Concerning Tan Zhenlin and Chen Pixian's〔1〕 Job Appointments: Instructions〔2〕 and Telegrams (March 4 and 9, 1952)

1

To be read by Liu, Zhu, and Zhou〔3〕, and handed over to Su Yu〔4〕 for handling. Agree with Comrade Chen Yi's〔5〕 proposal: The work of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee shall be placed under the actual responsibility of Comrade Chen Pixian. The work of the East China Bureau, during Comrade Rao Shushi's〔6〕 sick leave, shall have Comrade Tan Zhenlin serve as acting secretary; however, major matters must still be discussed with Comrade Chen Yi and handled only after obtaining Comrade Chen Yi's approval. If Liu, Zhou, and Zhu concur with the above points, request Su Yu to inform Chen and Tan by telephone.

Mao Zedong
March 4
(Published based on the manuscript.)

2

To Comrade Chen Yi, with copies to the East China Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee:

The telegram of March 6〔7〕 has been received. It is agreed that during Comrade Rao Shushi's sick leave, Comrade Tan Zhenlin shall act in Comrade Rao Shushi's post, but major matters must still be executed only after obtaining Comrade Chen Yi's agreement. As Comrade Chen Yi is busy with numerous responsibilities in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and Comrade Liu Xiao〔8〕 is on sick leave, it is agreed that Comrade Chen Pixian shall serve as acting first secretary.

The Central Committee
March 9
(Published based on Mao Zedong's manuscript.)

**Notes**
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Instructions on the Report from the Ministry of Forestry on Nationwide Forest Fires in 1951〔1〕 (March 4, 1952)

The Party and government responsible persons of Jilin (Songjiang) and Heilongjiang provinces should be given disciplinary action. Is it known if any action has already been taken?

Mao Zedong
March 4
(Published based on the manuscript.)

**Note**
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Instructions on the Report by Xiao Hua〔1〕 Concerning the Campaign Against Tigers in Units Directly Under the Military Commission (March 4, 1952)

To all comrades:

The experience in combating tigers in the units directly under the Military Commission〔2〕 is very good; all departments may emulate it.

Mao Zedong
March 4
(Published based on the manuscript.)

**Notes**

--- Notes

〔1〕 Tan Zhenlin was then holding leading posts in the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the East China Military and Administrative Committee. Chen Pixian was then the Fourth Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.
〔2〕 This instruction was written on a report conveyed by Su Yu to Mao Zedong on the afternoon of March 4, 1952, relaying the content of a long-distance telephone call from Chen Yi that morning.
〔3〕 Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Zhu refers to Zhu De. Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.
〔4〕 Su Yu was then Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army and Deputy Commander of the East China Military Region.
〔5〕 Chen Yi was then the Second Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.
〔6〕 Rao Shushi was then the First Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
〔7〕 This refers to the telegram sent by Chen Yi on March 6, 1952, to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee requesting instructions on leadership issues in the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee. The telegram stated: "After discussions among comrades of the East China Bureau and with Comrade Bo Yibo's input, we jointly recommend that during Comrade Rao Shushi's leave of absence for health, Comrade Tan Zhenlin act in the post of Secretary of the East China Bureau, and Comrade Chen Pixian act in the post of Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee. I shall remain in Shanghai to participate in the work of the East China Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Committee, and concurrently oversee the work of the East China Military Region. The above is submitted for approval."
〔8〕 Liu Xiao was then the Second Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee.


〔1〕 This refers to the report submitted by the Central People's Government Ministry of Forestry on February 22, 1952, to Chen Yun, with a copy to Zhou Enlai, concerning nationwide forest fires in 1951. The report states that in the first half of 1951, a total of 4,270 forest fires occurred across the country, affecting 34.5 million mu of forest area and resulting in a loss of 6.77 million cubic meters of timber. The area of forest damaged was twelve times the area reforested during the same period. These fires were most severe in the Northeast, primarily in Songjiang and Heilongjiang provinces. Timber losses in the Northeast accounted for over 99 percent of the national total. Most forest fires were caused by farmers burning off wasteland. The principal root cause was that some leading cadres, one-sidedly emphasizing that spring plowing was the "overriding central task," feared that arranging fire prevention work would hinder spring plowing and that prohibiting burning off wasteland would prevent the fulfillment of bumper harvest targets, thus neglecting forest protection and fire prevention work.


〔1〕 Xiao Hua was then Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission.
〔2〕 This refers to the experience in combating tigers in units directly under the Military Commission, as discussed in the report submitted by Xiao Hua to Mao Zedong on March 2, 1952. The report stated that the campaign against tigers across the units directly under the Military Commission was generally healthy, though in isolated cases a "leftist" deviation of forced confessions had been detected. To continue expanding the results and prevent deviations so as to ensure the normal development of the movement, the General Party Committee of units directly under the Military Commission held an enlarged meeting on March 1 and decided on the following matters: 1. Demand that all units generally strive to satisfactorily complete their tasks before March 15, thoroughly eliminate remaining tigers, and prevent and correct "leftist" deviations. 2. Explain in detail the tiger-fighting policy to all tiger-fighting teams, especially for corrupt elements among old cadres, who must be overcome by relying on the Party's policies. Enhance tiger-fighting tactics by focusing on investigation and detailed accounting. Leaders must not be impatient or impulsive. We also established two disciplinary rules for tiger fighting: a. Prohibition of beatings, verbal abuse, binding, and other forms of personal humiliation and disguised corporal punishment; b. No use of "fatigue tactics" or "relay tactics." 3. Tigers already identified must undergo review for case verification and recovery of stolen goods.