(April 22, 1952)
Comrade Li Kenong, with copies to Kim and Peng
At 2:30 a.m. on April 22, we received your telegram No. IJI, together with the two
group briefings No. l and No. 1 attached; we have carefully studied them all. We
agree with the line adopted at today’s meeting of the two groups and concur that we
should continue to maintain a firm stance. Only in this way can we place ourselves
in a position of initiative and compel the enemy side to make concessions. To achieve
this objective, we should also be prepared to prolong the negotiations with the enemy
for several more months. With regard to suspending the administrative meetings and
reverting to public talks, we may raise the following two points: first, the other side
has completely departed from our compromise adjustment proposal of March 21; second,
it has been exploiting the confidential nature of the administrative meetings to engage
in deception and obfuscation. On the basis of these considerations, we propose to
suggest on the 23rd the suspension of the administrative meetings and the resumption
of open negotiations. Please make arrangements for the preparatory publicity work
relating to the resumption of public talks, and inform us of the progress by this
afternoon via telegram. As for the specific decision concerning the suspension of the
administrative meetings, we shall communicate it to you this evening.
Mao Zedong
7:00 a.m., April 22
[1] This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Li Kenong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Central People’s Government and head of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’
delegation to the Korean Armistice Talks.
(2)
“Kim” refers to Kim Il-sung, Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
“Peng” refers to Peng Dehuai, Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese
People’s Volunteers.

[3]
This refers to the telegram sent by Li Kenong at 2:30 a.m. on April 22, 1952, to Mao
Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Peng Dehuai, seeking instructions on the line to be taken at
that day’s joint staff meetings of Groups III and IV of the Korean Armistice Talks.
The telegram stated:
(1) Given the current situation in the negotiations, continuing to hold joint staff
meetings of Groups III and IV is unlikely to resolve the issues. In order to further
increase pressure on the opposing side and force it to make substantial concessions,
it is imperative to abolish this administrative-type meeting format. Since the
commencement of these administrative meetings, the other side has made no concessions
whatsoever; instead, it has used this confidential forum to mislead its own people and
to deceive its allies. The abolition of the administrative meetings will not impair our
future freedom of action, whereas the other side’s previous shifts in attitude have all
occurred openly under public pressure. If we decide to terminate the administrative
meetings and move the negotiations into the open, we should do so relatively quickly.
(2) At the Group III staff meeting, we should more firmly emphasize our position on
the issue of nominations by neutral countries and oppose the other side’s unreasonable
demands to restrict airport construction. (3) At the Group IV staff meeting, we should
continue to refute the other side’s adjusted principles of April 1 and its figure of 70,000
POWs, while reiterating even more strongly that their principle of the complete and
voluntary repatriation of all prisoners of war is unacceptable to us.
[4]
These refer to the briefings submitted by Li Kenong at 2:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. on
April 21, 1952, to Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Peng Dehuai, concerning the staff
meeting agenda item 3 and agenda item 4, respectively, of the Korean Armistice Talks.
[5]
These refer to Li Kenong’s remarks delivered at the staff meeting on agenda item 3 and
at the staff meeting on agenda item 4 during the Korean Armistice Talks on April 21,
1952.