To Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng\[1\]
(April 28, 1955)

Comrades Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng:

At present, the greatest possible danger facing Vietnam seems to lie not south of Dien Bien Phu, but along the communication lines in our army's rear. If the enemy were to drop two paratroop battalions at the most critical points on our rear communication lines, construct fortifications, and hold them, the entire communication line would be cut off. If our army cannot swiftly annihilate this enemy, and the situation becomes protracted, our forces at Dien Bien Phu may face the possibility of being forced to retreat. The Military Commission's telegram already assessed the possibility of the enemy attacking and seizing the communication lines, but the emphasis was insufficient, and it was placed on par with the direction of Luang Prabang. Please give this further consideration, and ask the Vietnamese side to promptly deploy necessary forces to appropriate areas, specifically to deal with such unexpected contingencies, so as to prevent the Dien Bien Phu campaign from falling short for lack of a final effort.

Mao Zedong
April 28

[1]
Peng Dehuai, then serving as a member of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defense.
Huang Kecheng, then serving as Vice Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.