Central Committee Transmits Luo Ruiqing’s[1]
Inspection Report on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries in Several Large and Medium-Sized Cities, with Comments
(March 23, 1951)

To all central bureaus, and forward to sub-bureaus, provincial party committees, district party committees, party committees of large and medium-sized cities, and their affiliated public security departments:

Comrade Luo Ruiqing’s inspection report of March 20 on the issue of suppressing counterrevolutionaries[2] is hereby forwarded to you. The Central Committee deems this report to be correct. You are requested to treat it as the opinion of the Central Committee and implement it accordingly, and to use it as a basis for examining your work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries. In this intense period of the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the dispatching of responsible comrades or work teams by higher authorities to various localities to inspect and assist in the work is of great value. You are requested to send personnel to do so wherever possible.

Central Committee
March 23

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[1] Luo Ruiqing, then Minister of Public Security of the Central People’s Government.
[2] Refers to Luo Ruiqing’s report of March 20, 1951, to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee on the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries in several large and medium-sized cities. Based on information obtained through inspection, the report raised several issues worthy of attention in the urban suppression of counterrevolutionaries: First, some comrades underestimated the presence of urban counterrevolutionaries, believing that cities differed from the countryside, where there were large numbers of bandits and local tyrants, whereas cities only had spies. Second, they overestimated the potential shock caused by suppressing counterrevolutionaries in cities, which increased their own misgivings, causing their resolve to waver repeatedly, making it impossible to firmly carry out executions. Third, they placed excessive trust in their own limited foundation of investigative work, neglected the great power of the broad masses in opposing traitors, dared not boldly mobilize the masses, acted timidly and cautiously, and could not break out of their narrow circle. Fourth, the use of special informant relationships was too indiscriminate and lacked strict control and supervision. Fifth, the public security cadres in large and medium-sized cities were few in number and weak in quality, sorely lacking in experience in managing cities, and had not properly summarized the experience they did have. Leadership at various levels also generally needed strengthening; otherwise, coping with the complex and acute struggle would indeed be difficult. For these reasons, public security departments should more proactively secure the leadership of party committees and closely seek instructions and report to party committees; urban party committees, in turn, should pay greater attention to public security work, find ways to supplement cadres, and provide concrete guidance and help in resolving specific difficulties.