We basically agree with the directive telegram sent by the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Region to the Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military Region on April 2, and believe that the basic policy adopted in this telegram (with the exception of the point on reorganizing the Tibetan army) and many of its specific steps are correct. Only by acting in this way can our army be established in an invincible position in Tibet.

The situation in Tibet is different from that in Xinjiang; Tibet is much worse off than Xinjiang, both politically and economically. When Wang Zhen's troops entered Xinjiang, they still first focused all their efforts on careful calculation, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency in production. Now they have established a firm foothold and won the enthusiastic support of the minority nationalities. At present, rent and interest reduction is being carried out, and land reform will be carried out this winter; the masses will support us even more. Xinjiang has unimpeded automobile access to the interior of China and close economic ties with the Soviet Union, which has brought great benefits in material welfare to the minority nationalities. Tibet cannot implement rent reduction or land reform for at least two or three years. Xinjiang has several hundred thousand Han people, while Tibet has almost no Han people; our army is in a completely different ethnic region. We can only rely on two basic policies to win over the masses and establish ourselves in an invincible position. The first is careful calculation and self-sufficiency in production, and using this to influence the masses; this is the most fundamental link. Even if the highway is completed, we cannot rely on it for large-scale grain transport. India may agree to exchange grain and goods to enter Tibet, but our standpoint should be based on our army being able to survive even if one day India does not provide grain and goods. We must use all efforts and appropriate methods to win over the majority of the Dalai and his upper-stratum clique, isolate the small number of bad elements, and achieve the goal of gradually reforming Tibet's economy and politics over many years without bloodshed; but we must also be prepared to deal with the possibility that bad elements may lead the Tibetan army in a rebellion to attack us, and in such a time our army can still survive and persist in Tibet. All of this must rely on careful calculation and self-sufficiency in production. Only with this most basic policy as the foundation can the goal be achieved.

The second thing that can and must be done is to open up trade relations with India and the interior of China, so that Tibet's imports and exports tend toward a balance, so that the Tibetan people's standard of living does not decline slightly due to our army's entry into Tibet, and strive to bring about some improvement in their lives. As long as we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we will lose our material basis for existence, the bad elements will every day hold capital to incite the backward masses and the Tibetan army against us, and our policy of uniting with the majority and isolating the minority will be weak and powerless, impossible to realize.

Among all the opinions in the Southwest Bureau's April 2 telegram, only one point is worth considering, which is the question of whether it is possible and advisable to reorganize the Tibetan army and establish a military and political committee in the short term. In our opinion, we should not reorganize the Tibetan army at present, nor formally establish military sub-districts, nor establish a military and political committee. For the time being, everything should remain as it is, to be dragged out, until one or two years later when our army is truly able to be self-sufficient in production and has won the support of the masses, then we can talk about these issues. In these one to two years, two situations may occur: one is that our upper-level united front policy of uniting with the majority and isolating the minority takes effect, and the Tibetan masses also gradually draw closer to us, thus making the bad elements and the Tibetan army not dare to stage a rebellion; the other is that the bad elements believe we are weak and can be bullied, lead the Tibetan army in a rebellion, and our army counterattacks in a struggle of self-defense, dealing them a blow. Of the two situations above, either one is favorable to us. From the perspective of the Tibetan upper-stratum clique, there are insufficient reasons at present to fully implement the agreement and reorganize the Tibetan army. In a few years it will be different; they may feel they have no choice but to fully implement the agreement and reorganize the Tibetan army. If the Tibetan army stages a rebellion, or if they stage not one but several, and all are beaten back by our army, then our reasons for reorganizing the Tibetan army will be even greater.

It seems that not only the two Siluns, but also the majority of the Dalai and his clique, feel that the agreement was accepted reluctantly and are unwilling to implement it. At present, we not only lack the material basis to fully implement the agreement, we also lack the mass basis to fully implement it, and we also lack the upper-level basis to fully implement it; to implement it forcibly would bring more harm than good. Since they are unwilling to implement it, then fine, we will not implement it for now, let's drag it out and see. The longer it is dragged out, the more reasons we will have, and the fewer reasons they will have. Dragging it on will not be very harmful to us, or may even be somewhat beneficial. Let them do all kinds of bad things that harm the people, while we will only do good things like production, trade, road construction, medical care, and united front work (uniting with the majority, patiently educating) to win over the masses and wait for the opportune moment to talk about the issue of fully implementing the agreement. If they feel that primary schools are not suitable to be run, then the primary schools can also be closed down.

The recent demonstration in Lhasa should not be seen as something done only by bad people like the two Siluns, but should be seen as a representation made to us by the majority of the Dalai clique. The content of their petition is very strategic; it does not express a rupture, but only asks us to make concessions. The hint within it about restoring the old Qing dynasty practice of not stationing the People's Liberation Army is not their true intention. They know full well this is impossible; they are attempting to use this point to exchange for other points. The petition criticized the 14th generation Dalai, so that the Dalai would not bear political responsibility for this demonstration. They appear in the guise of protecting the interests of the Tibetan nationality; they know that they are weaker than us in terms of military strength, but stronger than us in terms of social influence. We should in fact (not in form) accept this petition and postpone the full implementation of the agreement. Their choice to hold this demonstration at a time when the Panchen has not yet arrived was a calculated one. After the Panchen arrives in Lhasa, they may try hard to pull him in, to make the Panchen join their clique. If our work is done well, the Panchen does not fall for their trick, and arrives safely in Xigaze, then the situation will become more favorable to us. But the fact that we lack a material basis will not change for a while, the fact that they are stronger than us in terms of social influence will also not change for a while, and therefore the fact that the Dalai clique is unwilling to fully implement the agreement will also not change for a while.

At present, we must formally take the offensive, reprimanding the unreasonableness of this demonstration and petition (violating the agreement), but in reality, we must be prepared to make concessions, wait for conditions to mature, and prepare for a future offensive (that is, implementing the agreement). What are your opinions on this? We hope you will consider and inform us by telegram.