Annotations to Deng Xiaoping’s [I] Comprehensive Report on Land Reform, Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, and Support for the Korean War Resistance
(May 16, 1951)

Comrades Xiaoping, Zikui, Jianying, Shushi, Zhongxun, Yibo, and Gao Gang, and others: Please also forward this to the heads of the respective bureaus, provincial committees, regional party committees, and municipal committees of large and medium-sized cities.

Comrade Xiaoping’s report is very good; it is being circulated for your study. My comments are appended to each section of the report and are offered for your reference.

[I]
Deng Xiaoping was then First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Mao Zedong
May 16

[2]
Zikui refers to Deng Zikui, who at the time served as Third Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Jianying refers to Ye Jianying, First Secretary of the South China Branch of the CPC Central Committee. Shushi refers to Rao Shushi, First Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Zhongxun refers to Xi Zhongxun, First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Yibo refers to Bo Yibo, First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Gao Gang was then Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

[3]
This refers to Deng Xiaoping’s comprehensive report dated May 9, 1951, addressed to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee, concerning land reform, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and support for the Korean War resistance. In this report, Mao Zedong added nine annotations:

1. Regarding the report’s discussion of the Huaihai Campaign in the Southwest (i.e., the campaigns to eliminate bandits, suppress local tyrants, reduce rents, and return deposits) and the great successes achieved in land reform, Mao wrote: “All of this is excellent and worthy of celebration. All regions that have not yet reached this stage should follow suit.”

2. Concerning the directive that wherever land reform is carried out, it must adhere to the principles of re-inspection, rent and debt reduction, punishment of illegal landlords, appropriate satisfaction of poor and tenant farmers’ demands, and the transformation of the leadership composition of peasant associations and rural governments, Mao commented: “All of these are correct, and they should be implemented everywhere.”

3. With respect to instances where lax control led to continued killings during the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and the punishment of illegal landlords, even after leadership had decided to scale back operations, Mao noted: “Similar phenomena occurred in the Central South region, also due to lax control. We must remember this lesson and never repeat it.”

4. Noting that, following several directives from the Southwest Bureau—especially those issued by Chairman Mao—the aforementioned practices had ceased by late April, Mao instructed: “The provinces in the Central South and East China must resolutely and uniformly halt such actions if they are to regain effective control.”

5. On the matter of authority to approve executions, which, with the exception of a few county committees, had been centralized under the regional party committees, Mao emphasized: “Without exception, this power must be fully reverted to the provincial or regional party committees.”

6. Observing that, in the later stages of both the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and land reform, a trend toward lawlessness and indiscipline—characterized by failure to report beforehand or seek approval afterward, and disregard for established procedures—was once again gaining momentum, Mao cautioned: “The provinces in the Central South and East China should pay close attention to these lessons and strictly enforce the system of reporting and seeking instructions. Under no circumstances should such harmful practices be allowed to resurface.”

7. Addressing the fact that cadres throughout the Southwest region had begun a rectification campaign in May to summarize experiences, acknowledge achievements, build on strengths, correct shortcomings, and actively combat tendencies toward lawlessness and indiscipline, Mao suggested: “Please consider whether a similar rectification drive could be organized in June and July, followed by another in winter, rather than waiting until winter to conduct just one session.”

8. Pointing out that many comrades had initially believed that participation in the Korean War resistance would detract from their work, but that once mass mobilization was launched, it greatly facilitated practical efforts, making recruitment particularly easy and unexpected, Mao remarked: “There are two other matters that caught many off guard. One was the reluctance to vigorously suppress counterrevolutionaries or to invite non-Party figures to join trial committees and jointly try counterrevolutionary elements. The reality, however, was quite the opposite: the more we broke down isolationist barriers, the better the situation became. This illustrates an underestimation of the enthusiasm of the people and non-Party members. Another issue was the hesitation to organize democratic personages, industrialists, merchants, university professors, and secondary school teachers into small groups to observe land reform and the execution of counterrevolutionaries. Even when they were invited to attend, only positive aspects were shown, while negative ones were concealed—a clear manifestation of severe isolationism. Yet the outcome was again contrary to expectations: all those who went and witnessed these events returned with favorable impressions and a sense of progress. The East China Bureau’s policy of allowing observers to see both positive and negative outcomes proved highly effective. This too reflects an underestimation of the initiative and potential of broad sections of non-Party society.”

9. Finally, noting that excessive rainfall this spring might adversely affect spring plowing, that serious famines had already broken out in some areas, and that there was concern that insufficient attention to these problems, coupled with neglect of the central task of securing a bountiful harvest this year, could lead to grave consequences—issues to which we are currently directing our attention—Mao expressed his own deep concern and urged: “I share your worries about this matter. I earnestly request that you provide close guidance to ensure a successful harvest.”