Commentary on the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee’s Report Regarding the Discovery of Internal Spies within the Enterprise System (April 10, 1951) Comrades Shushi, Zikui, Jianying, Xiaoping, Zhongxun, Yibo, Gao Gang, Rongzhen, Bocheng, Chen Yi, Helong, Zongsun, and Tan Zheng[1], also forwarded to the respective branch bureaus, provincial party committees, municipal party committees of large and medium-sized cities, district party committees, and heads of provincial military districts: According to the report from the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee, thirteen spies who had infiltrated the Party were uncovered in the enterprise system. Among them, Man Yuhua had usurped the post of deputy director of the trade union, while Yang Youting had fraudulently obtained positions as a delegate to the Tianjin Representatives’ Conference of All Sectors, a member of the Municipal Government’s Disaster Relief Committee, an executive committee member of the Textile Workers’ Union, and the chairman of the trade union at the Third Textile Mill, among other key posts. I request that you pay close attention to this issue of internal spies and draw lessons from the experience in Tianjin. Mao Zedong April 10th Printed from the manuscript. Notes [ ] Shushi refers to Rao Shushi, who at that time served as First Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. Zikui refers to Deng Zikui, who held the position of Third Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Second Political Commissar of the Central South Military Region of the PLA. Jianying refers to Ye Jianying, who was First Secretary of the South China Branch of the CPC Central Committee and Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region of the PLA. Xiaoping refers to Deng Xiaoping, who served as First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the Southwest Military Region of the PLA. Zhongxun refers to Xi Zhongxun, who was First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the Northwest Military Region of the PLA. Yibo refers to Bo Yibo, who held the post of First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the North China Military Region of the PLA. Gao Gang was then Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the PLA. Rongzhen refers to Nie Rongzhen, who was Second Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Acting Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, and Commander of the North China Military Region. Bocheng refers to Liu Boceng, who was Second Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee. Chen Yi was Second Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the East China Military Region of the PLA. He Long was Third Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander of the Southwest Military Region of the PLA. Zongsun refers to Zhang Zongsun, who was Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Deputy Commander of the Northwest Military Region of the PLA. Tan Zheng was Deputy Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Third Political Commissar of the Central South Military Region of the PLA.

Notification Concerning Two Prominent Experiences in the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Campaign (April 10, 1951) To all Central Bureaus, with further transmission to branch bureaus, municipal party committees of large and medium-sized cities, and district party committees: According to a report from the Central Public Security Ministry dated March 22: During the recent phase of the suppression campaign, two significant experiences have emerged. First, conducting large-scale, well-planned, and coordinated raids to apprehend numerous counterrevolutionaries simultaneously has proven to be an effective and indispensable measure for rooting out social counterrevolutionaries. Practical actions in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Pingyuan, and Chahar have demonstrated this point. Such operations deliver the most severe blow to the enemy, provide profound educational impact to the masses, and cause minimal social unrest. As long as the principles of thorough preparation, accurate targeting, tight organization, unified command, swift action, strict discipline, and timely publicity are adhered to, it is possible to ensure that no innocent persons are arrested while simultaneously gaining popular support and public sympathy. Second, experiences from Beijing, Tianjin, and Zhangjiakou have shown that convening expanded meetings of city-level and district-level conferences of representatives from all sectors and consultative committees—with extensive participation by representatives of various democratic parties, prominent democrats, ethnic minorities, religious groups, and industrial and commercial circles—to expose the crimes of counterrevolutionaries, disseminate the policy of suppressing counterrevolutionaries, address ideological doubts among democrats, and mobilize all social strata to resolutely crush counterrevolutionary forces has been successful. Based on these local experiences, we can summarize as follows: One, the leading officials themselves should preside over such meetings; public security organs should present reports on the situation regarding the suppression campaign, systematically categorizing cases and focusing only on major incidents and principal culprits rather than listing every single offender. By using real people and actual events to explain the policy, we can effectively incite hatred toward counterrevolutionaries and secure the support of people from all walks of life. Two, evidence of counterrevolutionary crimes—photographs, case files, confessions, and other concrete proof—should be displayed at the meeting to dispel any remaining doubts. Three, adequate preparation is essential before the meeting, and strict adherence to established principles must be maintained during the proceedings. Decisions already made regarding the execution of convicted criminals must not be altered. Four, efforts should integrate top-down leadership with grassroots mobilization, harnessing the power of the masses and persuading democratic figures. Five, a differentiated approach should be adopted: those who sincerely support the policy but harbor doubts should be patiently explained to and their understanding enhanced, whereas individuals with ulterior motives should be confronted with irrefutable facts so that they have no room for argument. We believe that this practice should be widely promoted. These two summaries are very insightful; please take note and implement them accordingly. Mao Zedong April 10th Printed from the manuscript.