Marginalia on Deng Hua’s Report Concerning the Military Situation in Korea and the Guidelines and Tasks for Next Year [1] (December 1952) 1. It should be affirmed that the enemy intends to land on a large scale with five to seven divisions along the Han River–Yalu River line and to parachute behind our lines. The timing should be prepared for in the spring, though it may come even earlier. We must greatly strengthen our bunkers and tunnels, deploy five armies along this front, including four experienced ones, delineate defensive sectors, and resolutely prevent the enemy from landing; there must be no mistake. 2. The second area of danger for a landing is the Tongchon–Wonsan line, and the third is the Chinampo–Han River line. 3. Under no circumstances must we allow the enemy to land on the west coast, and especially not along the Han River–Yalu River line. Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Note [1]: These three passages of marginalia by Mao Zedong were written on a report submitted on December 4, 1952, by Deng Hua, acting commander and acting political commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, concerning the military situation in Korea and the guidelines and tasks for the following year. The first two passages were penned beside remarks in the report discussing the possibility of a U.S. landing on our flanks or rear and analyzing various potential scenarios for such a landing. The third passage was written next to the following sentence in the report: “Given the present situation, we can say that transportation and supply are now reasonably assured, enabling us to engage in a more protracted struggle with the enemy. (However, if the enemy were to land on the west coast, transportation would become very difficult.)”