(July 8, 1953)
Commander Peng, and for the information of Premier Kim and Comrade Li Kenong[1]:
Your telegram of the afternoon of July 7 has been received and forwarded to Pyongyang. We agree that the issue of revising the military demarcation line[2] should not be raised with the other side for the time being, but should be postponed until around the 18th, when a decision will be made in light of the military situation. If by around the 18th there has been no significant change in the originally set military demarcation line, this issue need not be raised. If by that time the task of capturing the area south of Kumseong has been basically accomplished, then the revision of the military demarcation line should be proposed, so as to bring it into conformity with the actual situation at that time. If the other side stubbornly refuses, we may take a step back and propose that the newly occupied area be made a demilitarized zone, with the military demarcation line drawn within this area. If the other side continues to firmly oppose this, we must still contend for it until an appropriate moment, and ultimately establish it on the military demarcation line of June 17. During the period from the resumption of the talks until around the 18th, discussions may be held with the other side on various other issues concerning the implementation of the armistice agreement, and every effort should be made to obtain affirmative replies from the other side on these issues. Therefore, barring new changes, the date for signing the armistice must also be postponed until after July 20.
If the armistice agreement can be signed around July 20, then regardless of whether Syngman Rhee[3] participates in the armistice or not, or if he participates but continues to carry out sabotage after the armistice, we can still use the signing of the armistice agreement to undermine the morale of the "United Nations Command" camp and the U.S. and ROK forces. If it cannot be signed, the initiative will still remain in our hands, and we can continue to strike at the enemy politically and militarily.

Mao Zedong
3:30 a.m., July 8

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[1] Premier Kim refers to Kim Il Sung, then Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Comrade Li Kenong refers to Li Kenong, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government and head of the Chinese People's Volunteers delegation to the Korean Armistice Negotiations.
[2] Military demarcation line, i.e., the military demarcation line.
[3] Syngman Rhee, then President of the Republic of Korea.