Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] on Questions of Troop Operations and Rest and Rehabilitation (June 2, 1951)

Comrade Dehuai: (1) Comrade Kim Il-sung may arrive in Beijing on the evening of June 3. He is likely to offer his views on operational matters. Therefore, please hold off sending the telegram you had prepared for Comrade Kim Ung [2]; that telegram also requires some further revision.

(2) Having reviewed the Political Department of the Volunteer Army’s directive telegram of 8:00 p.m. on June 1 concerning current political work, as well as the Third Corps Political Department’s directive telegram of May 31 to the Political Departments of the Fifteenth and Sixty-first Armies, I find both documents very sound. At present, it is extremely important to boost morale, halt the enemy advance, and stabilize the situation.

(3) The Third Corps Political Department’s telegram states: “Troops assigned to hold the line must thoroughly abandon any notions of rest and rehabilitation and fully grasp the significance of their defensive mission.” This point is rightly made. Accordingly, the Third Corps should be divided into two types of units: one consisting of troops whose combat effectiveness has not been impaired or has suffered only minor damage, which would remain at the front to hold the line, continue fighting, score a few small victories, raise morale, and undergo further training; and another comprising units whose combat power has been severely degraded, which must be withdrawn to the Gushan area for reorganization and replenishment in preparation for renewed combat. As for the Nineteenth Corps, its main forces should stay on the front lines to fight, while a portion of its battered units should be moved to positions closer to the rear for rest and rehabilitation. Moreover, according to the Volunteer Army Headquarters’ figures of May 27 regarding the allocation of new recruits, the Nineteenth Corps is slated to receive over 50,000 men, whereas the Third Corps is to receive only a few thousand. It may be necessary to adjust these allocations in light of the Third Corps’ recent losses.

Mao Zedong, 11:00 p.m., June 2, printed from the manuscript. Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [2] Kim Ung was at the time a front-line commander of the Korean People’s Army.