Telegram to Stalin on the Korean War Situation and Our Troops’ Adoption of a Rotation Strategy (March 1, 1951)  I. From the most recent campaigns waged on the Korean battlefield [1], it is evident that the enemy will not withdraw from Korea unless it is substantially defeated. However, achieving such a decisive defeat will require time. Therefore, the Korean War may be prolonged; at a minimum, we should prepare for two more years.  At present, the enemy’s operational intent is to engage us in a war of attrition. Over the past month, after establishing defensive positions and undergoing reorganization and reinforcement, the enemy has been probing our lines in search of opportunities to test our defenses. Its aim is, on the one hand, to prevent us from conducting necessary rest and replenishment at the front, and, on the other, to exploit its technological superiority to wear down our forces. Meanwhile, the enemy has been vigorously harassing the Korean coast and relentlessly bombing our supply routes. Only sixty to seventy percent of our supplies reach the front; thirty to forty percent are destroyed en route. Given these circumstances, and with no new units having yet arrived while existing formations remain unreinforced, there is a real possibility that the enemy may once again advance across the 38th Parallel, both north and south, within the next month and a half.

II. In order to thwart the enemy’s intentions, sustain prolonged operations, and gradually annihilate its forces, the Chinese People’s Volunteers intend to adopt a rotation system. We have decided to organize three rotating echelons: the nine army corps comprising thirty divisions currently fighting in Korea will form the first volunteer echelon; six additional army corps being transferred from China, together with three more now stationed in Korea—two of which are resting and refitting in the Wonsan–Hamhung area—will constitute the second volunteer echelon, totaling nine corps and twenty-seven divisions. This force is expected to arrive in the 38th Parallel region by early April and relieve the six army corps now holding the Han River front. Finally, six more army corps being readied for transfer from China, along with four corps from the first volunteer echelon, will comprise the third volunteer echelon, consisting of ten corps and thirty divisions, to be deployed around mid-June.

Of these ten corps, four have been engaged in combat for five months and must therefore be withdrawn for rest and reconstitution. Upon the second volunteer echelon assuming front-line duties, they will be redeployed to the Pyongyang–Wonsan area to undergo replenishment while also performing coastal defense tasks. The remaining two corps of the first volunteer echelon will be returned to China for overhaul and reinforcement.

Over the course of the past four campaigns, the Chinese People’s Volunteers have suffered over 100,000 combat and non-combat casualties and losses. We are currently working to replace these losses by recruiting and training an additional 120,000 troops. Over the next two years, we anticipate another 300,000 casualties and plan to recruit and train an equal number of replacements to support the rotation system.

III. Based on our operational experience in January and February, three of my army corps sustained heavy losses during the Hamhung–north campaign and are currently undergoing rest and rehabilitation. As a result, only six army corps are presently engaged in combat at the front, suffering severe shortages and lacking reinforcements. Consequently, I lack any reserve forces: when we achieve a tactical victory, I cannot exploit it to expand our gains, and when the enemy reinforces its positions, I am unable to counter those reinforcements. Moreover, as our forces have advanced southward, our rear-area supply lines have become excessively long and supply is extremely difficult, while we must also maintain garrisons to secure our positions. Therefore, until the enemy is decisively defeated and we have air cover, attempting to drive it further south too soon would actually undermine our ability to isolate and destroy its forces.

In view of this situation, and before the nine corps of the second volunteer echelon reach the front in early April—when the enemy’s ground forces still enjoy a numerical advantage over ours—I propose refraining from large-scale offensive operations and instead maintaining a defensive posture along the southern bank of the Han River, supported by the six corps of the second volunteer echelon and four corps of the Korean People’s Army, in order to delay and contain the enemy. That said, it must be acknowledged that, over the next month and a half, the enemy may seize an opportunity to launch an offensive, forcing us into battle. Under such circumstances, our forces will permit the enemy to advance up to the 38th Parallel; once the nine corps of the second volunteer echelon have assembled, we will then launch a powerful new campaign. Our plan is to deploy the second echelon between April 15 and the end of June—over a period of two and a half months—to eliminate tens of thousands of U.S. and Syngman Rhee regime troops north of the 38th Parallel, after which we will advance southward beyond the Han River.

In sum, given the United States’ determination to continue the war, the steady influx of U.S. reinforcements, and the prospect of a protracted war of attrition against our forces, the Chinese People’s Volunteers must prepare for a long-term campaign. Only by wearing down the U.S. military over several years—depleting its manpower by hundreds of thousands—can we compel it to recognize the futility of its efforts and withdraw, thereby resolving the Korean question.

Printed from the Internal Edition of Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong. (Includes revisions by Mao Zedong.)

Notes [1] Refers to the Fourth Phase Campaign.