Instructions Concerning the Arrangements for the Signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement and Other Issues
(July 21, 1953)

Your telegrams of 0200 hours July 20 and 0130 hours July 21 are noted.

Mao Zedong
0900 hours, July 21

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**Notes**

¹ Premier Kim refers to Kim Il Sung, then Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Commander Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
² Military demarcation line.
³ CPV Command, i.e., the Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
⁴ Syngman Rhee, then President of the Republic of Korea.
⁵ Harrison, then Chief Delegate of the “United Nations Command” side at the Korean Armistice Negotiations.
⁶ Clark, then Commander-in-Chief of the “United Nations Command.”
⁷ Military Armistice Commission, i.e., the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

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Comrade Li Kenong, and for the information of Premier Kim and Commander Peng:¹


1. Regarding the military demarcation line,² you should consult with the CPV Command³ and secure its consent, then determine it with the other side in accordance with the actual situation.

2. Regarding the detention of the remaining prisoners of war not to be directly repatriated, to be confined in a demilitarized zone south of Panmunjom under the control of the other side as designated by them, we may agree in principle, but it must be stated that the other side must pay attention to the following three points:


(1) We absolutely do not recognize the statement of the Syngman Rhee⁴ government that personnel from India, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the Indian armed forces, the Indian Red Cross, and our side’s explaining representatives, are not permitted to enter the territory of South Korea,
because this violates the provisions defining the terms of reference. We will also notify the five neutral nations—India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden—that in the work of taking over the prisoners of war not to be directly repatriated, they have the right to pass through South Korea and have the right to receive protection from the “United Nations forces,” including the South Korean forces.


(2) Demand that the other side inform us of the total number of prisoners of war not to be directly repatriated, including the number of prisoners of war already forcibly detained and held back by South Korea. We must also declare that among these prisoners of war not to be directly repatriated, except for the genuine prisoners of war whom General Harrison⁵ has already stated will not be released, no special agents dispatched by Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek may continue to pose as camp administrators, instructors, interpreters, or hold any other posts in the prisoner-of-war camps, nor may they follow the prisoners of war into the demilitarized zone.


(3) The provisions of paragraphs (7), (8), (9), and (10) of the Armistice Agreement can only be made into a temporary supplementary agreement, applicable solely to the handling of these prisoners of war, and it must be stipulated that only genuine prisoners of war may be permitted to enter the aforementioned designated prisoner-of-war custody sites within the demilitarized zone. No other persons whatsoever, except for personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Indian forces, Indian Red Cross personnel, our side’s explaining representatives, and representatives of both sides, shall be allowed to enter this demilitarized zone. We will put forward a counter-proposal and telegraph it tonight.

3. Regarding the effective date of all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement except for Paragraph 12, we should take the initiative to set it, in accordance with the 63 provisions proposed by the other side and agreed to by us, at a time after the ceasefire comes into effect within twelve hours of signing. The starting time should be the time when the personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission enter Korea after the ceasefire and, proceeding from Panmunjom, arrive at their respective rear ports to begin carrying out their supervisory and inspection duties. The interval between the time when all provisions of this Armistice Agreement come into full effect and the time when the ceasefire takes effect will be approximately five days. It is hoped that you will make a more precise calculation and then propose it.

4. The signing date, considering the time needed for various preparatory tasks, including the correction of the military demarcation line, the printing of maps, and construction work, will not be earlier than July 26. If you estimate this to be possible, you may set the signing date with the other side as the 26th. We should insist that Kim, Peng, and Clark⁶ do not attend the signing ceremony, and that the texts should be sent to them for signature. As for the number of participants in the ceremony, since Kim and Peng will not be present, we may agree to the number proposed by the other side.

5. The detailed working rules of the Military Armistice Commission⁷ remain to be examined. You are requested to submit your examination opinions by telegraph.

6. Regarding the exchange of the total numbers of prisoners of war to be repatriated, we agree with the opinion in your telegram. In addition to the old prisoners of war, our side will add another one thousand newly captured puppet prisoners of war.