Central Directive Forwarding Luo Ruiqing’s Inspection Report on the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionary Activities Campaign in Several Large and Medium-Sized Cities (March 23, 1951) To all Central Bureaus, with copy to Sub-bureaus, Provincial Committees, Regional Party Committees, Municipal Committees of Large and Medium-sized Cities, and their respective public security organs:

We hereby transmit Comrade Luo Ruiqing’s inspection report on the suppression campaign, dated March 20, 1951 [2]. The Central Committee deems this report to be correct. You are requested to implement it forthwith as the Central Committee’s instruction and to use it as a basis for examining and improving your suppression work.

During this critical phase of the campaign, it is highly effective for higher-level leading comrades or working groups to be dispatched to various localities to conduct inspections and provide assistance. Therefore, you are urged to send out such teams whenever possible.

Issued by the Central Committee on March 23, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.

Notes  [1] Luo Ruiqing was at that time Minister of Public Security of the Central People’s Government.

[2] Refers to Luo Ruiqing’s report of March 20, 1951, addressed to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee, concerning the suppression campaign in several large and medium-sized cities. Based on his findings during the inspection, the report identifies several issues worthy of attention in urban suppression work:  First, some comrades have underestimated the extent of counterrevolutionary activity in cities, believing that cities differ from the countryside—where bandits and local tyrants are rife—while in cities only secret agents exist. Second, there is an excessive apprehension about the potential social repercussions of suppressing counterrevolutionaries in urban areas, which has unduly intensified their own misgivings, shaken their resolve, and made them reluctant to carry out executions. Third, there is an overreliance on limited intelligence-gathering efforts, coupled with a failure to recognize the immense power of the broad masses in combating spies and traitors; as a result, they dare not fully mobilize the people, proceeding in a timid and circumscribed manner, unable to break free from narrow confines. Fourth, clandestine informants are being recruited too indiscriminately, without adequate controls or oversight. Fifth, the ranks of public security cadres in large and medium-sized cities are both numerically inadequate and lacking in quality; their experience in urban management is severely deficient, and existing experience has not been sufficiently systematized. Moreover, leadership at all levels generally needs to be strengthened; otherwise, it will indeed be difficult to cope with complex and acute struggles.  In light of these points, the public security organs should take a more proactive role in securing the leadership of the Party committees and maintaining close consultation and reporting to them. At the same time, city Party committees should pay closer attention to public security work, make every effort to replenish the cadre ranks, and provide concrete guidance and assistance in resolving specific difficulties.