal forces are frantically killing people”—is Hu Feng’s expression of terror in response to our people’s revolutionary forces’ great struggle to suppress counterrevolutionary elements. This feeling reflects the collective mindset of all counterrevolutionaries, whether individuals, groups, or cliques. What terrifies them is precisely what fills the revolutionary masses with joy. The description of “an unprecedented event” is also accurate. Historically, with the exception of the transition from primitive communal systems to slavery—which marked a shift from non-exploitative to exploitative structures—most revolutions have resulted from one form of exploitation replacing another. There has been neither the necessity nor the possibility of completely eradicating counterrevolutionary forces. Only we, the proletariat and the people under Communist leadership, have embarked on a revolution aimed at ultimately abolishing all forms of exploitation and all classes. Naturally, the exploited classes will inevitably attempt to resist through their own counterrevolutionary parties, groups, or individual agents. It is only by the united, resolute, thorough, and clean suppression of these forces that such a goal can be realized—and that such a possibility truly exists. The assertion that “the struggle has inevitably deepened” is also valid. The only inaccuracy lies in the use of the term “feudal forces,” which serves as a deliberate inversion of “a people’s democratic dictatorship based on the worker-peasant alliance”—just as their “mechanistic view” is the antithesis of “dialectical materialism.”

Note: Returning to Zhang Zhongxiao, his counterrevolutionary sensibilities are remarkably acute. Compared with many comrades in our revolutionary ranks, including some Party members, there is a vast disparity in class consciousness and political discernment. In this regard, our comrades are far less equipped than those within the Hu Feng group. Our ranks must learn and heighten their class vigilance; their political sensitivity needs to be sharpened. If the Hu Feng group has offered us anything positive, it is this thrilling struggle, which has greatly elevated our political awareness and responsiveness, enabling us to resolutely suppress all counterrevolutionaries and thereby strengthen our revolutionary dictatorship, so that we may carry the revolution forward to its ultimate goal: the building of a great socialist state.