Postscript The third volume of “Mao Zedong’s Collected Works Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” contains a total of X documents by Mao Zedong dating from 1952. Among them, Y were written in his own hand; Z were records of speeches and talks that he personally reviewed and approved; and W were documents he had examined and authorized for publication under his name, including congratulatory telegrams, reply letters, orders, and responses delivered upon receiving credentials. Of these documents, V had already been published—some after Mao’s death—in such collections as Volume Five of “Selected Works of Mao Zedong,” “Selected Letters of Mao Zedong,” and “Military Writings of Mao Zedong” (internal edition). The remaining U are being published here for the first time. The editors have deemed certain documents particularly significant and have printed their titles in bold type in the table of contents; there are N such items. 1952 marked the final year of the period of national economic recovery in China. During that year, our country completed the task of restoring the national economy ahead of schedule, achieved a fundamental improvement in fiscal and economic conditions, essentially concluded land reform in the newly liberated areas, successfully brought the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns to a close, and made comprehensive preparations for transitioning to planned economic construction. Beginning in the second half of that year, Mao Zedong and other leaders of the CPC Central Committee began to deliberate and propose the Party’s general line for the transitional period. The documents contained in this volume vividly reflect the theoretical viewpoints, policy ideas, and experiential summaries put forward by Mao Zedong as he guided the completion of these various tasks. These materials hold considerable historical value for the study of China’s transition from new democracy to socialism. The present postscript offers a brief overview of the content and background of the documents, focusing on four key issues.

I. On the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns In December 1951, a campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism was launched within Party and state organs, quickly spreading nationwide with great vigor and decisiveness. As the Three-Anti Campaign deepened, it exposed widespread illegal activities by corrupt elements within Party, government, military, and mass organizations, many of which were linked to unlawful elements among the bourgeoisie. To curb and crack down on such illegal behavior, on January 26, 1952, Mao Zedong drafted for the CPC Central Committee the “Central Directive on First Launching the Five-Anti Campaign in Large and Medium-Sized Cities,” calling for the mobilization of workers, law-abiding bourgeois elements, and other citizens across the country—especially in large and medium-sized cities—to launch a Five-Anti Campaign aimed at combating bribery, tax evasion, embezzlement of state property, substandard workmanship, and theft of state economic intelligence, thereby complementing the Three-Anti Campaign already underway within Party and state organs. Working in tandem, the Two Campaigns were declared victoriously concluded around the same time in August 1952 after more than six months of intensive effort. This volume includes a total of A documents—consisting of directives, comments, letters, and important marginal notes added during the review process—that Mao Zedong wrote to guide the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, accounting for approximately two-fifths of the entire collection. These documents reflect our Party’s firm resolve and tremendous determination to rectify various forms of corruption within Party and state organs and to strike at the five harmful practices of unscrupulous capitalists. They clarify the central leadership’s guiding principles, policies, and strategic thinking regarding the Two Campaigns and summarize practical experiences gained in different localities. In addition to what was mentioned in the postscript to the second volume of this series, the following points merit particular mention: Emphasis was placed on uniting the majority while isolating the minority to swiftly forge a united front for both the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns. During the initial phase of mobilization, care was taken to clearly distinguish between corruption and waste and to conduct a detailed analysis of instances of overspending by cadres. In the anti-corruption struggle, those found guilty of minor acts of corruption—originally defined as involving sums below 500,000 yuan (in old currency, equivalent to 50 or 100 yuan in later denominations)—were generally not treated as full-fledged corrupt elements but were dealt with leniently “so as to free more people and facilitate education.” (Telegram to Chen Yi, February 29) Regarding the classification of private industrial and commercial households, a category of basically law-abiding households was introduced, and it was roughly determined that law-abiding, basically law-abiding, and semi-law-abiding, semi-illegal households together accounted for about 95 percent of all such businesses, while severely and completely illegal enterprises comprised approximately 5 percent. (Directive, March 5) As the campaigns entered their peak phase, emphasis was laid on “conducting thorough investigations and studies, keeping meticulous accounts, distinguishing genuine tigers from impostors, and strictly prohibiting forced confessions,” with the observation that “this is the key to achieving complete victory in the current ‘tiger-hunting’ operation.” (Comments, February 22 and 26) During the stage of finalizing cases, attention was directed toward rigorous screening procedures: “Not a single bad actor must be let off, nor should any innocent person be wronged”; “We must act conscientiously and pragmatically, without fear of trouble, persevere to the end, uphold what is right, correct what is wrong, demote those who deserve demotion, promote those who deserve promotion, and leave pending only cases where guilt or innocence remains uncertain. In short, we must resolve matters truthfully.” (Comments, May 9 and 10) It was also stressed that “city-level municipal committees and governments should, while carrying out the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, ensure the normal functioning of economic life,” adding that “production, transportation, finance, and trade must not come to a standstill.” (Comments, February 15 and 17) Proposals were made to control the scale of the campaigns and implement them in a phased manner: during the spring plowing season, no Three-Anti campaigns were to be conducted at the county, district, or township levels, with all efforts concentrated on production; the Five-Anti Campaign in large and medium-sized cities was to proceed step by step, with no such campaigns to be held at the county, district, or township level. With regard to offending capitalists, the general approach was to require restitution rather than impose fines, and to determine the amount of restitution realistically, reducing excessively high demands to reasonable levels so that “we could gain the upper hand politically and economically, enabling the economy to recover and develop rapidly, bringing capitalists back into alignment with us and restoring their entrepreneurial enthusiasm, while preventing unemployment among workers.” (Comment, May 9) Furthermore, it was suggested that relevant laws and regulations be formulated and people’s courts established to punish corrupt officials and unlawful capitalists according to law. Mao Zedong pointed out that conducting fair trials based on factual evidence and recovering stolen assets constituted “an excellent opportunity for communists to learn how to govern the country, bearing great significance for the entire Party and the nation.” (Comment, May 10) Although some overestimations of the situation and overly ambitious targets for “tiger-hunting” led to excessive measures in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, thanks to careful guidance along the lines just outlined, many problems were promptly corrected once detected, and most issues were resolved fairly and pragmatically during the case-finalization phase. In the fields of education, science, culture, and health, the Three-Anti Campaign was conducted concurrently with the ideological reeducation movement among intellectuals that had begun in 1950. Early in the Three-Anti Campaign, Mao Zedong approved Li Fuchun’s report dated January 11, 1952, concerning the progress of the Three-Anti Campaign at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, as well as Bo Yibo’s letter conveying this report to Mao. In his report, Li Fuchun noted that “the primary purpose of the Three-Anti Campaign at the Academy is to combine intellectual enlightenment with ideological transformation.” He emphasized the need to establish the principle of “protecting talent without causing harm”: those who had already undergone self-criticism should be assisted in overcoming their shortcomings, whereas those who had not yet engaged in self-examination should not be publicly urged to do so. (Comments and annotations, January 13) Later, in a telegram approved by Mao Zedong regarding the handling of scientists and scholars during the Three-Anti Campaign, it was stipulated that “ideological transformation should remain the central focus” in dealing with valuable specialists and scholars. Those who had engaged in corrupt practices prior to liberation were to be treated as having ideological problems; however, any action taken against individuals who had become corrupt after liberation required prior approval from the municipal committee, and in some cases even from the provincial committee or the central bureau, in order to avoid bias. II. On Major Class Struggles Within the Country and the Bourgeoisie Issue In June 1952, in a comment appended to a document from the United Front Work Department, Mao Zedong stated: “Following the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the principal contradiction within China has become that between the working class and the national bourgeoisie; therefore, the national bourgeoisie should no longer be referred to as the intermediate class.” This document, included in the present volume, demonstrates Mao Zedong’s judgment that the main class contradiction in Chinese society had by then shifted, a point he believed should be promptly clarified within the Party. As early as September 1948, during a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other central leaders conducted a forward-looking analysis of changes in the principal contradiction within China after the victory of the new democratic revolution. In an article titled “On the Economy and Cooperatives of New Democracy,” drafted around early September, Liu Shaoqi pointed out that private capitalist economies and the substantial capitalist elements arising from small-scale production “would inevitably compete with the state economy and cooperative economies even under a new democratic social system. This competition would grow increasingly intense over time and continue for a long period. Such is the fundamental and primary contradiction emerging gradually in the new society after the overthrow of imperialist, feudal, and bureaucratic capitalist rule, although it had existed in the old society as well. It is the contradiction between new democracy and old democracy or old capitalism—the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants on one side and the proletariat and other working people on the other.” On September 8, Mao Zedong stated in his report at the meeting that now, with the revolutionary bourgeoisie having completed its mission, the principal internal contradiction lay between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, while externally it remained the contradiction with imperialism. On September 13, Liu Shaoqi also remarked in his speech that once national power had been secured and the democratic revolutionary stage had ended, with feudal forces eliminated, imperialist forces driven out, and bureaucratic capital eradicated, leaving no further contradictions between the people and these forces, the primary contradiction would indeed be that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On September 15, Zhang Wentian’s draft outline prepared by the Northeast Bureau concerning the composition of the northeastern economy and the basic guidelines for economic development in the region likewise asserted: “The socialist-type economy operated by the new democratic state led by the proletariat stands in opposition to the private capitalist economy.” “This contradiction—the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—is the fundamental contradiction of new democratic society after the complete elimination of oppression by imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The struggle over this contradiction, particularly the prolonged economic competition associated with it, will ultimately determine whether new democratic society transitions to socialism or simply returns to ordinary capitalism.” The analysis conducted at the September meeting of the Political Bureau regarding the evolving nature of the principal contradiction after the revolutionary victory was subsequently confirmed and incorporated into the resolution adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held in March 1949. However, during the first two years following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the principal class contradiction within the country did not immediately undergo such a shift. As Mao Zedong observed in a comment in April 1950: “At present, our primary adversary is imperialism, feudalism, and the remnants of the reactionary Kuomintang, not the national bourgeoisie.” (See page X of the first volume of this series.) Based on this assessment, he proposed the strategic guideline of “not attacking on all fronts” at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held that June. By 1952, after roughly three years of efforts—including the expropriation of bureaucratic capital and its transfer to state ownership, the expulsion of imperialist forces from China, the relatively thorough suppression of counterrevolutionary elements across the country, and the near-complete conclusion of land reform in the newly liberated areas encompassing over 300 million people—the class relations within the country had undergone a historic transformation. It was precisely at this juncture that Mao Zedong explicitly identified the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie as the principal class contradiction domestically. The recognition that this contradiction had become the primary class contradiction in Chinese society did not imply an immediate call for the abolition of the bourgeoisie; these are two distinct matters. Even during the height of the Three-Anti Campaign, while advocating for a decisive crackdown on the rampant aggression of the bourgeoisie, Mao Zedong simultaneously forwarded a report by Bo Yibo on the status of the Three-Anti Campaign in central organs and future recommendations. This report emphasized that the political and economic status accorded to the national bourgeoisie under the Common Program had yet to change. In the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the focus should be on targeting a small number of major illegal businessmen, while encouraging lesser offenders to confess voluntarily, repent, and pledge allegiance to government policies, at least maintaining a neutral stance. Law-abiding businesspeople, meanwhile, must be protected. (January 21) In a significant revision he made to a draft directive from the United Front Work Department concerning several issues related to the conclusion of the Three-Anti Campaigns among various democratic parties, Mao Zedong reiterated: “During the new democratic period—that is, the period in which the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are permitted to exist—it is impermissible for the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie to hold independent positions or ideologies. Such notions are divorced from Marxism and represent a naive, even laughable, way of thinking. Some Party members have already developed this erroneous mindset during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, and it must be corrected.” (March 27) This erroneous thinking had previously been reflected in several articles published in the first three issues of the journal “Study” in 1952. Mao Zedong took note of these problems and issued a stern critique. The Central Propaganda Department submitted a self-criticism to the central leadership regarding the errors in “Study,” pointing out that the authors of these articles had failed to distinguish between two crucial matters: first, using the Marxist-Leninist ideological system to educate and transform teachers, students, and staff of state organs (excluding political representatives of the bourgeoisie), thereby eradicating bourgeois ideology; and second, employing the Common Program to reform the “five poisons” of bourgeois thought, compelling them to operate legally under the leadership of the working class. On April 4, Mao Zedong forwarded this report from the Central Propaganda Department, making several revisions and adding a passage affirming Feng Ding, deputy head of the propaganda department of the East China Bureau, for his article published in the Shanghai Liberation Daily entitled “Learning Mao Zedong Thought to Grasp the Character of the Bourgeoisie and Struggle Against Its Ideology,” stating that “the views expressed in this article are fundamentally correct,” though “certain shortcomings have been amended,” and that the April issue of “Study” was preparing to reprint it. The version of Feng Ding’s article reprinted in “Study,” retitled “On Grasping the Character of the Chinese Bourgeoisie and Struggling Against Its Erroneous Ideologies,” contained three passages that were notably revised or supplemented. These three passages read as follows: “Bourgeois ideology varies among different groups and factions. For example, in China, there are progressive and backward tendencies within the bourgeoisie. At the same time, as a class, it shares common characteristics: namely, the ideology rooted in the exploitative system of wage labor under capitalism. The unrestrained pursuit of profit and extreme individualism that stems from this ideology often leads to speculative practices, damage to public interests, and even actions that are profoundly detrimental to others. The harm caused by such thinking to the general populace is exceptionally profound and extensive.” “As classes, bourgeois and proletarian ideologies are diametrically opposed, since one represents individualism while the other advocates collectivism. This opposition manifests itself everywhere. However, under certain social conditions, a unified front can still be formed—for instance, during the Western bourgeois revolutions. In China, similar unified fronts have emerged on several occasions and continue to exist today. Because of the inherent contradictions, such fronts necessarily involve both cooperation and struggle. Take, for example, the recent ‘Five-Anti’ campaign: it was triggered by the bourgeoisie’s violation of the Common Program and its relentless pursuit of private gain, which undermined the interests of both the state and the people. Consequently, the working class and the people had no choice but to resist in order to safeguard those interests.” “Today, bourgeois ideology in China possesses a dual nature. On the positive side, it can genuinely embrace the leadership of the working class and abide by the Common Program. Only when subjected to constant criticism and pressure from the working class—both politically and economically—can the bourgeoisie’s negative aspects be effectively curbed, allowing its positive aspects to be fully realized, even if only incrementally, over time and within specific scopes, thereby contributing more to the nation and the people. The bourgeoisie can only find a path forward and a means of survival by setting aside its nefarious ‘five poisons’ and acting in accordance with the Common Program, formulated through consultation among all revolutionary classes under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, as well as with the various decrees successively promulgated by the People’s Government.” Several colleagues who worked in the editorial department of “Study” at the time witnessed Mao Zedong’s revisions to Feng Ding’s manuscript, but the original revised draft has yet to be located. Therefore, we cannot definitively determine which portions of the revisions were made by Mao Zedong and which by the editorial staff of “Study.” According to the recollections of those who were involved in the editing process at the time, it is highly likely that some of the changes were indeed authored by Mao Zedong. On September 5, in a letter to Huang Yanpei, he again addressed the errors in certain articles published earlier in “Study,” reiterating: “It is necessary to require the bourgeoisie to accept the fundamental principles of the working class—such as the abolition of exploitation, the elimination of class distinctions, and the rejection of individualism—and to embrace the Marxist worldview.” “This amounts to demanding that the bourgeoisie embrace socialism. While this may be feasible for a small number of progressive individuals, it is inappropriate to make such a demand of the bourgeoisie as a whole, especially during the First Five-Year Plan period.” “At this stage, we should merely require them to accept the leadership of the working class—that is, to adhere to the Common Program—and refrain from going beyond that.” “To go further and insist that the bourgeoisie adopt the working-class mindset, or in other words, to prevent them from pursuing profit-driven interests and instead encourage them to think like workers—that is, to believe that ‘there is no life without labor’—and to aspire solely to socialism rather than capitalism, is neither possible nor advisable.” III. On the Party’s General Line for the Transitional Period The general line for the transitional period began to take shape in the second half of 1952. However, among Mao Zedong’s writings from that year, only a single document directly reflects the process of its formulation: a comment dated November 13, 1952, appended to a letter from Luo Ruiqing. In this comment, Mao Zedong noted: “The reason for this matter is that when I spoke about it previously, I did not clearly specify its nature—as was done at the meeting on November 12—nor did I delineate the scope of dissemination or indicate who should not receive the information. Consequently, some comrades disseminated it within a certain range. This is not their responsibility, but mine. Comrade Luo Ruiqing has requested disciplinary action in connection with this matter, and I see no objection to granting it.” The “matter” referred to in Luo Ruiqing’s letter originated as follows: On September 24, the day Zhou Enlai returned from the Soviet Union, Luo Ruiqing attended a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and heard Mao Zedong discuss his vision for China’s transition to socialism. Mao stated that socialism could be basically accomplished within ten to fifteen years, rather than waiting until a decade later to begin the transition. The Second Plenary Session had proposed the policy of “limitation and counter-limitation,” but now this concept had been further elaborated. Currently, the private sector accounts for 30 percent of industry and the state-owned sector for 70 percent—a ratio of 3 to 7; retail trade is structured as 40 percent private and 60 percent state-owned. If development continues along these lines for another five years, the proportion of private enterprise will shrink further, yet the absolute numbers will still show some growth. This is not yet socialism. We need to consider what will happen after five years, ten years, and fifteen years. Luo Ruiqing conveyed Mao’s remarks at a meeting of the Party Leadership Group of the Ministry of Public Security and a conference of provincial and municipal directors of public security held before National Day. On November 12, Mao Zedong revisited this vision at a central meeting and clarified that it was not yet a resolution and should not be passed down. Luo Ruiqing, having previously disseminated the information, subsequently wrote to Mao requesting disciplinary action. In August 1952, in order to formulate China’s First Five-Year Plan for national economic development and to determine projects to be constructed with Soviet assistance, Zhou Enlai led a delegation to the Soviet Union. On August 28, he submitted to Stalin a “Draft Report on China’s Current Situation Over the Past Three Years and Future Guidelines for Development Over the Next Five Years,” in which he noted that, based on the prevailing domestic and international circumstances, “Comrade Mao Zedong has proposed a strategy of fighting, stabilizing, and building simultaneously, determining that national construction should commence in five-year cycles starting in 1953 and ensuring China’s advance toward socialism.” The draft also included proposals for controlling private industry through state capitalism, placing it under state management, and actively developing mutual aid cooperative organizations in individual farming. In October, Liu Shaoqi again led a delegation to attend the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Acting on Mao Zedong’s instructions, he wrote to Stalin on the 20th, seeking his opinion on China’s transition to socialism and related issues. The first question raised in the letter was: “How can China gradually transition to socialism from its current position?” Liu Shaoqi analyzed the respective shares of state-owned, cooperative, and private enterprises in China’s industrial gross output and total merchandise value, projected the major changes expected to occur over the next five to fifteen years, and pointed out: “By the tenth year, more than ninety percent of China’s industry will be state-owned, with private industry accounting for less than ten percent. Moreover, these private enterprises will largely depend on the state for raw materials, the purchase and sale of finished products, and bank loans, being integrated into the national plan and unable to operate independently. By then, we will be able to smoothly bring this portion of private industry under state management.” “When requisitioning factories from capitalists, we envision adopting a method whereby we persuade them to surrender their factories to the state, while the state retains the capitalists’ personal property, assigns employable personnel to jobs, and provides them with living allowances. In exceptional cases, the state may also compensate the capitalists to some extent.” “Our estimate is that, under these conditions, most Chinese capitalists would agree to hand over their factories to the state.” He added: “This is one possible approach to industrial nationalization that we are contemplating. As for the specific methods to be employed and the timing of nationalization, these will naturally depend on future developments.” Concerning agricultural collectivization, Liu Shaoqi stated in the letter: “In agriculture, following land reform, we have already promoted the mutual aid cooperative movement among farmers. Currently, forty percent of farmers nationwide participate in this movement, with seventy to eighty percent in the formerly liberated areas, where thousands of well-organized agricultural cooperatives based on land shares and several collective farms have been established. We intend to vigorously and steadily expand this movement over the next ten to fifteen years, aiming to organize the majority of Chinese farmers into agricultural cooperatives and collective farms, thereby essentially achieving collectivization of China’s agricultural economy.” He further noted: “As for the final stage of completing rural agricultural collectivization, the appropriate method for eliminating the few remaining rich peasants will depend on the circumstances at that time.” Regarding handicrafts, Liu Shaoqi wrote: “We plan to provide strong support to small artisans in organizing production cooperatives and encourage workshop owners to join forces and adopt machine-based production. Some traditional crafts, however, will inevitably be squeezed out by industrial manufacturing. Unlike our efforts to organize farmers against landlords, where we have established or are about to establish Party organizations, we generally lack such structures among artisans. Consequently, we will face greater difficulties in transforming the handicraft sector and organizing production cooperatives, and the process may take longer.” At the conclusion of the first question, Liu Shaoqi added the following clarification: “This is essentially our envisioned approach to transitioning to socialism. These issues have not yet been discussed at meetings of the CPC Central Committee; they remain merely the conjectures of a few comrades and have only been casually mentioned in informal conversations.” According to Liu Shaoqi’s report to the central leadership on October 26, Stalin expressed agreement with the above-mentioned proposals put forward by the Chinese central leadership and suggested: “Once we have seized power, the transition to socialism should proceed in a gradual manner.” These materials fully illustrate the deliberations and discussions that took place in the second half of 1952 among Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and other central leaders as they conceived and advanced the Party’s general line for the transitional period. Of course, looking further back, it can be said that as early as September 1948, during a meeting of the Political Bureau, while conducting predictive analyses of China’s socialist prospects, preliminary ideas were already circulating suggesting that, after the nationwide victory of the new democratic revolution, another ten, fifteen, or twenty years might be required before transitioning to socialism. The resolution adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949 also reflected this notion. In July 1949, in a letter to Stalin during his visit to China, Liu Shaoqi had similarly remarked: “There are many steps and a considerable amount of time required before China can achieve the general nationalization of capital. The exact duration will depend on various international and domestic factors. Our estimate is that it may take anywhere from ten to fifteen years.” This context underscores that the proposal of the Party’s general line for the transitional period was grounded both in contemporary realities and in historical precedents. IV. On Social Reform in Ethnic Minority Areas Some ethnic minority regions in China have long suffered from serfdom, national oppression, and discrimination, compounded by their remote border locations and poor transportation infrastructure, resulting in underdeveloped political, economic, and cultural conditions. Fundamentally transforming the impoverished and backward state of these areas necessitates a phased implementation of comprehensive social reforms. However, the socio-historical conditions in these regions differ significantly from those in Han-populated areas, requiring social reform policies and measures tailored to the unique characteristics of each ethnic group. In several telegrams written by Mao Zedong to guide social reform in Tibet and Xinjiang, he repeatedly emphasized that such reforms must be carried out on the basis of the actual conditions prevailing in these ethnic minority areas, opposing any hasty or indiscriminate approaches that disregard their specific circumstances. In April 1952, in three telegrams concerning Tibet, he pointed out that “on the political front, we must proceed with extreme caution and gradual steps, awaiting the completion of road construction, the establishment of self-sufficiency in production, and improvements in the material well-being of the Tibetan people before undertaking any major reforms.” He analyzed the differing situations in Tibet and Xinjiang and proposed that “Tibet should refrain from rent reductions and land reform for at least the next two to three years.” “For the time being, we should not reorganize the Tibetan army, establish military administrative zones, or set up military-political committees. Let everything remain as it is and continue to drag on until our troops are truly capable of achieving self-sufficiency and gaining popular support, at which point we can revisit these issues.” Currently, the priority lies in practicing strict economy, achieving self-sufficiency, opening up trade channels, balancing imports and exports, and improving the lives of the Tibetan people—these two fundamental policies serve to win over the local population and secure a favorable position. On October 8, during a meeting with a delegation paying homage to him from Tibet, he reaffirmed the Party’s policy of protecting religion and further elucidated its stance on social reform in these ethnic minority areas. He stated: “Whether or not to distribute land in ethnic minority areas is a decision for the ethnic minorities themselves. In Tibet, there is no question of land distribution at present; as for the future, whether or not to proceed with it is entirely up to you, and you should undertake the division yourselves—we will not do it on your behalf.” He also said: “The establishment of military-political committees and the reorganization of the Tibetan army were stipulated by agreement because you were apprehensive. I have instructed the comrades working in Tibet to implement these measures more slowly. The agreement calls for execution, but since you are hesitant, we can only proceed at a slower pace—this year we’ll wait, next year we’ll try again, and if you’re still reluctant the following year, we’ll defer it once more.” Furthermore, he explicitly affirmed the Party’s commitment to assisting ethnic minority areas in developing their economies and cultures. These views of Mao Zedong fully exemplify the Chinese Communist Party and the Central People’s Government’s profound respect for the aspirations of ethnic minorities and their pragmatic approach to social reform in these regions.