Telegram to Li Kenong [1] Regarding the Two-Step Procedure for Negotiations Following the Resumption of Talks (July 9, 1953) Comrade Li Kenong, with copy to Premier Kim and Commander Peng [2]: We have received your telegram of 8 July at 02:00. Negotiations after the resumption should proceed in two stages. First, we should discuss the various guarantees pertaining to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement; only thereafter shall we address the preparatory work for the signing. Accordingly, in the statements to be made at the meeting on the 10th, no reference should be made to the subsidiary committees. Instead, it should be stated that, pending agreement on the implementation guarantees of the Armistice Agreement, preparations for the signing cannot be initiated. The question of revising the Military Demarcation Line should not be raised at this juncture but handled as per our telegram of 8 July at 03:30. As for the issue of submitting the case of the 27,000 [3] to the Political Conference, it is premature to raise it now; we should hold off until just before the signing is about to take place. We have revised the draft statement and are transmitting it herewith, intending to secure the first speaking slot at the meeting on the 10th so as to present it initially. Should the opposing side respond in an overbearing or sophistical manner, we should refute their arguments on the spot. If their reply is of an explanatory nature and delivered in a reasonable tone, we should indicate that further consideration is required and propose a recess. Should they pose questions, we may suggest taking them back for study and then calling for a recess. Judging from press reports, Washington is instructing General Clark [4] to send another letter. Should the opposing side read out this letter at the meeting on the 10th before we have had the opportunity to speak first, regardless of its content, we should nonetheless deliver our prepared statement first. Subsequently, depending on the substance of their letter, we may offer a brief response, promising a more comprehensive reply at a later date. For instance, if the letter is essentially similar to that of the 29th, we should express our dissatisfaction and request that they carefully consider our remarks before formulating a reply. If the new letter contains more concrete assurances, we should state that we will take it back for further examination. And if the letter emphasizes proceeding with the preparatory work for the signing, we should reiterate the final paragraph of our statement, urging the other side to give it serious thought and provide a response. Mao Zedong, 22:00, 9 July Printed according to the revised text.

Li Kenong was at the time Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s Government, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Delegation to the Korean Armistice Talks. [2] Premier Kim refers to Kim Il-sung, Prime Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Commander Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [ ] Refers to the South Korean government under Syngman Rhee’s leadership, which brazenly violated the armistice agreement already signed by both sides by forcibly detaining over 27,000 of our captured personnel. [4] Clark was at the time Commander-in-Chief of the “United Nations Command” invading Korea.