Comrade Dehuai:

Successive campaigns have proven that it is difficult for our army to achieve the mission of annihilation by implementing large-scale strategic or operational outflanking maneuvers to encircle several divisions, or one whole division, or even one whole regiment of the American forces at one time. This is because the American forces at present still possess a rather strong will to fight and self-confidence. In order to strike down this self-confidence of the enemy to achieve the final objective of large-scale encirclement and annihilation, it seems appropriate that our ambition in each operation should not be too great. It is enough to require that each of our corps, in one operation, annihilate one whole battalion, or at most two whole battalions, of the American, British, or Turkish forces. We now have eight corps on the front line. If each corps annihilates one whole enemy battalion, that is a total of eight whole battalions, which will deal a very heavy blow to the enemy. If each corps can annihilate two whole enemy battalions each time, for a total of sixteen whole battalions, the blow to the enemy will be even greater. If this cannot be done, then it is still more appropriate to require each corps to annihilate only one whole enemy battalion each time. That is to say, fighting American and British forces is different from fighting puppet forces. Against puppet forces, we can implement large-scale strategic or operational encirclements. Against American and British forces, for several months to come, we should not implement such large-scale encirclements, but only small-scale tactical encirclements. That is, each time, each corps should only meticulously select one enemy battalion, or slightly more, as its target for complete encirclement and annihilation. In this way, after fighting three or four more campaigns, that is, after each American and British division has had another three or four of its whole battalions cleanly annihilated, their morale cannot but fall, and their confidence cannot but be shaken. At that time, we can make a plan to annihilate one whole enemy division, or two or three whole divisions. In the past, when we fought Chiang Kai-shek's New First Army, New Sixth Army, Fifth Army, Eighteenth Army, and the Gui clique's Seventh Army, we went through this process from small annihilations to large annihilations. Since our army entered Korea, the five campaigns have already completed a stage of this journey of small annihilation battles, but it is not yet enough. We must still go through several more campaigns to complete the stage of small annihilation battles and advance to the stage of large annihilation battles. As for the location of the fighting, as long as the enemy is willing to advance, the further north the better, as long as it does not exceed the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Please consider the above and reply by telegram.

Mao Zedong
May 26

One

This policy of the Central Government is not only for Tibet, but for all fraternal minority nationalities within the country. This is because reforms to inherent systems such as politics, economy, culture, and religion, as well as reforms to customs and habits, if not carried out consciously and voluntarily by the people of each nationality and the leaders connected with the people, but are instead carried out by coercive orders from the Central People's Government, and are carried out rigidly and coercively by working personnel of Han or other ethnic origins, will only arouse ethnic resentment and fail to achieve the purpose of reform.

Two

Among the Tibetan people, Buddhism has very high prestige. The people's faith in the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni is very high. Therefore, the agreement not only stipulates that religion should be respected and monasteries protected, but also that the status and functions of the two aforementioned leaders of the Tibetan people should be respected. This is not only to reconcile the two formerly discordant parties within the Tibetan nationality, but also to cause all nationalities within the country to show necessary respect for the Tibetan leaders.

Three

All troops and local working personnel entering the Tibet region must strictly abide by the nationality policy and religious policy, must strictly abide by the agreement on the measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, must strictly observe discipline, must practice fair trade, that is, trade conducted completely according to the principle of exchange of equal values, must prevent and correct the tendency of great-nation chauvinism, and through their sincere respect for the Tibetan nationality and their practice of serving the Tibetan people, eliminate this great ethnic estrangement left over from history and win the sincere trust of the local government of Tibet and the Tibetan people. If there are personnel among these troops and staff who violate the nationality policy and the agreement, if they do not observe discipline, if they bully the Tibetan people and do not respect the leading figures connected with the people, if they commit the principled error of great-Han chauvinism, then the leading organs and leading personnel should be responsible for correcting it in a timely manner. At the same time, the local government of Tibet and the Tibetan people have the right to criticize and the right to report and make representations to the higher-level people's government and the Central People's Government. This principle applies not only to the Tibetan nationality, but to all fraternal nationalities.

Mr. Xingyan:

Your kind letter has been respectfully received. The list of personnel to attend the National Committee meeting as non-voting delegates was finalized yesterday. It does not include anyone from the Hong Kong side, which is not inconsistent with your esteemed opinion. This is my reply. With best regards.

Mao Zedong
May 26

The Haitang poem has been received. I sincerely thank you for your kind thoughts.

Comrade Shushi:

Your report of May 11 has been received. I agree with all your opinions. Several more batches of counter-revolutionaries in the various cities of East China should be arrested, until they are all arrested. The authority to approve arrests and executions in the various cities, if you deem it necessary, can be postponed for one month, until July 1, before being returned to the next higher level, in order to facilitate continued arrests and executions. In addition, please pay attention to your own safety and security, as well as that of the principal responsible persons at all levels.

Mao Zedong
May 28

Comrade Dehuai, and also for Gao:

All telegrams have been received. (1) Your plan to order all corps to resolutely halt the enemy on and south of the Gimhwa, Cheorwon, and Saknyeong line, and your plan to move the main force of the Forty-second Corps to the area east of Ichon and to move the Forty-seventh Corps to the Namchon-Sinmak area, are both very correct. I hope you will resolutely implement them. (2) Yang Chengwu's two corps can be moved into Korea immediately, with one corps replacing the Forty-seventh Corps to build airfields while also attending to coastal defense, and with one corps replacing the Forty-second Corps to defend against a possible landing in the Wonsan direction. (3) To prevent the puppet Capital Division from raiding northward toward Wonsan from Yangyang, it is necessary to deploy a combat-effective division on the Goseong-Tongcheon line. Does the People's Army have such a force? (4) What is the situation of the 180th Division of the Sixtieth Corps? I am very concerned.

Mao Zedong
May 31, 2:00 a.m.