Letter to Peng Dehuai [1] Concerning Assistance in Establishing Artillery and Engineer Regiments for Vietnam (April 3, 1954)

Comrade Peng Dehuai: Vietnam must establish four additional artillery regiments and two engineer regiments, to be organized, equipped, and trained within six months. Please assess whether this is feasible. If there is a shortage of artillery pieces, they should be drawn from China’s existing artillery units, even if it means temporarily rendering some of our own artillery units combat-ineffective until they can be replenished later. The instructors and advisors for these four artillery regiments and two engineer regiments should all be selected from artillery units that fought in Korea, with officers at the divisional and corps levels included. The preferred training location is Vietnam; failing that, Guangxi would also be acceptable.

Six months is a very tight timeframe. If you concur, please instruct the General Staff, in coordination with the Artillery Directorate, to swiftly draw up a plan. At the same time, consult with the Vietnamese side to secure their agreement. All efforts must be concentrated on this task.

The two artillery divisions are not to be formed by recruiting new troops; instead, they are to be reorganized from regular infantry divisions or independent regiments and battalions. Once these two artillery divisions are established, together with the previously mentioned artillery division, and five infantry divisions are brought into alignment, a combined force of five infantry divisions and three artillery divisions—eight divisions in total—will be capable of launching attacks against Hanoi and Saigon. Furthermore, adequate supplies of artillery ammunition and engineer equipment for these three artillery divisions must be arranged without delay. Anti-aircraft artillery should likewise be increased accordingly.

Dien Bien Phu must be resolutely captured. If maneuver operations proceed smoothly and there is solid assurance of success, the general offensive should be launched ahead of schedule. To replace personnel losses sustained at Dien Bien Phu, at least five thousand to eight thousand new recruits should be mobilized immediately, undergo three months of training, and promptly fill the vacancies. After a period of rest lasting one and a half to two months, operations should then be directed toward Luang Prabang.

As for Viet Trung (unless there are truly insurmountable difficulties), both the summer and autumn campaigns must be completed; Hanoi is to be attacked no later than early spring of next year. Even if the Geneva Conference is successful, the aforementioned artillery-building program will remain unchanged.

Please consider the above as appropriate.

Mao Zedong April 3, 1954

Printed from the manuscript.

Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was at the time Vice Chairman of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission.