Relations with the Swedish and Swiss Members [1]
(June 6, 1954)
To Comrades Ri Sang-cho and Chong Kok-yok, with copy to Premier Kim (2) and the Volunteer Army Headquarters (3):

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for Korea has become the focal point of the current Geneva Conference. We have already telegraphed our policy regarding the NNSC (4) to you. With respect to our (North Korea, China, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) relations with the Swedish and Swiss members (5), we request that you conduct a comprehensive review, paying particular attention to the following points:

(1) At Sinuiju and Manpo, the general policy of prior notification and random inspections should be maintained. However, some flexibility may be exercised in conducting these inspections. Both the Polish–Czechoslovakian side (6) and the North Korean–Chinese side should adhere to the principle of acting reasonably, advantageously, and with restraint, so as to leave the Swedish and Swiss members no grounds for complaint.

(2) At Chongjin, Heungnam, and Shinanju, since there are no rotations or replacements, inspections need not be permitted in principle. Yet, overly strict restrictions on inspections might arouse suspicion among the Swedish and Swiss members. It would be preferable, therefore, to provide a few more opportunities for inspections, allowing them to make no significant findings before withdrawing.

[1]
This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Ri Sang-cho, Chief Negotiator for the North Korean side of the Military Armistice Commission, and Chong Kok-yok, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Delegation to the Military Armistice Commission.
[2]
Premier Kim refers to Kim Il-sung, who at that time served as Prime Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
[3]
The Volunteer Army Headquarters.
[4]
The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
[5]
The “two R’s” here refer to the Swedish and Swiss members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
[6]
Poland and Czechoslovakia, also members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

(3) It is appropriate to afford the Swedish and Swiss personnel proper care in their daily lives at our various ports of entry; however, their general activities may likewise be somewhat relaxed, provided that such relaxation does not cause substantial disruption.

(4) We should persuade our Polish and Czechoslovakian comrades to strive, within the framework of the NNSC, to jointly establish certain facts with the Swedish and Swiss members, without seeking to draw conclusions on every matter. Moreover, they should engage in as much informal interaction as possible in their daily routines.

(5) Any special investigations proposed by the opposing side should be considered in light of the specific nature of each request. If such investigations are indeed consistent with the Armistice Agreement, they should not be rejected simply because they may be cumbersome.

(6) New measures suggested by the other side at the southern ports of entry should be handled in accordance with the spirit of our previous telegram. All of the above points must be progressively implemented based on the actual circumstances of each location and each issue; abrupt relaxation should be avoided, as it could give the other parties—namely, the United States, South Korea, and the Swedish and Swiss members—an impression of weakness.

(7) Please pay close attention to all of the foregoing points.

(8) We have received your telegram requesting instructions concerning our rear-area ports of entry and approve the views set forth therein.

Mao Zedong
June 6, 1954