Opening Address

Some of those present today were previously unknown to us—we had only heard their names but never met them in person. That people who did not know each other before can now sit together in a meeting of the National Defense Council is a situation well worth reflecting on. Today, we face a powerful enemy right before us. They encircle and threaten us, and we must unite. Among those present are the backbone of the People’s Liberation Army, individuals of social renown, and those with past military experience. All of you maintain ties with the masses in various respects and can play a role in realizing our common goals.

The U.S. imperialist aggressor bloc is deeply dissatisfied with us and harbors hostility toward us. The traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, the running dog of U.S. imperialism, still clings to Taiwan. The national liberation war remains incomplete and unvictorious in that part of Taiwan. Our country’s national defense tasks are immense. Beyond industrial issues, there are also problems of army building and combat. Army building and combat are linked to every aspect. Our current combat task is to liberate Taiwan; our future combat task is to defend against imperialist aggression. There are many issues in army building—for instance, the military service system. A document on this has already been distributed, and we ask everyone to offer their opinions. Some documents have yet to be issued. Our army must be enhanced: its organization and equipment must be improved, its training must be improved, and the army’s training is connected with national military training. The future tasks of the National Defense Council are: to unite, to train our army and our people, and to gradually build a modernized revolutionary army. Apart from the Soviet army, we aim to build the world’s second most powerful modernized revolutionary army. Now we have plans for economic construction and cultural construction; military construction should also have a plan, so that we can proceed step by step to achieve the goal of building a powerful modernized revolutionary army. This is the people’s goal, a goal stipulated in the constitution.

Speech

The modernization of China’s armed forces, I believe, can be divided into three stages. The first generation was the New Army established in the late Qing Dynasty. The New Army had 36 zhen, that is, 36 divisions. Quite a number of those present today served in that army—some from the Japanese Army Officer Academy, some from the Yunnan Military Academy (our Vice Chairman Zhu De was from the Yunnan Military Academy), some from the Hunan Military Academy, and some from the Baoding Military Academy (Committee Member Tang Shengzhi was from the Baoding Military Academy). This New Army, together with the revolutionary party founded by Sun Yat-sen and on the basis of popular support, accomplished the task of overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. But later it became corrupt, detached itself from the people, fell apart, each faction raising its own funds and carving out its own turf, and was cast aside by the people. The second generation was the Whampoa Army. It was once a revolutionary army, which overthrew the army just mentioned. Many of those present today, both Communist and non-Communist, witnessed and experienced this firsthand. I myself once recruited a class of students for the Whampoa Military Academy in Shanghai, at No. 44 Huanlong Road. Premier Zhou Enlai was then the director of the political department at the Whampoa Military Academy. The National Revolutionary Army, with the Whampoa Army as its backbone, initially formed eight corps. Huang Qixiang and Cai Tingkai were from the Fourth Corps; Cheng Qian and Li Minghao were from the Sixth Corps; Tang Shengzhi was from the Eighth Corps. The Whampoa Army also once enjoyed the people’s support and swept all before it during the Northern Expedition, but it too had a shortcoming: it became detached from the people. The Communist Party made a mistake at that time—it did not want its own army, only sending party representatives into the army. Later, when Chiang Kai-shek expelled the party representatives and carried out a purge, the only army under direct Communist control was Ye Ting’s independent regiment. After the Nanchang Uprising, the army led by the Party became a guerrilla force, and this guerrilla force fought on for 22 years. The present People’s Liberation Army is the third generation. The predecessor of the People’s Liberation Army was the Red Army. These three generations represent three stages in China’s modern armed forces. China should compile a military history, and it would be good to write about the progress made across these three eras. Our army was first a guerrilla force, later became somewhat more regular, and is now better still, but strictly speaking, it is still far from modernization. Therefore, we must study hard. Since the emergence of atomic weapons, great changes have taken place in military strategy, tactics, and equipment, and in this regard we understand nothing at all. Judging from history, our goal of army building can be achieved, and our cause is full of hope. Our army is far from modernized, yet it defeated U.S. imperialism in Korea. At the end of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek colluded with the imperialists. Soon the KMT and the Communist Party split, the Northern Expedition army changed direction, and we carried on alone. The country belonged to Chiang Kai-shek; we had only a few battered rifles. Yet our struggle represented the direction of the people. We were able to gather the guerrilla forces, form army corps and front armies, and later carry out the 25,000-li Long March. The 25,000-li Long March was no simple feat. Suppose we drilled a hole straight through the earth from here and came out in the United States—that would be just a little over 12,500 kilometers. By the end of the Long March, not many of our troops remained. On the one hand, it was because Chiang Kai-shek attacked us; on the other, it was because we made political and military mistakes and were forced into a great relocation. When we reached Zunyi, we conducted self-criticism and corrected our errors. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and guerrilla forces together totaled 1.2 million. Before the Chongqing negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek invited us to discuss national affairs—national affairs are the affairs of the whole nation, so we could not refuse. In fact, when we arrived in Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek was utterly unprepared and only hastily convened a few people to deliberate. They talked while dispatching troops. We few in Chongqing also deliberated. As the old saying goes, “When water comes, block it with earth; when troops come, meet them with generals.” We too dispatched troops. The more painfully we struck Chiang Kai-shek, the easier the negotiations became. Committee Member Gao Shuxun revolted precisely at this time. By the winter of 1948, the situation was largely settled; by the spring of 1949, it was decided. Now let us reckon the accounts. The basic condition for our victory was that we represented the hopes and direction of the people. After Japan’s surrender, the people nationwide hoped for rest, even if only for two or three years. In the end, they got only one year of rest, and even in that year many battles were fought. The people’s hopes, the direction the people needed, plus our own various efforts—in the past, these enabled the Northern Expedition, the liberation of the whole country, and the start of national construction. In the future, on the basis of popular support and with our efforts, we will certainly be able to defeat imperialist aggression, liberate Taiwan, and build a modernized revolutionary army. At present, our industry, agriculture, culture, and military are still inadequate. The imperialists reckon you have only so little, so they come to bully us. They ask, “How many atomic bombs do you have?” But there is one thing they have miscalculated: China’s latent strength, when brought into play in the future, will be astonishing. China is a great nation and must have powerful land, sea, and air forces. With such a long coastline, we must build a strong navy. The people nationwide all hope we will have an air force. At the beginning, we had only a tiny air force, like the one seen during the Tiananmen parade. In 1954, our country produced an airplane of its own. Since Pangu created the world and from the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors to the present, this is an earth-shaking event, even though it was only a trainer aircraft. China is a vast country, yet its industry lags behind that of the Netherlands and Belgium, and its automobile manufacturing lags behind Denmark’s. There is a common saying: “Behave with your tail between your legs.” To behave is to behave—why shouldn’t we raise our tails? The reason is simple: we still cannot make tanks, automobiles, large-caliber artillery, or tractors. It is better to keep our tails tucked in. I hope everyone will work hard while also taking care of their health—first, to continue working, and second, to see the airplanes, tanks, artillery, and tractors we ourselves will build in the future. For our common goal, we should achieve something substantial and make our country look the part. Can we do it? Yes, as long as we have confidence. All our cadres must exert themselves. Today, the National Defense Council includes people from all quarters and with experience from every era. Everyone is inspired by patriotism and united by a common goal—this is something truly precious. Many of you present are senior figures. When you were a division commander, I was still a soldier. One good thing about us is that we let all the people know what we are doing. In the past, when Chiang Kai-shek had an opinion, people had to guess at it, and after a while it would change. Now there is no need to guess about us. Our direction is the people’s direction, and this is enshrined in the constitution. Nowadays, we often hear people say they want to “feel the bottom.” What bottom is there? The constitution is the bottom. The Communist Party’s bottom is to bring into play all useful factors and to destroy obstructive ones. Useful factors are constructive forces, including all kinds of intellectuals and generals and soldiers who came from the old army. Many of the Communist generals also came from the old army—for example, Vice Chairman He Long once served as the garrison commander of western Hunan. No one is born a Communist. A person is born without any set task; a mother does not give birth to a son so that he will become a soldier or a general. These are shaped by social and historical conditions. Our navy is still only a sprout at present. Last year, I took a warship from Hankou to Nanjing and also watched a torpedo boat exercise in Nanjing. The naval personnel were all young people aged 19 to 23. Seeing them made us forget our own decrepitude. At that time, I also saw Committee Member Lin Zun—you have become teachers. Building industry requires engineers; running schools requires professors. We must unite with them; without them, it won’t work. Of course, without new people, it also won’t work. Severing history won’t do. The view that we built everything from scratch is incorrect.

Published based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.


--- Notes

[1] Refers to the new-style army organized and trained by the Qing government after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, modeled on the military systems of Western capitalist countries.
[2] Tang Shengzhi (1889–1970), a native of Dong’an, Hunan. He participated in the 1911 Revolution and the Anti-Yuan National Protection War. In 1923, he became commander of the Fourth Division of the Hunan Army. During the Northern Expedition in 1926, he served as commander of the Eighth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and concurrently as commander of the central route’s vanguard. In 1954, he served as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and a member of the National Defense Council.
[3] The Whampoa Army refers to the National Revolutionary Army organized by the Guangdong Revolutionary Government in 1925, with the Whampoa Military Academy cadet corps as its backbone. By June 1926, it had grown to eight corps.
[4] Huang Qixiang (1898–1970), a native of Mei County, Guangdong. During the Northern Expedition in 1926, he served as commander of the 36th Regiment, 12th Division, Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1954, he served as a member of the National Defense Council and a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Cai Tingkai (1892–1968), a native of Luoding, Guangdong. During the Northern Expedition in 1926, he served as commander of the 28th Regiment, 10th Division, Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1954, he served as vice chairman of the National Defense Council and a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee.
[5] Cheng Qian, during the Northern Expedition in 1926, served as commander of the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1954, he served as vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and vice chairman of the National Defense Council. Li Minghao (1897–1980), a native of Liling, Hunan. During the Northern Expedition in 1926, he served as commander of the 54th Regiment, 17th Division, Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1954, he served as a member of the National Defense Council.
[6] Ye Ting (1896–1946), a native of Huiyang, Guangdong. In the early stage of the Northern Expedition, he served as commander of the Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army.
[7] Gao Shuxun (1898–1972), a native of Yanshan, Hebei. In October 1945, he led one army and one column in an uprising at Handan. At the time of the uprising, he was deputy commander of the 11th War Zone of the Nationalist Army and concurrently commander of the New Eighth Army. In 1954, he served as a member of the National Defense Council.
[8] Refers to Cheng Qian.
[9] He Long, during the Northern Expedition in 1926, successively served as commander of the Sixth Division of the Eighth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and concurrently garrison commander of western Hunan, commander of the First Division of the Ninth Army, and commander of the Independent 15th Division. In 1954, he served as vice chairman of the National Defense Council.
[10] Lin Zun (1905–1979), a native of Fuzhou, Fujian. Former commander of the Second Fleet of the Nationalist Navy. On April 23, 1949, he led 25 ships under his command in an uprising and joined the People’s Liberation Army. In 1954, he served as a member of the National Defense Council.