Comments and Reply Telegram to Luo Ruiqing [1] on the Three-Anti Report Concerning the Logistics System of the Central-South Military Region (February 18, 1952) To Comrades Chen Yi, He Long, Zhang Zongxun, Liu Lantao, Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, and Yang Lisan [2]:  Hereby forward to you for your review one report received from Comrade Luo Ruiqing in Hankou [3]. You are requested to exercise strict control over the Three-Anti and “Tiger-Hunting” campaign within your respective logistics systems, ensuring its thorough implementation. This is of utmost importance and great urgency! Mao Zedong February 18  To Comrade Luo Ruiqing:  (1) Your report dated February 16 concerning the logistics system of the Central-South Military Region has been received. It is most satisfactory and has already been circulated to all regions for emulation.  (2) Your task is to inspect and assist the Party, government, military, civilian, and educational sectors in carrying out the entire Three-Anti and Tiger-Hunting campaign; it is not confined solely to the public security apparatus. Please take note of this. Mao Zedong February 18 Printed according to the manuscript. Notes [1] Luo Ruiqing was at that time Minister of Public Security of the Central People’s Government and a member of the Savings Inspection Committee. He had been dispatched by the Central Committee to the Central-South region to aid in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. [2] Chen Yi was then Commander of the East China Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. He Long was Commander of the Southwest Military Region. Zhang Zongxun was First Deputy Commander of the Northwest Military Region. Liu Lantao was Deputy Political Commissar of the North China Military Region. Gao Gang was Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region. Peng Dehuai served as Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. Yang Lisan was Minister of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission. [3] Refers to Luo Ruiqing’s report of February 16, 1952, on the Three-Anti work within the logistics system of the Central-South Military Region. The report stated that the Central-South Military Region believed that, in the tiger-hunting effort, resolute and resourceful commanders must be sent to station themselves in and lead the logistics departments; tiger-hunting teams should be organized, plans formulated, and responsibility assigned on a contracted basis. By employing the “Ten Inspections” method—examining finances, accounts, contracts, vouchers, orders, processing, engineering projects, living conditions, historical records, and personal relationships—one could identify the tigers. Subsequent vigorous attacks at mass meetings, meticulous scrutiny in small-group discussions, and individual counseling would generally succeed in breaking them down. The report further noted that corruption, waste, and bureaucratic practices were extremely serious in the logistics sector—not only in the Central-South but throughout the country—and warranted grave attention.

Comments on the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee’s Report Regarding the Tiger-Hunting Situation in the Propaganda and Education Sector (February 18, 1952) This document [1] is very good. Forward it to all Central Bureaus for dissemination among cultural and educational institutions to follow suit. Mao Zedong February 18 Printed according to the manuscript. Note [1] Refers to the report submitted on February 17, 1952, by the Propaganda Department of the Nanjing Municipal Committee of the CPC to the East China Bureau and to the Central Committee, concerning the tiger-hunting situation in the propaganda and education sector. The report stated that since the start of the tiger-hunting campaign, complacent notions such as “the cultural and educational sector is a clean office” and “minor corruption is inevitable, but major corruption does not exist” had been completely dispelled. Six major tigers and sixty-seven smaller ones had already been apprehended in this sector, and the search was ongoing. The report outlined several key issues that should be emphasized in the tiger-hunting campaign within the cultural and educational propaganda system: (1) Strictly adhere to policy guidelines, correcting the erroneous approach of relying solely on mass pressure to resolve conflicts. Instead, deeply mobilize the masses, conduct painstaking and detailed investigations, rigorously control the convening of struggle meetings to prevent coerced confessions, and ensure that the campaign proceeds in accordance with policy. (2) While subjecting senior intellectuals to cleansing, also provide firm support to help them overcome their difficulties. Once they have largely confessed to their own shortcomings, shift the focus to criticizing the influence of bourgeois ideology. (3) Adopt differentiated guidance: prioritize key targets, attend to general cases, and temporarily set aside units lacking any core cadres, freeing up resources to address more pressing matters later. The report also suggested that upon completion of the tiger-hunting campaign, alongside ideological reeducation and rectification movements in colleges and universities as well as in literary and artistic circles, a thorough anti-bureaucratic struggle should be launched within the Propaganda Department itself to elevate thinking and improve work.

Comments on the Ministry of Labor’s Opinions Concerning Several Points That Labor Administrative Organs Should Pay Attention to During the Three-Anti Campaign (February 18, 1952) To Comrades Chen, Bo, and Li [1] as well as Comrade Peng Zhen [2]: All departments under the Central Financial and Economic Commission and the Central Political and Legal Commission should emulate the practices of the Central Public Security Ministry and the Central Ministry of Labor [3], issuing instructions based on their own experience to subordinate departments in the major administrative regions and provinces and cities, directing them to launch offensives against corruption and bourgeois elements. These directives should be vivid and forceful, avoiding generality. Mao Zedong February 18 Printed according to the manuscript. Notes [1] Chen refers to Chen Yun, who at the time was Vice Premier of the State Council and Director of the Financial and Economic Commission. Bo refers to Bo Yibo, Vice Director of the Financial and Economic Commission of the State Council and Chairman of the Central People’s Government Savings Inspection Committee. Li refers to Li Fuchun, Vice Director of the Financial and Economic Commission of the State Council and Vice Chairman of the Central People’s Government Savings Inspection Committee. [2] Peng Zhen was then Vice Director of the Political and Legal Commission of the State Council and Vice Chairman of the Central People’s Government Savings Inspection Committee.

[3] The report issued by the Central Public Security Ministry on February 5, 1952, regarding the progress and experiences of the Three-Anti Movement’s tiger-hunting campaign, summarized their efforts to reorganize tiger-hunting teams, once again mobilize the masses, and, for key units where the anti-corruption struggle had not yet been fully effective, personally direct operations from the leadership level, concentrating firepower to swiftly break through and apprehend five major corrupt officials. On February 13, 1952, the Central Ministry of Labor issued instructions to the labor ministries of the major administrative regions and the labor bureaus of various provinces and cities, providing guiding opinions on matters that labor administrative organs should be mindful of during the Three-Anti Movement. The instructions pointed out that initial findings from the ministry and local labor bureaus revealed that the bourgeoisie was currently mounting a particularly aggressive offensive against labor administration bodies. In addition to vigorously exposing and pursuing common instances of corruption, waste, and bureaucracy, local labor administrations were also urged to pay particular attention to those officials who accepted bribes from employers and betrayed workers’ interests when handling labor disputes. Following the completion of the inspection work, the Central Ministry of Labor planned to conduct a comprehensive review of its operations and, based on this, formulate new working guidelines and the 1952 work plan. Local labor administrations were likewise instructed to undertake similar measures.