Resolve the Problem of the “Five Excesses”
(March 19, 1953)

e: Xuanji, V. pp. 77-19, Available English Translation: SW, V, pp.
qo!

riding to this source, this article was an intra-Party directive drafted by Mao and
by the Central Committee of the CPC. The problem of the “Five Excesses” was
fori raised publicly in an RMRB editorial, June 6, 1953.

This document, like the previous one, reflects Mao’s support for focusing on
production and deemphasizing class struggle in the countryside at this time. It
‘also demonstrates Mao’s detailed knowledge of the work-style of the Party and
government organizations in the rural areas and stands as one of his first analyses of bureaucratism and its consequences during the stage of socialism, See C.
Bettelheim (1978), pp. 62-64, 71-77, for an analysis that links bureaucratism to
administrative processes, Lé., reports and meetings, developed by administrative organizations in order to compensate for the lack of knowledge that they
need to execute their responsibilities. Bettelheim argues that this knowledge is
possessed by production units that have, however, been deprived of their decision-making responsibilities, and when the two are united, that is, when decision-making coincides with possession of knowledge, the basis for
bureaucratism will be eliminated,

_ (1) In the work of our Party and government organizations in the rural areas
there exist some serious problems of being divorced from the peasant masses
and of violating the interest of the peasants and the activists among them.

constitute the so-called problem of the “Five Excesses.” The “Five

a ses” refer to an excess of assignments; an excess of meetings and trainof Courses. an excess of documents, reports, and statistical forms, an excess

S Otgunizations, and an excess of extra duties for activists. These problems
© existed for a long time, and the Center, at one time, had issued directives
arding some of these problems, requesting that the Party committees at the

us levels pay attention to these problems and solve them. However, not

Rae ey they not been solved, they have even become aggravated, The rea-
, tf this is that the problem has never been systematically raised as a
“hole. ty particular, the most significant [reason for this is that) the struggle
tinct decentralizationism' and bureaucratism has not been launched in the
8 of Party and government leadership at the five levels of the Center, the

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greater [administrative] regions, the provinces (municipalities), a ;
districts, and the «ian. This is because the “Five Excesses” that &
districts and the xiang are basically not generated in the districts ap
themselves but at the higher levels. [The “Five Excesses”] stem from th
tence of serious decentralizationism and bureaucratism in the organs gy
and government leadership at the xian level and above. In some CARES th
products that were left behind from the revolutionary war and the pig
land reform’ and that have not been changed up to now. In 1953, th “ei
carrying out the Center’s directives with regard to opposing bur
commandism, and violation of law and order,’ we must pay attention fy
coming bureaucratism and decentralizationism in the leadership @ organs
alter those institutions and methods that were necessary in the past but,
longer necessary now, Only in this way can the problem be solved }
leadership organs at the various levels, on the problem of assigning fi
the problem of calling meetings and organizing training courses, on Ts
lem of issuing documents and statistical forms and requesting reports f
lower levels, on the problem of regulating the forms of district and ©
izations, and on the problem of using the activists in the rural areas, fron
on it is up to the comrades in major positions of responsibility in Party
committees and in governments at the levels of xian and above to establish:
priate regulations in accordance with practicable conditions. In some es
Center should set out unified regulations, In the past, many work dep rt
in the Party, government, and people's organizations at all levels had inde
dently assigned tasks to the lower levels; arbitrarily convened meetil
held training [sessions] for lower-level personnel and the activists in th
tryside; issued floods of documents, charts, and lists; or casually de ]
reports from the lower levels and the rural [units}; all these bad instil
and bad methods must be resolutely abolished and should be replaced by a
tutions and methods for which there is leadership, that are unified, i
the circumstances, As for the many kinds of committees that exist in
xiang in the countryside and the excess of extra duties for activists, hind
production and causing people to be divorced from the masses, the
also be resolutely but gradually altered. .
(2) [Regarding this problem in the] various related departments 1
Party, government, and people's organizations at the Center level, the ©
rades in charge of the Organization Department of the Central Committee,
Central People’s Government’s Administration Council, and its three at
ary committees - the Finance and Economics Committee, the Cultut
Education Committee, and the Political and Judicial Affairs Committee
respectively held responsible by the Central Committee for rapidly cleamme?
the various things that in the past have caused the problems of the “7
Excesses,” for formulating appropriate institutions and methods |for d€
with these problems], and for reporting to the Central Committee.
(3) [Regarding this problem in] the various greater [administrative] Te
and provinces and municipalities, the comrades in charge of the Valr

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. of the Central Committee, the subbureaus, the provincial and munici-
Party! committees, and the administrative organs at the corresponding
4 should assume the responsibility of clearing up the problems of the
ye EXCesses” formulate for themselves their own method of solving them,
wf report to the Central Committee. In order to achieve this goal, we request
ad each bureaus of the Central Committee, subbureau, and provincial and
toa a) [Party] committee send out an investigation team specifically to
nt itself with the problems of the “Five Excesses” and to investigate the
sion in one or two districts or xiang under its jurisdiction (in the cities
they should investigate one or two districts or neighborhoods) and use {the
pests] a reference material for solving the problems.
4) As for the problem of the “Five Excesses” at the special district and xian
_ yevels, it 1s up to the provincial [Party] committees to bear the responsibility
‘of giving guidance in resolving them.

(5) Agricultural production is the predominant work in the countryside. In
the countryside all other types of work revolve around agricultural production
and serve its interests, All so-called work assignments and work methods that
may hinder the peasants from carrying out production must be avoided. At the
“moment, agriculture in our country is basically still a scattered small-scale

peasant economy operated with old-fashioned implements. This is vastly different from the mechanized, collectivized agriculture of the Soviet Union.
“Therefore in our country during the current period of transition, it is still

impossible for us to put into effect unified and planned production in agriculture, except on the state farms;* nor is it possible to interfere too much with
~ the peasants. We can still only use [our} pricing policy” and necessary and
 practicable economic and political work to direct agricultural production and

Coordinate it with industry so that it can be absorbed into the national eco-
Nomic plan. Any so-called agricultural “planning” and rural “assignments”

‘that go beyond these limits will necessarily be impracticable and will neces-
“Wily incite the opposition of the peasants and cause our Party to be divorced
‘from the peasant masses, who make up eighty per cent of the population of the
“Satire country. This is very dangerous. The so-called problem of the “Five

s” in the work of the districts and the xiang is in large measure the
Pression of this type of excessive interference with the peasants. (The other
‘on is the product of the necessities of the revolutionary war and the land
thee has been handed down [since then}.) It has already aroused the dis-

faction of the peasants, and so it must be changed.

Notes

nia Mt tom “decenitalizationism” bas been used fo translate the Chinese term fensuan zhuyi
s Chewhere has been wariously translated a) “deveotralism™ (os in SW, V), oF
pn rer “ur “eacessive decentralization.” “Decentralizationiam” preserves the connota-
Pig gn see bere. Mao refers, by this term, 10 the practice of decentralized and uncnordi-
Son-making wi the various levels of the Party apparaties, 2 pinctice that in his view had

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become by habit an operational principle, When we translate the tern as dispersionigg, 5
Mar, 21, 1955. we do 0 because we detect there an escalation in Mo's misgivings cog
ihe phenomenon, unc because he seems to be describing not merely uncoordinated « “7
ing, bun deliberate und malicious undermining of the interests of the whale by indivichual
obllective acting to their own advantage at the expense of others,

2. See text Feb. 18. 1951, note 2

5. See text Jan, 5, 1953.

4, State farms were relasively large-scale agricultural enterprises managed direc
state. Their establishment was explained in Article 20 of the (welve- Year) National Py
Agricultural Development, 1956-1967, published in Jun. 1956 (als known as the Bory A
The purposes of the state farms were; (1) to produce agricultural fivestock predicts. |y
raw materials, and commodity grain directly for the state: (2) fd train cadres and fecha
agricultural mechanization: and (3) 16 demonstrate to the peasants the advantage Of ¢
tion (cooperativization) and large-scale mechunizatvon, In addition, state farms pro
tions for young people and demobilized military personnel and were important i the ¢
of previously uncultivated Jand, particularly uy border regions. State farms were wai
units of 5,000 tw 10,000 mu each, They were also characterized by extensive cult
reclaimed-Land areas, and a regulates! wage of remuneration system. By and large, they

were usually directly controlled by the Center through the Agricultural Exploration Deg
(rongken bu) Of the Stale Council, Less heavily mechanized state furms were offen 1
state authorities at the provincial of regional level Although by 1962 there were ele
state farms throughout the country that together oocupicd about 5 per cent of the arable te
the development of state firm enterprises had net been economically rewarding since fh
1950s and carly L960s, and in general the development of the enterprises as a whole
pended, See J, Prybyla (1978), pp. 57-59.
5. The pricing policy to which Mao refers is the policy in which ihe state pays a hig
an agricultural product for which i has a demand and thus stimulates its production
lower price for products whose production it does not wish 10 encounige. An alien
to simply assign tasks to different producers regardless of the conditions of demand and
effect a balanced distribution of income across the board. This was not endorsed by Maa:
considered it ultraletiist.