Commentary on the Forwarding of the Trade Ministry’s Comprehensive Report on the “Tiger-Hunting” Campaign (February 18, 1952) This report [1] is hereby circulated to all departments of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, to the Party Leading Groups of the Central People’s Government, to the various Central Bureaus and Major Military Regions, and further transmitted to the Sub-bureaus, provincial, municipal, and regional Party committees, as well as to the Party Leading Groups of the financial, banking, trade, industrial, and logistics departments. All units are urged to thoroughly purge bourgeois agents and economic and political spies planted by the Kuomintang.

Mao Zedong February 18 Based on the manuscript.

Notes [1] Refers to the Trade Ministry’s Party Leading Group and its organ-level Party committee’s comprehensive report dated February 18, 1952, concerning the progress of the “tiger-hunting” campaign. The report states that, as of February 15, the Trade Ministry had exposed thirty-eight major “tigers,” over half of whom were economic agents infiltrated or co-opted by the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang reactionaries. This indicates that the Trade Ministry and its central corporations have become a primary target of the bourgeoisie’s aggressive offensive in the realm of economic intelligence. Given that these institutions control information on commodity conditions, price trends, and trade plans nationwide, while not directly engaging in commercial operations, concentrating efforts on rooting out such agents assumes particular significance within these organizations. It is reasonable to assume that the trade departments and regional companies in the major administrative regions, as well as the commercial bureaus and city-level trading companies in large cities, also harbor a substantial number of such agents. In addition to these agents, numerous “tigers” are also present in the areas of procurement and sales, and in basic construction projects. Analysis reveals that the principal source of the major “tigers” uncovered thus far within the Trade Ministry has been personnel recruited from society, followed by those retained from previous staff; a smaller proportion comprises veteran cadres. Among the latter, a significant contingent originated as former merchants or had long been involved in managing state-owned production facilities. Information suggests that the composition of personnel in state-owned trading enterprises across the country generally mirrors this pattern. The Central authorities are instructed to notify localities to exercise strict vigilance in these respects.