General Political Department’s Commentary on the Central-South Military Region Party Committee’s Report Regarding the Convening of a High-Ranking Cadre Conference to Review Work [1] (August 5, 1953) To the Party Committees and Political Departments of all Major Military Regions, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, all Specialized Arms, all Academies, all Schools, and all Directly Affiliated Units:  We hereby forward to you an abstract [2] of the Central-South Military Region Party Committee’s report dated July 9 concerning the review of work at the region’s high-ranking cadre conference. The issues raised therein are extremely important and are common throughout the entire military.  All military regions, arms, and departments are requested to similarly study these problems and find appropriate solutions. The Central-South Military Region has adopted a correct approach in addressing these issues, which may be followed and implemented elsewhere.  Issued by the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission on August 5, based on a version revised by Mao Zedong.  Notes [ ] Text set in Song typeface within this document represents additions and revisions made by Mao Zedong. [2]

Refers to the summary of the report submitted on July 9, 1953, by the CPC Central-South Military Region Committee to Mao Zedong, the Central Military Commission, the General Political Department, and the Central-South Bureau, regarding the situation of work review at the high-ranking cadre meeting.

The summary states that, in order to summarize and resolve certain problems arising from the campaign against bureaucracy—with the aim of enhancing leadership, educating cadres, improving work practices, and strengthening relations between leadership and the masses as well as between superiors and subordinates—the Military Region convened a high-level cadre conference attended by principal leading cadres at or above the division level. The main issues raised at the conference and the corresponding recommendations for improvement were as follows:

(1) On the issue of chaotic operations in companies and related leadership shortcomings. Besides improper task allocation, the root cause of such chaos lies in the working style of the leadership organs, namely the so-called “five excesses” (too many ad hoc assignments, too many meetings, too many directives and documents, excessive demands for written reports and statistical forms from lower levels, and overly complex organizational structures within companies). This reflects a widespread malady among organs at all levels—namely, their lack of clear understanding of conditions at the grassroots. Therefore, resolving the problem of company-level disorganization requires overcoming subjectivism, one-sidedness, and impatience within the organs, and improving both leadership conduct and methods.

(2) On the issue of veteran soldiers. Veteran soldiers form the backbone of companies; however, current attitudes toward them are highly unsatisfactory. Instead of providing proper education when mistakes occur, they are often subjected to ridicule and reprimand. Some are not promoted due to age, nor are they admitted into the Party. To rectify this tendency, it is necessary to formulate an appropriate and proactive policy that encourages veterans to actively contribute as bearers of traditional values among new recruits. Furthermore, the demobilization of veteran soldiers should be carried out in planned stages.

(3) On the issue of dealing with intellectuals. Although the prevailing attitude of distrust and discrimination toward intellectuals among worker-peasant soldiers has largely disappeared, similar prejudices still persist within cadre ranks and leadership organs, where there remains a blind lack of trust. Instructions have therefore been issued to all units to conduct inspections and make corrections in this regard.

(4) On the issues of suicide and ideological struggle. Many leadership organs treat suicide incidents with undue levity, attributing blame solely to the individuals involved while neglecting to examine systemic failings in leadership. Consequently, no meaningful lessons are drawn. Through the deliberations at this conference, the following points were concluded: First, a patient, step-by-step approach should be adopted in dealing with backward elements, avoiding hasty action. Second, sick personnel must be cared for with genuine concern and meticulous attention, rejecting callous indifference. Third, romantic relationships between male and female staff members that violate marriage laws should be handled appropriately, without resorting to forced separation or public condemnation through struggle sessions. Fourth, company-level cadres must learn to effectively employ ideological struggle as a tool for ideological education, paying close attention to both method and effect.

(5) On the issue of military-civilian relations and relations between the armed forces and local authorities. Following the termination of the troops’ duties as work teams, their ties with the people and local communities have gradually weakened, and several previously effective mechanisms have either been abolished or are on the verge of being discontinued. It is imperative to regularly instill in the troops an ethos of relying on and caring for the people; to conduct periodic disciplinary inspections and rectify any actions detrimental to the interests of the masses; to maintain frequent communication with local authorities, soliciting and heeding their opinions regarding military activities; and during peak agricultural seasons, to provide necessary manpower to assist farmers in their labor.