1. As can be seen from the recent campaigns currently being fought on the Korean battlefield, the enemy will not withdraw from Korea unless the greater part of them is wiped out, and wiping out the greater part of these enemies will require time.
Therefore, the Korean war has the possibility of becoming protracted, and we should at least make preparations for two years.
At present, the enemy’s operational intention is to attempt to wage a war of attrition against us.
Over the past month, after the enemy secured their positions, they have, following adjustments and replenishments, sought opportunities to launch probing attacks against us. Their aim is, on the one hand, to deny us the necessary rest and replenishment on the front lines, and on the other, to use their technological advantages to wear down our forces.
At the same time, the enemy has been very active in harassing the Korean coast and in the incessant bombing of supply lines.
Only 60 to 70 percent of our army’s replenishment supplies can reach the front lines, while 30 to 40 percent are destroyed en route by bombing.
In the coming month and a half, because our new troops have not yet arrived and our veteran troops have not been replenished, the enemy may once again advance into and withdraw from the areas north and south of the 38th Parallel.

2. To thwart the enemy’s intentions, persist in protracted operations, and achieve the goal of gradually annihilating the enemy, our Chinese Volunteer Army intends to adopt the policy of rotating units in combat.
The Chinese Volunteer Army has decided to organize three echelons of rotating forces. That is, the nine armies comprising thirty divisions currently fighting in Korea will serve as the first-echelon volunteer forces; the six armies now being transferred from within the country and the three armies currently in Korea that are about to be replenished (two of which are now resting and reorganizing in the Wonsan and Hamhung areas), totaling nine armies and twenty-seven divisions, will serve as the second-echelon volunteer forces. They can all arrive in the area of the 38th Parallel by early April to take over the tasks of the six armies now on the Han River front. The six armies to be transferred from within the country and four armies from the first-echelon volunteer forces, totaling ten armies and thirty divisions, will serve as the third-echelon volunteer forces, to be deployed by mid-June.
Of the ten armies mentioned above, four armies, having fought for five months, must be replenished and rested. After the second-echelon volunteer forces take over the front-line tasks, they will be transferred to the Pyongyang and Wonsan areas for rest and replenishment, while also attending to coastal defense.
The other two armies of the first-echelon volunteer forces will be transferred back to the country for reorganization and replenishment.
In the past four campaigns, the Chinese Volunteer Army’s combat and non-combat casualties and attrition have exceeded 100,000. We are now replenishing with 120,000 veterans and new recruits. This year and next, we anticipate a further 300,000 casualties and plan to replenish another 300,000 to facilitate the rotation of forces in combat.

3. Based on the combat experience of January and February, because three of our armies suffered relatively heavy losses in the campaign north of Hamhung and are undergoing rest and reorganization, only six armies are currently fighting on the front lines. With significant attrition and no replenishment, we lack reserve forces. As a result, we cannot expand the fruits of victory when a campaign is won, nor can we strike enemy reinforcements when they arrive.
At the same time, as our army advances southward, the rear supply lines become extended, supply is very difficult, and troops must still be left behind for garrison duties.
Therefore, before the enemy has been largely wiped out and while we still lack air cover, prematurely forcing the enemy to retreat southward would actually be disadvantageous for us to divide and annihilate them.
In view of this situation, before our second-echelon volunteer forces of nine armies arrive at the front by early April, the enemy’s ground forces will still hold an advantage over ours. We should avoid launching campaign-scale offensives and instead use the six armies of the second-echelon volunteer forces and four armies of the Korean People’s Army to conduct defensive operations in the area north of the South Han River, delaying and blocking the enemy.
However, it must be estimated that in the coming month and a half, the enemy may seek opportunities to attack and force us into battle.
Under such circumstances, our army intends to allow the enemy to advance into the areas north and south of the 38th Parallel, and then, once all nine armies of our second-echelon volunteer forces have assembled, launch a new and powerful campaign.
We plan that, after the arrival of our second-echelon forces, during the two and a half months from April 15 to the end of June, we will wipe out tens of thousands of troops from the organic units of the U.S. forces and Syngman Rhee’s forces in the areas north and south of the 38th Parallel, and then advance south of the South Han River. This would be most advantageous.
In sum, under the circumstances in which the United States persists in continuing the war, the U.S. forces continue to receive large-scale replenishments, and they are preparing to wage a protracted war of attrition against our army, our army must prepare for protracted warfare. Over several years, we will wear down hundreds of thousands of Americans, forcing them to recognize the difficulties and withdraw. Only thus can the Korean question be resolved.

Printed from the original document preserved in the Central Archives.

Note

--- Notes

〔1〕This is an excerpt from a telegram by Mao Zedong to Stalin.
〔2〕This refers to the Fourth Campaign.
〔3〕For the 38th Parallel, see note 〔5〕 on p. 99 of this volume.