To Comrade An Ziwen’s[2] Comments on the Proposal Letter[1] from Some Comrades of the Artillery Regiment of the 192nd Division Regarding the Three-Anti Struggle
(February 16, 1952)

Comrade An Ziwen:
Please draft a method for handling such issues, discuss it once at the General Party Committee, consider it carefully until it is appropriate, and then submit it to the Central Committee.
Mao Zedong
February 16

Please have this document copied and distributed to all members of the General Party Committee for their review.

Printed based on the manuscript.

**Notes**
[1] Twelve comrades from the Political Office of the Artillery Regiment of the 192nd Division of the 19th Corps of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army wrote a letter to Mao Zedong on February 11, 1952, proposing two suggestions:
(1) In capturing large and small tigers, never neglect to catch the overt tigers. The letter stated that some major embezzlers within the military are engaged in logistical and financial work, while others are military and political leaders at or above the regimental level. Unlike typical embezzlers, they do not need to use conventional methods for embezzlement. Instead, they rely on their authority to arbitrarily withdraw public funds or other supplies, openly and brazenly embezzling to establish private households, with a small number of them growing wealthy. The letter recommended an investigation into this matter, as it might lead to the capture of some large and small tigers.
(2) A clear distinction must be made between embezzlement and waste. Regarding the open use of public funds for personal enjoyment being classified as "waste bordering on embezzlement," this is undoubtedly tantamount to releasing a tiger to cause harm.

[2] An Ziwen, then serving as the Second Secretary of the General Party Committee of Central-Level Organs and a member of the Inspection Committee for the Economy of the Central People’s Government.

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Comments on Forwarding the Central-South Bureau’s New Tiger-Fighting Plan
(February 17, 1952)

To the Central-South Bureau, all Central Bureaus, military regions, and the Volunteer Army:
(1) The Central-South Bureau’s new tiger-fighting plan, sent on February 13, has been received. This new plan, which targets 8,000 large tigers and over 42,000 small tigers, raises the tiger-fighting benchmarks for all major administrative regions across the country to the highest level at the current stage, bringing it closer to reality than previously envisioned plans. All Central Bureaus are requested to revise their plans at an appropriate time as circumstances permit.
(2) The Central-South Bureau has decisively extended the duration of the Three-Anti Campaign, dividing it into four phases spanning more than six months to coordinate with various tasks. For the entire major administrative region—especially considering the Three-Anti Campaign at the county, district, and township levels, and particularly for areas where land reform tasks have yet to be completed—this approach is feasible. I’m afraid only by doing so can thoroughness be achieved. Whether this arrangement is suitable for other regions should be considered by all Central Bureaus. However, for major cities, large industrial and mining areas, railway transportation systems, state-run trade systems, and tax collection systems, the campaign must essentially be completed within two months, or at most two and a half months, after the formal launch of the movement; otherwise, it will be detrimental to the economy. Furthermore, during the tense period of the campaign, a portion of competent cadres must be designated to handle routine work, ensuring that normal financial and economic operations—production, transportation, finance, and trade—are not disrupted. One month, or at most one and a half months, after the formal launch of the local Three-Anti Campaign, the number of cadres assigned to daily operations should gradually increase. This point is very important; all comrades are requested to pay attention to it.
Mao Zedong
February 17

Printed based on the manuscript.

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Telegram from the Military Commission Approving the 39th Army of the Volunteer Army to Halt Tiger Fighting and Return to Combat
(February 17, 1952)

To the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army:
The forwarded February 16 telegram from the 39th Army[1] has been received. The main forces of that army are to halt tiger fighting and return to combat. This action is very appropriate. All other frontline units encountering a similar situation should act in the same manner.
Military Commission
February 17

Printed based on Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

**Note**
[1] Refers to the telegram forwarded by the Party Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, originally sent by the 39th Army Party Committee on February 16, 1952, addressed to the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army and the Corps Party Committee. The telegram stated: Starting at 5:30 this morning, the enemy has furiously shelled our entire front line positions and deployed over 40 combat vehicles, indicating a potential large-scale offensive. Therefore, we have ordered the 115th Division and the 117th Division to temporarily halt tiger fighting, fully mobilize for combat, and crush the enemy’s offensive.

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Reply Telegram Approving the Southwest Region’s New Tiger-Fighting Plan
(February 17, 1952)

Comrades Deng Xiaoping and He Long[1]:
Your February 13 telegram[2] has been received. I approve your new plan. After a period of time, adjustments may be made as appropriate based on circumstances.
Mao Zedong
February 17

Printed based on the manuscript.

**Notes**
[1] Deng Xiaoping, then serving as the First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. He Long, then serving as the Third Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Refers to the report sent by Deng Xiaoping and He Long on February 13, 1952, regarding the results of the tiger-fighting campaign and the supplementary plan for the second phase of tiger fighting in the Southwest Region. The report stated that as of February 11, a total of 10,028 tigers had been captured across local and military systems in the Southwest Region. The second-phase plan set a mandatory target of capturing 17,000 tigers, with an aspirational target of 20,000, of which large tigers must account for at least one-tenth.

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Comments on Forwarding Comrade Xi Zhongxun’s[1] Report on the New Tiger-Fighting Budget for the Northwest Region
(February 17, 1952)

Comrade Xi Zhongxun, with copies to all Central Bureaus, military regions, and responsible comrades of the Volunteer Army:
(1) Your February 14 report[2] has been received. It is excellent and forwarded to all comrades for reference. Regarding the tiger-fighting budget, the Central-South Bureau recently proposed a budget of capturing 8,000 large tigers, which is the highest nationwide. Your region and other regions may refer to the Central-South plan to appropriately increase your budgets. However, since your region and others recently announced budgets, increases can be made after a period of gaining more experience.
(2) The tiger-fighting budgets and efforts of military sub-districts at all levels must be under the unified leadership of the Central Bureaus, sub-bureaus, provincial, municipal, and regional Party committees, as well as prefectural committees. Otherwise, outcomes will be unfavorable. I am pleased to note that you have already paid attention to this point.
(3) "It is permissible to have mistaken suspicions, but not to mishandle cases; prevent the coercion of confessions"—this is very well said. During the high tide of the campaign, comrades must be reminded to take note of this.
(4) Your stipulation that sentencing involving imprisonment requires approval by authorities two superior levels, and that sentences of life imprisonment and the death penalty must all be approved by the military and administrative committees of major administrative regions, is appropriate. However, for dismissals and arrests, it is generally advisable to require approval by authorities two superior levels. During the tense period of "fighting tigers," for cases requiring swift action, reliable leading figures and their organizations should, under conditions where evidence is conclusive, be granted the authority to handle such matters on the spot, with subsequent reporting and confirmation.
Mao Zedong
February 17

Printed based on the manuscript.

**Notes**
[1] Xi Zhongxun, then serving as the Second Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Refers to the report submitted by Xi Zhongxun on February 14, 1952, to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee regarding the new tiger-fighting budget and measures to be adopted for the entire Northwest Region. The report stated: The planned target for the region is to capture 13,000 tigers, including 1,300 large tigers. To achieve this plan, the following must be ensured: First, continuously engage in serious struggles against right-leaning tendencies. Second, ensure unified leadership by the Party Committee alongside the division of responsibilities among various systems and departments, with neither aspect being neglected. Third, provide close guidance and strict control, adhering to the principle that suspicious cases may be mistaken but mishandling must be avoided, and preventing the coercion of confessions. Dismissals, arrests, and imprisonments must be approved by authorities two superior levels. The authority to approve life imprisonment and the death penalty rests entirely with the military and administrative committees. Fourth, pay attention to certain remote corners when capturing tigers. Finally, it is proposed that the major regional organs conduct a public trial meeting to openly deal with several major embezzlers who embezzled over 100 million yuan, thereby demonstrating policy and further advancing the tiger-fighting campaign.

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Letter to Gao Gang[2] on Sending Comrade Chen Boda[1] to the Northeast to Understand the Situation of the Five-Anti Campaign
(February 17, 1952)

Comrade Gao Gang:
In order to understand the situation of the Five-Anti struggle in the Northeast, I am sending Comrade Chen Boda to Shenyang for an inspection. If time permits, he shall also visit Changchun and Harbin, and after one week to ten days, return and proceed to the Shanghai area. Upon Comrade Chen’s arrival, please provide him with guidance.
Mao Zedong
February 17

Printed based on the manuscript.

**Notes**
[1] Chen Boda, then serving as Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Gao Gang, then serving as Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

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Telegram to Comrade Tan Zheng[1] and Others on the Need for the Central-South Military Region to Increase Its Tiger-Fighting Budget
(February 18, 1952)

Comrade Tan Zheng, with a copy to Jianying[2]:
Your February 13 telegram[3] has been received. According to a recent report from the Central-South Bureau, your military region’s tiger-fighting budget has been increased to capturing 800 large tigers. This represents an increase compared to your previous figures, but compared to the East China Military Region’s budget of 1,600, it is only half. In reality, the East China Military Region may eventually capture 2,500 to 3,000 large tigers. You should essentially align with their benchmarks, though increases can be made slightly later and must be motivated by the initiative of comrades below so that it does not feel overly forced. In particular, the South China military system may capture over 1,000 large tigers and tens of thousands of small tigers, yet their set figures remain very low, indicating insufficient resolve. Recently, I observed that the 48th Army has gradually increased its tiger captures; this should immediately serve as a model to educate the entire military.
Mao Zedong
February 18

Printed based on the manuscript.

**Notes**
[1] Tan Zheng, then serving as the Third Political Commissar of the Central-South Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
[2] Jianying, i.e., Ye Jianying, then serving as Commander of the South China Military Region.
[3] Refers to Tan Zheng’s February 13, 1952, report to Mao Zedong concerning the tiger-fighting budget of the South China Military Region at that time. The report stated that the South China Military Region’s second budget, combined with figures from units stationed in Guangdong and Guangxi as well as Guangxi itself, planned to capture a total of 183 large tigers and 2,164 small tigers.