Commentary on the Southwest Military Region Party Committee’s Directive Regarding the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries [1] (March 11, 1951) To the military leadership organs directly under the Central Military Commission and the Military Academy; to the party committees of all major military regions; to the Party Committee of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; with copy also to the party committees of the military districts of all provinces: You are requested, in like manner as the Southwest Military Region Party Committee, to conduct a fresh review—regardless of whether such a review has already taken place or not—on the following matters: the study of the four documents on counterrevolutionary suppression and the dissemination of related reports; the campaign to eliminate bandits (in areas where this task remains); the retention of former officers and personnel; as well as the issue of other counterrevolutionary elements having infiltrated organs and units; and questions of secrecy.
In addition, you are to issue necessary instructions to your directly subordinate organs and units, including corps, armies, and divisions, and ensure that these tasks are completed within a specified time frame.

We consider it an important political task at present to draw widespread attention to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries throughout all military organs, schools, and units, and to handle this matter correctly.
Those who neglect this task should be subject to criticism.

Your reviews and instructions are to be submitted to the Central Military Commission in one copy. Mao Zedong, March 11, 1951. Printed from the manuscript.

Notes [1] Refers to the telegram issued on March 6, 1951, by the CPC Southwest Military Region Committee concerning the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, addressed to various armies, military regions, and other units, with copy to the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission.

When forwarding this telegram, Mao Zedong not only wrote the above commentary but also added numerous marginal notes throughout the text. The telegram and accompanying notes read as follows:

Since receiving last year’s central directive on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the troops of our military region, under the unified leadership of the Southwest Bureau, have resolutely implemented this directive, thereby achieving remarkable results in bandit-fighting operations and in mobilizing the masses to suppress counterrevolutionaries.

However, owing to the lack of specialized research and planning within the army itself, this major issue has yet to receive widespread attention from party committees at all levels. (Mao’s note: If this is true of the Southwest, similar conditions likely exist in other military regions and provinces as well.)

Some units exhibit tendencies to “deal leniently with serious cases,” to “punish disciplinary infractions more severely than political offenses,” or to apply strict measures locally while being lax in the military.
There has been insufficient seriousness in dealing with former government officials and staff, and inadequate attention paid to those among them who pose serious threats.
Among party cadres, there continue to be instances of underestimating the enemy, complacency, and loss of confidential information.

The Military Region Party Committee believes that these shortcomings must be corrected without delay, for they not only affect the success of the bandit-fighting campaign, mass mobilization, and social order, but also constitute a crucial question directly related to maintaining and strengthening the political and organizational purity and cohesion within the armed forces. (Mao’s note: Precisely so.)

To this end, it has been decided: First, the Regulations on the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries promulgated by the Central People’s Government, Comrade Peng Zhen’s report on the same subject, the February 22 editorial of the People’s Daily, and Minister Shi Liang’s special article entitled “Resolutely and Correctly Suppress All Counterrevolutionary Activities”—these four documents—are to be carefully organized for study by cadres at all levels, followed by a practical inspection based on their application.
Party committees at the divisional level and above are to convey the findings of these inspections in reports addressed to both internal party members and external cadres.
Any tendency to lose vigilance against counterrevolutionaries, to treat serious cases lightly, or even to seek peaceful coexistence with them, must be exposed, criticized, and rectified. (Mao’s note: This is absolutely necessary.)

Second, the campaign to eliminate bandits and capture their leaders shall be further intensified, closely integrated with mass struggles, and precautions taken to prevent complacency arising from successes in the fight against banditry.
Existing backlog cases under custody should be promptly cleared, and swift sentencing carried out in accordance with the Regulations on the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries.
Henceforth, all cases involving bandits are to be handled uniformly by the military in conjunction with local authorities, with monthly reports submitted to the Military Region.

Third, efforts to retain former officers and personnel must be strengthened.
All units and organs are to undertake a comprehensive purge. (Mao’s note: Very correct—there should indeed be a general purge.)
While continuing to unite with, win over, and reform these individuals, any specific elements engaged in subversive activities must be resolutely arrested and brought to justice.
As for all counterrevolutionary elements who have disguised themselves as defectors or insurgents and infiltrated our ranks, scrutiny and investigative work should be rapidly stepped up to gather evidence and deal with them appropriately.
Only through resolute purging and suppression of counterrevolutionary elements can we better unite and educate the majority.
A one-sided emphasis on education and reformation, accompanied by a relaxation of political vigilance, is fundamentally mistaken. (Mao’s note: Absolutely correct—this is precisely how it should be done.)

Fourth, a plan should be drawn up forthwith to swiftly and separately deal with the spy and thug elements among the large numbers of former officers and personnel currently undergoing training but still awaiting disposition; no delays are permitted.
Detailed instructions regarding items three and four above will be issued separately by the Military Region; please take note and implement them accordingly.