Possible Backbone for the Modernization of Our Army [1]
(June 21, 1951)
Comrade Xu Xiangqian:
Your telegrams of June 16 and 19 have both been received. The issues you raised are answered separately as follows:
(1) The military order Comrade Gao Gang [2] handed over to you for handling represents the minimum requirements essential for the Korean battlefield within this year. Because of the formidable firepower of the enemy on the Korean battlefield, the damage and loss of our army’s various weapons are very great, necessitating constant replenishment. In addition, from the time we entered the war until the end of this year, we have mobilized 1.1 million new recruits, all of whom need to train with weapons and take weapons to the front line. This is vastly different from past domestic wars. Therefore, if possible, we must request the Soviet government to begin shipping the various weapons in the order in batches starting in July, delivering one-sixth each month and completing delivery by year’s end, so that our army on the Korean battlefield can temporarily receive constant replenishment according to its current organization.
(2) I consider the organizational proposal put forward by the Soviet General Staff to be entirely correct. Without modern equipment, it is impossible to defeat the armies of the imperialists. The specific organizational proposal
[1]
This is a telegram from Mao Zedong to Xu Xiangqian, Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission, who was then visiting the Soviet Union at the head of the Ordnance Industry Delegation of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. The telegram was simultaneously sent to Stalin.
[2]
Gao Gang, then serving as First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.

can be brought back by Zhang Qinghua [1] for further study. However, when carrying out reorganization, it must suit the requirements of the Korean battlefield. According to your telegram, only equipment for 13 divisions can arrive this year, with the rest to be shipped successively only next year and the year after. This would leave the Korean battlefield without the necessary replenishment. Therefore, I have already cabled Comrade Filippov [2] to request that he consider shipping the various weapons and materiel in the order on schedule, as stated in point (1). As for the weapons still insufficient according to the organizational standards proposed by the Soviet side, they can be shipped successively next year. Depending on the state of weapons transportation, a number of divisions and regiments can be successively drawn and reorganized, gradually completing the new organization and equipment for 60 divisions. I hope you will earnestly discuss this point with the Soviet General Staff.
(3) Since the purpose of our order is as stated above (the urgent needs of the Korean battlefield), it is in no way contradictory to our ordnance production. When your delegation continues discussions on ordnance production issues, you may use the organizational proposal put forward by the Soviet General Staff as a basis. However, the new organization and equipment for 60 divisions may become the backbone for the first modernization of our army, whereas our entire national defense force was originally planned to be 180 divisions. Therefore, our ordnance production is intended to equip such a number and should be completed within three to five years.
(4) Of course, whether our requests can be fulfilled depends on the possible conditions of transportation. The Soviet comrades will calculate this realistically.
Mao Zedong
June 21
[1]
Zhang Qinghua, then serving as Deputy Director of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Department of the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People’s Government.
[2]
Filippov, i.e., Stalin.