To Comrade Li Kenong,[1] with copies to Premier Kim and Commander Peng:[2]
(July 9, 1953)

Your telegram of 8 July, 2:00 hours, received. The negotiations following this resumption of the session should proceed in two steps. First, the various guarantees concerning the implementation of the armistice agreement should be discussed, and only then should the preparatory work prior to signing be addressed. Therefore, in the statement at the meeting on the 10th, do not mention the various small-group meetings; instead, indicate that so long as the guarantees for implementing the armistice agreement have not yet been properly settled, it is impossible to proceed with the preparatory work for signing. The question of revising the military demarcation line should not be raised now; handle it according to our telegram of 8 July, 3:30 hours. Raising the issue of the 27,000 persons[3] being referred to the political conference is premature at this stage; it should be deferred until just before the signing is about to take place. We have revised the draft statement and are now sending it to you. Prepare to take the floor first at the meeting on the 10th and present it. If the other side’s reply is outrageous or resorts to sophistry, refute it on the spot. If the reply is of an explanatory nature and their attitude is not bad, then indicate that we need to consider it and propose an adjournment. If the other side raises questions, indicate that we will take them back for study and propose an adjournment. According to press reactions, Washington is instructing Clark[4] to send another letter. If, at the meeting on the 10th, the other side reads this letter before we have been able to take the floor first, then regardless of its content, we should still first read out our statement, and then, depending on the content of their letter, give a brief reply, telling them that a comprehensive response will be given on another day. If its content is basically similar to that of the 29th, indicate that we cannot be entirely satisfied and request the other side to study our statement and provide a reply. If the letter contains somewhat more concrete guarantees than the previous one, then indicate that we will take it back for study. If the letter emphasizes proceeding with the preparatory work for signing, then reiterate the final paragraph of our statement, requesting the other side to give it serious consideration and provide a reply.

Mao Zedong
9 July, 22:00 hours

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[1] Li Kenong, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s Government, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, and Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Delegation to the Korean Armistice Negotiations.
[2] Premier Kim refers to Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Commander Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.
[3] Refers to the incident in which the Syngman Rhee government of South Korea brazenly violated the armistice agreement already signed by both sides and forcibly detained over 27,000 of our captured personnel.
[4] Clark, then Commander-in-Chief of the invading “United Nations Command.”