Commentary on the East China Military Region Party Committee’s Report Regarding the Campaign to Root Out Corruption and Its Deployment
Commentary on the East China Military Region Party Committee’s Report Concerning the Anti-Tiger Campaign and Future Deployments (February 22, 1952) To the Party Committees of the East China Military Region, all Major Military Regions, and the Volunteer Army:  (1) I approve the report submitted by the East China Military Region Party Committee at 7:00 p.m. on February 21, 1952 [1].  (2) This report is to be circulated to all Major Military Regions and the Volunteer Army for implementation by analogy.  (3) At present, the anti-tiger campaign throughout the armed forces has reached its peak. With one or two more campaigns, we should be able to basically resolve the problem and then shift to the “Three-Anti” struggle at the battalion, company, and county-level independent regiment levels. Therefore, at this stage, first, we must ensure that all tigers are thoroughly eliminated; do not slacken our efforts. Second, we need to emphasize investigation and study—keeping both broad and detailed accounts, verifying the authenticity of each tiger, and strictly prohibiting the extraction of confessions through coercion. If these two points are carefully observed, complete victory will be assured.

Mao Zedong February 22 Based on the manuscript. Notes [ ] Refers to the report of the CPC East China Military Region Committee dated February 21, 1952, concerning the results of the anti-tiger campaign and future deployments. The report states that the anti-tiger movement among East China troops began on February 1, 1952. After conducting two phases—the initial offensive against tigers and a deadline-driven self-confession drive—significant progress had been made. However, the task was not yet fully completed, so it was proposed to launch a third campaign: a widespread search of mountains and caves, with the primary focus on capturing major tigers and rounding up every last one. To this end, the following requirements were set forth:

(1) Units that have already fulfilled or exceeded their original targets should guard against complacency and continue the anti-tiger effort. First, they should conduct a thorough re-examination of all tigers already uncovered, finishing off those that were wounded or encircled but not yet killed, and clearly distinguishing between genuine and spurious cases. Second, in accordance with the principle of “eliminating all tigers and eradicating corruption,” as well as the requirement to submit a formal written guarantee to higher authorities upon completion of the “Three-Anti” campaign, additional budgets should be allocated based on actual needs, paying close attention to eliminating any remaining gaps or blind spots.

(2) Units that have not yet met their targets should strive to complete them swiftly and then proceed as outlined in the preceding paragraph.

(3) In general, the anti-tiger strategy should prioritize case-by-case handling, conducting in-depth and meticulous investigations while simultaneously encouraging denunciations and meritorious reports. Furthermore, full confessions by major corrupt officials should be used to provide firsthand testimony to educate others.

(4) The experience gained during the self-confession phase should be summarized, anti-tiger cadres and the masses should be educated accordingly, forces should be realigned, new operational plans should be formulated, and all preparations for the next campaign should be meticulously carried out.

(5) With the exception of a few units where gaps or blind spots remain, further intensive pressure should generally be halted. Any individuals who may have slipped through the net can be dealt with incidentally during the comprehensive mountain searches.