Comments on Bo Yibo’s Report〔1〕 on the Summary of the “Tiger-Hunting” Campaign at the Central Level and on Future Arrangements (February 7, 1952)

Comrade Bo Yibo, with copy to all comrades:  (1) I approve this report〔2〕 and request that all comrades follow its example.  (2) I ask each Central Bureau to consider, during February, conducting trials—along the lines of the central authorities’ proceedings on February 1, which sentenced seven major embezzlers—to try several major embezzlers at the level of the major administrative regions (those involved in smaller-scale embezzlement under 100 million yuan should not be tried for the time being). Among them, some are to be sentenced to death, some to death with reprieve, some to long-term imprisonment, some to short-term imprisonment, some to imprisonment with reprieve, and some are to be exempted from criminal punishment (in which case administrative disciplinary measures shall be imposed), so as to advance the tiger-hunting campaign.

Mao Zedong February 7 Based on the manuscript.

Notes 〔1〕 Bo Yibo was then Director of the Savings Inspection Commission of the Central People’s Government. 〔2〕 Refers to Bo Yibo’s report of February 6, 1952, addressed to Mao Zedong, concerning a summary of the tiger-hunting campaign at the central level and plans for the future. The report states that the public trial held on February 1 adopted a policy of both severe pressure and selective leniency toward major embezzlers, thereby creating an extremely favorable situation for the subsequent phase of the campaign; moreover, even more embezzlers will be apprehended en masse within the next ten days. The report raises several strategic issues: First, with respect to recalcitrant embezzlers—especially those whose cases have political overtones, those who are economic traitors, and senior cadres found guilty of embezzlement—one should not rely solely on forceful, harsh, and coercive methods, but rather prioritize ideological struggle and winning over their minds, supplementing this approach with mass pressure. Second, it is essential to move from rough estimates to detailed accounting, ensuring a clear understanding of the facts; any work that has not yet been done must be completed without delay. Third, leading cadres at every level must conduct self-inspections, thoroughly cleanse themselves, and only then proceed downward. Fourth, full use should be made of all direct and indirect reserve forces. Fifth, a system of special task forces assigned to individual cases, with strict deadlines for solving them and designated teams responsible for bringing down each “tiger,” should be implemented. Sixth, efforts should be concentrated and resources pooled at the ministerial level, with unified planning and deployment.