Telegram on the Issue of Military Personnel Corpses
(April 3, 1954)
To Comrades Li Xiangchao, Du Ping, and Ding Guoniu, with notification to Premier Kim and Commander Peng:
We have received your briefing of March 20, 1954, as well as your telegrams of March 22 at 12:00 p.m. and March 28 at 1:00 p.m., all concerning this matter. We generally concur with the views set forth in these communications.

(1) The opposing side has proposed commencing the exhumation and removal of corpses starting May 1. Given our current state of preparation, the commencement date should be postponed. However, in the course of the conference negotiations, we must maintain the initiative so as to coordinate with the Geneva Conference.

(2) The opposing side exhibits certain weaknesses regarding the exhumation issue. First, the cemetery data they have successively submitted are internally contradictory, providing us with solid grounds to demand that they clarify these inconsistencies. Second, their stated policy of centralizing cemeteries is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the Armistice Agreement. The Agreement stipulates that each side’s military personnel corpses shall be exhumed and removed by its own personnel at the site of the graves. It would be contrary both to the Agreement and to common sense for the opposing side to undertake the exhumation, transportation, and centralization of our personnel’s remains, only to rebury them and then have our own personnel return to exhume and transport them once more. Once the bodies have been exhumed, they should be handed over to our side immediately; there is no justification for reburial. Based on this reasoning, we can propose an exchange mechanism whereby each side exhumes and removes the other side’s remains within its own territory. Such a proposal would be difficult for the opposing side to oppose.

(3) Therefore, our strategy should be, on the one hand, to promptly present detailed information on the widely dispersed graves of our personnel located in the enemy-held area and to request that the opposing side account for the contradictions in its previously submitted materials. On the other hand, we should strive to achieve an exchange of remains without dispatching personnel to carry out the exhumation. If this cannot be accomplished, we will proceed to centralize the enemy’s remains within our own territory as well.

In practical terms, we may first submit the cemetery data and request confirmation and explanation from the opposing side. Subsequently, we can put forward the proposal for an exchange of remains and prepare to discuss this matter with them for a period of time, without yet delving into specific procedures for exhumation or the establishment of relevant institutions. Nor is it necessary at this stage to raise the issue of postponing the exhumation at the conference.

(4) The preparatory work mentioned in your telegram—namely, convening meetings involving the relevant parties to report on and collect data concerning our personnel’s graves, to investigate the enemy’s claims about graves within our territory, to determine centralization sites, and to make concrete arrangements for exhumation—should be expedited without delay. Meanwhile, the Volunteer Army Command should, according to the outline you have drafted, instruct the volunteer units stationed in Korea and Northeast China to gather the requisite materials and deliver them to Kaesong during the second half of April. As for the Korean People’s Army, Premier Kim is requested to order the relevant authorities to compile and submit the materials to Kaesong. Materials from former volunteer units in other parts of the country may be sent to Kaesong during the first half of May.

Mao Zedong
April 3, 1954