Notes on the Report Concerning Next Year’s Policies and Tasks [I]
(December 1952)
It should be affirmed that the enemy will land in large force along the Hanchon–Yalu River line with five to seven divisions, and simultaneously conduct airborne operations behind our lines. The timing should be prepared for in the spring, though it may come even earlier. We must greatly strengthen our bunkers and tunnels, deploy five armies along this front—four of them experienced—demarcate defensive sectors, and resolutely block the enemy’s landing; there must be no mistakes.
The second potential landing zone is the Tongchon–Wonsan line, and the third is the Chinampo–Hanchon line.
[I] These three notes by Mao Zedong were written on a report submitted on December 4, 1952, by Deng Hua, acting commander and acting political commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, concerning the situation on the Korean battlefield and the policies and tasks for the following year. The first two notes were penned beside passages in the report discussing the possibility of a U.S. landing on our flanks or rear and analyzing various scenarios for such a landing. The third note was written next to the following passage in the report:

“Under the present circumstances, we can say that transportation and supply are now fairly assured, enabling us to engage the enemy in a more protracted struggle. (However, if the enemy lands on the west coast, transportation will become very difficult.)”

We must absolutely not allow the enemy to land on the west coast, and in particular, we must prevent any landing along the Hanchon–Yalu River line.