To All Comrades of the CPC Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, with Notification to the Northeast Bureau, the Northeast Military Region, and the Heads of All Departments of the Central Military Commission:  Instruction on Preparing All Necessary Conditions to Resolutely Thwart the Enemy’s Amphibious Landing Venture and Secure a Greater Victory in the War:

I. Based on various indications—the accession to power of Eisenhower[1], the breakdown of negotiations, and the United Nations’ adoption of the Indian proposal[2]—it is judged that the enemy has a strong likelihood of launching a daring amphibious assault with approximately seven divisions along our rear coastal line, particularly along the western coast between the Han River, the Chongchon River, and the Yalu River.


II. Our Volunteer Army, in coordination with the Korean People’s Army, bears the resolute task of crushing the enemy’s landing offensive and securing an even greater victory in the war.


III. To this end, our forces must:  (A) Mobilize every possible resource to vastly strengthen the robust defensive fortifications along the coast and in the adjacent hinterland; concurrently, reinforce the depth-of-defense works along the 38th Parallel[3] to provide complementary support.  (B) Deploy ample troop and firepower along the coastal sectors posing the greatest threat to our rear areas and their interior, thereby ensuring the defeat of both seaborne assaults and large-scale airborne landings by the enemy. In other regions where enemy landings may occur—namely, the Tongchon–Wonsan area, the Ongjin Peninsula, the Chinampo–Han River region, and areas east of Hamhung—deploy whatever forces and firepower are available, likewise committing all available strength to repel the enemy’s attacks.  (C) Decisively and expeditiously undertake measures such as constructing new railway lines, upgrading existing ones (between Manpo and Ch’angsong), widening numerous highways, establishing additional warehouses and supply depots, and pre-positioning substantial stocks of food and ammunition, so as to guarantee unimpeded transportation and uninterrupted supplies for all front-line and rear-area units, including the Korean People’s Army, under any circumstances.  (D) The various armies on our front have achieved significant combat successes in the past; in 1953 they should strive for even greater accomplishments and the annihilation of more enemy troops.  (E) Political work shall ensure that all officers and men throughout the army maintain unwavering resolve and high morale in order to defeat the enemy’s offensive and secure a greater victory.  (F) Particular attention should be paid to preparatory work during the period from now until April 1953, as this constitutes the critical juncture for defeating the enemy.  (G) Comrade Deng Hua, acting commander and political commissar, shall concurrently serve as commander and political commissar of the Western Coast Command; Comrade Liang Xingchu[4] shall be appointed deputy commander of the Western Coast Command, and the remaining cadre of that command should be reinforced.

IV. Over the past two-plus years, our Volunteer Army, in close cooperation with the Korean People’s Army, has attained great and brilliant victories in its courageous and tenacious struggle against U.S. imperialism and its puppet forces. We have thoroughly assessed the enemy’s capabilities, surmounted numerous difficulties, and accumulated rich experience. U.S. imperialism has employed a wide array of tactics in its confrontation with us, yet each one has ended in failure. What remains is the option of a daring amphibious landing against our rear; it seeks to use this maneuver to strike at us. Should we succeed in neutralizing this move and rendering their venture a failure, the inevitability of their ultimate defeat will be sealed.

The Central Committee firmly believes that our Volunteer Army, together with the Korean People’s Army, is fully capable of thwarting the enemy’s amphibious landing scheme. It is hoped that all comrades will exercise utmost vigilance and prudence, demonstrate steadfastness and composure, mobilize their full strength, gain time, and complete all preparations for countering an enemy amphibious assault. Once these preparations are in place, victory will undoubtedly be ours.

Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on December 20, 1952, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.

Notes  [1] Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), a Republican, had been elected as the 34th President of the United States and was scheduled to assume office officially on January 20, 1953.  [2] Refers to the Indian proposal concerning the repatriation of Korean prisoners of war, which was adopted by the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on December 2, 1952. The main content of the proposal stipulated that, on the grounds of “non‑forced repatriation,” not all prisoners need be returned home, and those who were not repatriated would be placed under the custody of the United Nations.  [3] The 38th Parallel: see note [5] on page 99 of this volume.  [4] Liang Xingchu (1913–1985), native of Ji’an, Jiangxi Province. At the time, he served as acting commander of the 20th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and commander of the 38th Army.