Comrade Filippov [2]:

Regarding the terms our side should propose during the military representatives’ talks between the enemy and ourselves, we believe there are five main articles, namely:

(1) “Both sides agree to simultaneously issue a ceasefire order. From the moment the ceasefire order is issued, the naval, land, and air forces of both sides shall cease fire and halt all other hostile activities throughout the entire territory of Korea.” The enemy side may raise no objection to this article.

(2) “The land, naval, and air forces of both sides shall each withdraw ten miles from the 38th Parallel, establishing a demilitarized zone in the area ten miles south and ten miles north of the 38th Parallel. The civil administration of this demilitarized zone shall be restored to the conditions prevailing before June 25, 1950. The area north of the 38th Parallel shall be under the jurisdiction of the Korean People’s Government, and the area south of the 38th Parallel shall be under the jurisdiction of the South Korean Government.” The enemy side may raise certain objections to this article, but by proposing it in this way, we are being very fair, and it will be difficult for the enemy to criticize.

(3) “Both sides shall cease the transport (including land, air, and sea transport) of munitions, troops, or supplementary forces from outside Korea into Korea, as well as from within Korea to the frontline forces.” It is estimated that the enemy side may propose such a clause; therefore, our side should probably take the initiative in proposing it, or perhaps the latter part of this article could be omitted.

(4) “Establish a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives from nations recommended by each side that have not participated in the Korean War, responsible for supervising the implementation of Articles 1, 2, and 3.” It is estimated that the enemy side may propose a similar clause; therefore, our side takes the initiative in proposing this article. However, implementing this article will invite many troubles, as the “supervisory members” recommended by the enemy side will inspect our military transport vehicles along the Sino-Korean border and at key communication hubs in North Korea. Alternatively, our side might not take the initiative in proposing this article, but accept it when the enemy side proposes it. Which course is preferable, I ask you to consider and decide. It seems inappropriate to fundamentally refuse the establishment of a supervisory organ.

(5) “Both sides shall release prisoners of war. Within four months after the ceasefire, each side shall release and exchange all prisoners of war of the other side in batches.” The enemy side may propose a one-for-one exchange, but our side should demand the release of all prisoners of war. However, the enemy side holds a larger number of North Korean prisoners, some of whom have already been conscripted into the South Korean forces; this matter may provoke disputes.

The above are the five fundamental articles that we believe should be resolved during the military representatives’ talks between the two sides. In addition, there are also:

(1) “All foreign troops, including the Chinese Volunteer Army, shall complete their withdrawal from North and South Korea in batches within a specified period (for example, within three to four months).” This is also a very important article. However, the enemy representatives may consider this matter to fall within the political sphere and not to be resolved at this conference. Please consider whether our side should propose this article.

(2) “Refugees from both North and South Korea shall be repatriated to their original homes within a specified period (for example, within a few months).” Comrade Kim Il Sung [1] hopes to propose this article. However, implementing this matter is quite troublesome, and the representatives of North and South Korea may engage in many disputes over this issue, thereby affecting decisions on other major issues. Perhaps it could be proposed, and if disputes remain unresolved, it could be deferred to a future political international conference for discussion.

Regarding the above points, please inform me of your views.

Furthermore, we have dispatched Comrade Li Kenong [2], Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, leading a team of assistants, who departed for Korea last night. They are expected to arrive at Comrade Kim Il Sung’s location around July 5 to consult with Kim and others on matters related to the peace talks, and then proceed to the vicinity of Kaesong to preside over these negotiations from behind the scenes.

Attached are Comrade Kim Il Sung’s opinions for your reference.

Mao Zedong
July 3, 1951

[1] Kim Il Sung, then serving as Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
[2] Li Kenong, then serving as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s Government.