Reply Telegram to Chen Yi [1] Regarding the Situation and Deployment of the “Tiger-Hunting” Campaign in the East China Military Region (February 29, 1952) Comrade Chen Yi: Your telegram of February 25 [2] has been received. (1) Since your tiger-hunting campaign is progressing relatively quickly, the current assault phase may be essentially concluded by March 10, after which it can be brought onto a regular track. However, the formal announcement should be made according to specific circumstances: some units (perhaps most) may transition to the regular phase, while others will still require an intensive push. (2) The Central Committee is currently considering that so-called corrupt elements involved in cases below 500,000 yuan, and even those below 1 million yuan, generally should not be classified as corrupt but rather as taking small personal advantages or blurring the lines between public and private interests, so as to release more people and facilitate education; nevertheless, a small number of particularly egregious cases should still be treated as corruption. The Central Committee will issue a separate notice on this matter. (3) No public trials are to be held in the military. (4) As there is yet little experience with the Three-Anti Campaign at the company level, it would be advisable to first conduct pilot programs in several units. The serious problem at the company level is warlordism, alongside instances of corruption. A reform is needed, but the approach should differ from that used in organs, emphasizing education while simultaneously removing certain undesirable elements. (5) Recently, the Party Committee of the Southwest Military Region formulated a plan outlining guidelines and deployment arrangements [3], which has been sent to you today for your reference. Please consider it carefully before finalizing your own deployment. (6) All other points are approved. Mao Zedong February 29 Printed from the manuscript.

Notes [1] Chen Yi was then Commander of the East China Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. [2] Refers to Chen Yi’s report dated February 25, 1952, addressed to Mao Zedong and the East China Bureau, concerning the status of the tiger-hunting campaign within the East China forces and the work plan for the next stage. The report stated that, except for a few units where it had not yet begun, the tiger-hunting campaign had been widely launched throughout the army, though its development was highly uneven. It was decided to organize another sweeping search and to carry out the Three-Anti and tiger-hunting campaigns in the remaining unaddressed departments, aiming to bring the movement to a basic conclusion between March 5 and 10. The specific deployment for this phase was as follows: First, continue to target a group of “tigers,” without fixating on numerical targets, but ensuring that any potentially overlooked individuals were apprehended. Second, review and verify all previously identified “tigers,” distinguishing genuine cases from false accusations and assessing the severity of each offense. Third, categorize and handle minor corruption cases; those who had misappropriated less than 500,000 yuan of public funds should be placed under educational supervision rather than prosecuted as corrupt officials. Those involved in embezzlement ranging from 500,000 to 5 million yuan should receive administrative penalties as appropriate, while those exceeding 5 million yuan up to 10 million yuan might face both severe administrative sanctions and criminal prosecution. Fourth, explicitly address and correct the “leftist” tendency toward coercive confessions and arbitrary “stone-throwing” tactics, initiating a process of investigation and rehabilitation for those who had already been disciplined. Fifth, at the company level, the Three-Anti Campaign should prioritize education and mutual criticism, resorting to “stone-throwing” methods only in the most extreme cases. Sixth, following the promulgation of the central regulations on punishing corruption, a large-scale educational campaign should be conducted, after which coordination with the local Five-Anti Campaigns would commence. [3] Refers to the report issued by the CPC Southwest Military Region Committee on February 26, 1952, detailing the policies and deployment arrangements for the Three-Anti and tiger-hunting campaigns. See note [1] on page of this volume.