August 1, 1951

Comrade Dehuai, and to be forwarded to Gao:

(1) The deployment of replacing one or two armies of the Ninth Army Group with the Twentieth Army Group is very good, but the main force of the Ninth Army Group should still serve as the second-line troops (second echelon) for the September campaign; it should not be moved too far away. (2) The Thirty-eighth Army, Thirty-ninth Army, and Fortieth Army of the Thirteenth Army Group should be moved to the first line in early August to actively prepare for the September campaign, while three to four armies should be drawn from the Third Army Group and the Nineteenth Army Group to take over coastal defense duties. (3) Construct a large number of grain and ammunition reserve depots on the very front line, stockpile sufficient grain and ammunition for the September campaign, so that supplies can be replenished as they are consumed during operations. This point is of the utmost importance. I have heard that you are already making preparations, but I do not know what the specific situation is. (4) A reply on the above points is expected.

Mao Zedong
August 1

[1]
Dehuai, i.e., Peng Dehuai, then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
[2]
Gao, refers to Gao Gang, then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region.
[3]
The Chinese People's Volunteers had originally planned to launch a campaign counteroffensive against the enemy in September 1951. Later, in accordance with instructions from the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, it was decided to postpone the execution of the campaign counteroffensive plan (only intensifying preparations without launching it) and to prepare for tactical counteroffensives against the enemy.