Comments on Deng Hua’s [1] Several Opinions Regarding the Launch of a Summer Offensive (April 23, 1953)

Peng [2]: This document [3] seems approvable, so that they may proceed with their preparations for attack.
As for whether an early armistice can be achieved, or whether it would be more advantageous to refrain from fighting in order to facilitate negotiations, a decision on these matters may be made at an appropriate time in May.
Please handle as you see fit.
Mao Zedong April 23 Printed from the manuscript.

Notes [1] Deng Hua was then acting commander and acting political commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [2] Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, who at that time served as vice chairman of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission and commander and political commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [3] This refers to Deng Hua’s telegram dated April 20, 1953, addressed to Yang Dezhi and others, with copy to the Military Commission, outlining several opinions on launching a summer offensive on the Korean battlefield.
The telegram stated that although the likelihood of a resumption of negotiations and a subsequent ceasefire was greater this time than previously, the possibility of protracted talks still remained.
Even if the enemy, compelled by the overall situation, had no choice but to halt hostilities, it would nonetheless take a considerable amount of time before a genuine cessation could be effected.
Moreover, the enemy was cunning and sought to use military pressure to bolster its bargaining position during the talks, hoping thereby to extract further concessions; it also intended to buy itself some time in order to complete certain strategic measures.
In light of this assessment, it was imperative to adhere to the principle of “striving for a ceasefire while preparing for prolongation,” intensifying all forms of preparation and avoiding any complacency or slackening of vigilance.
Work on the coastal defense fortifications along both the eastern and western coasts should be continued, so as to be able to repel at any moment any enemy landing or offensive.
At the same time, a policy of reciprocal action must be pursued, employing active measures to support the negotiation process; accordingly, individual tactical counterattacks should continue to be carried out.
It is anticipated that the coastal defenses on the east and west will be substantially completed by the end of April.
As for the planned summer offensive, priority should be given to striking U.S. forces and those of its foreign satellite states.
In conducting this operation, care should be taken not to overextend the front, aiming instead for total annihilation, and adopting a strategy of accumulating small and numerous victories into one major success.
The offensive is scheduled to begin in early June and conclude by early July.
All preparatory work must be completed by the end of May, after which further steps will be determined according to developments.