Telegram to Gao Gang [1] Concerning the Capture of Big Tigers and the Handling of Illegal Capitalists (January 31, 1952) Comrade Gao Gang, and to all comrades: (1) Your report dated January 26 has been received. You have cleared out over 160,000 corrupt elements, achieving significant results, for which we are very pleased. Your policies and methods are fundamentally correct. (2) Given that four hundred big tigers have already been identified among 120,000 people at the central level, it is likely that there are far more than five hundred big tigers among the staff of Party, government, and military organs and enterprises throughout the Northeast—perhaps even several times that number. However, setting a preliminary target of five hundred is appropriate; additional targets can be added as the campaign progresses. (3) As for the minor corrupt elements, which account for over eighty percent of the total, they should be handled in accordance with the guidelines already issued by the central authorities. Except in cases of extremely minor offenses where a sincere confession and restitution, coupled with a pledge not to reoffend, may suffice without administrative punishment, most should nonetheless receive administrative sanctions such as dismissal, demotion, transfer, or formal reprimand, to demonstrate seriousness. The process should follow the method used during the Anti-Counterrevolutionary Campaign to clear backlogs: leading organs should analyze and compare groups of individuals, formulate a plan for handling them, and then submit it to mass meetings (with my participation) for discussion, amendment, and refinement, before the final decision is officially announced. Some organs in Beijing have already adopted this approach, with very positive results. £± ７

(4) Preparations must be thorough before taking action against capitalists; do not act hastily. If conditions vary across different cities, avoid simultaneous operations. A step-by-step approach is essential: first, organize several capable inspection teams to carry out inspections targeting the most recalcitrant and well-documented cases. Either the investigation succeeds and a case is cracked, or it does not proceed further. Subsequently, another group of cases is inspected, again resulting in successful prosecutions. Through this process, we gain valuable experience, train our cadres, educate a large number of small and medium-sized capitalists, as well as some large ones, encouraging them to confess voluntarily and mobilizing workers and shop assistants to report wrongdoing. Following this, we can organize third, fourth, fifth, and subsequent rounds of inspections, ultimately cracking more cases. In this way, we can win over more than ninety percent of capitalists—large, medium, and small—to our side, or at least secure their neutrality, thereby completely isolating a small minority (approximately six percent in Beijing) of reactionary capitalists. Meanwhile, public opinion will shift entirely in our favor. At that point, we can begin to punish the approximately one to two percent of the most reactionary capitalists—those guilty of bribery, theft, and other grave crimes—after obtaining solid evidence through inspection, imposing penalties such as arrest, execution (though only in rare cases), confiscation of property, imprisonment, or fines. Beijing has roughly fifty thousand commercial and industrial establishments; one percent corresponds to five hundred firms. After a month of intense struggle and several rounds of inspections, the Beijing municipal Party organization has so far arrested fewer than one hundred capitalists—still less than one percent—and plans to carry out additional rounds of inspections in February, aiming to arrest around three hundred in total (again, less than one percent). This is a gradual process of gaining understanding, deepening engagement, differentiating between factions, rallying the majority while isolating the minority. Such a task cannot be accomplished without the arduous, dedicated efforts of city-level Party organizations. There are profound contradictions among capitalists of different sizes; by focusing on the most reactionary among them—particularly speculative traders rather than industrial capitalists (although some particularly egregious factory owners also need to be addressed)—we may succeed in winning over the vast majority of capitalists without provoking widespread resentment. In fact, only a tiny minority (a few percent) would truly harbor grievances against us. In this manner, through a pincer movement from within and without, we can effectively root out all major corrupt elements hidden within the capitalist class. (5) To secure the enthusiastic support of the general public and farmers in the surrounding areas, the Beijing municipal government once organized over two hundred survey and interview teams to simultaneously visit every police station and township government jurisdiction, convening community meetings of residents and conducting door-to-door visits (while police and township government staff were instructed to abstain), spending about three to four days investigating all instances of corruption and misconduct by government employees and police officers, and reporting the findings to the municipal government for action. This approach proved highly effective. Such measures could be replicated in cities across the country and implemented several times each year. Mao Zedong January 31 Printed from the manuscript. Note [1] Gao Gang was at the time Secretary of the CPC Northeast Bureau and Chairman of the Northeast People’s Government.