(April 23, 1953)


Peng:
This document (I) seems approvable, so that they may make proper preparations for the attack. As for whether to cease hostilities sooner or to refrain from fighting in order to facilitate negotiations, a decision can be made at an appropriate time in May. Please handle it as you see fit.
Mao Zedong
April 23


[I]
Refers to Deng Hua’s telegram dated April 20, 1953, addressed to Yang Dezhi and others, with copy to the Central Military Commission of the CPC, outlining several points regarding the launch of a summer counteroffensive on the Korean battlefield. The telegram states that although the likelihood of a resumption of armistice talks and a subsequent ceasefire is now greater than before, the possibility of protracted negotiations still exists. Even if the enemy, compelled by the overall situation, has no choice but to agree to a halt in hostilities, it will nonetheless take considerable time for the fighting to actually come to a complete stop. Moreover, the enemy is cunning; it seeks to use military pressure to bolster its deceptive tactics during the talks and extract further concessions, while also hoping to gain some breathing room to complete certain strategic measures. Based on this assessment, we must adhere to Chairman Mao Zedong’s directive: “Strive for a ceasefire while preparing for protraction; on the military front, however, we should plan for protraction—focus solely on fighting, disregard the talks, maintain unwavering vigilance, and carry out all plans as originally scheduled.” Accordingly, we must intensify all preparatory work and avoid any complacency or slackening of effort. It is imperative to continue completing the coastal defense fortifications on both the eastern and western coasts, ensuring that we are always ready to repel any enemy landings or offensives. At the same time, we must adopt a policy of tit-for-tat, using active measures to support the negotiation process. For the present, individual tactical counterattacks should still be conducted. The construction of the eastern and western coastal defenses is expected to be roughly completed by the end of April. In launching the summer counteroffensive, our main thrust should be directed against U.S. forces and their foreign auxiliaries. This time, we should not seek to open too wide a front; instead, our aim should be total annihilation, pursuing a strategy of accumulating small and numerous victories into one major triumph. The counteroffensive is tentatively scheduled to begin in early June and conclude by early July. All preparatory work must be finished by the end of May, after which further action will be determined according to developments.