Deng, Tan, Zhao, Su, [1] and inform Chen, Tang, Zhang, Zhou [2] and Jianying, Shushi, Tao Zhu [3] and the Guangxi Military Region: Your telegram of January 17 has been noted.
(1) In the past, without your inspection and design, fortifications were constructed blindly, resulting in great waste. This is a lesson.
Henceforth, whenever expenditures are required for constructing fortifications, strongholds, repairing roads, buildings, warehouses, etc., all must undergo your personnel’s inspection and design, with budgets drawn up and submitted to the Central Committee for review and approval before construction begins. Otherwise, no reimbursement will be granted.
(2) The construction plan for the Humen Fortress has been finalized, and funds will be disbursed accordingly.
(3) Whether Yulin Port should have a fortress built for one artillery regiment similar to Humen can be designed and budgeted by you, then submitted by telegram for consideration.
(4) Drafting two plans for the overseas island garrison forces is correct.
Among the islands outside the Pearl River estuary, those that must be held should have material preparations—this is also correct.
(5) Along the line from Shantou to Daya Bay and other coastlines and inland areas, there is absolutely no need to construct any fortifications or strongholds. When the enemy comes, let them land, and it is necessary to lure them deep, then concentrate forces to annihilate them.
The troops must leave the coastline and be stationed at suitable locations convenient for annihilating the enemy according to the above intention, engaging in training and consolidation, and not go to defend the coastline.
For inspecting the infiltration of spies and eliminating small numbers of bandits landing, the security forces and local armed units shall take responsibility.
(6) Repairing bridges on highways is necessary, but it suffices if ordinary military vehicles can pass; no special large-scale repairs are needed. Funds for repairs on this scale can be disbursed accordingly; otherwise, they will not be issued.
(7) The enemy’s offensive will only involve Chiang’s bandits; there will be no foreigners.
Chiang’s bandits have an army of 500,000, of which the navy, air force, military schools, military organs, local troops, and military dependents account for over 200,000. The regular army capable of combat numbers at most 300,000, and at least 100,000 must be retained to defend Taiwan. Therefore, the forces that can be mobilized to invade Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang amount to no more than 200,000 at most.
Even if he concentrates 200,000 troops to strike one location, as long as they land on the mainland, we can annihilate them piecemeal with two or three armies, or at most three or four armies.
On our side, only the four locations of Humen, Xiamen, Zhoushan, and Wusong, as well as certain islands outside the Pearl River estuary, must be secured and not allowed to be invaded.
All other coastlines should not be defended; instead, let the enemy come in to facilitate concentrated annihilation.
Hainan Island is not a place capable of sustaining an army of over 100,000. If the enemy lands with fewer than 100,000 troops, we have one regular division and Feng Baiju’s [4] forces holding out on the island. Adding the main force of the 43rd Army will suffice to annihilate them piecemeal.
Many Communist Party members have fought wars for over twenty years, yet suddenly they have forgotten all their experience, building fortifications everywhere and fearing the enemy like tigers. You should educate them and tell them not to act this way.
(8) For constructing positions in Xiamen, Zhoushan, and Wusong, as well as repairing roads and bridges in Fujian, Pudong, and other areas, instruct Chen, Tang, Zhang, and Zhou to direct subordinates to pay attention to selecting only the most essential items for proper design and construction, and to strictly avoid waste.
Mao Zedong
January 24
Based on the manuscript.

Notes

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[1] Deng refers to Deng Zihui, then serving as Second Political Commissar of the Central South Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Tan refers to Tan Zheng (1907–1988), from Xiangxiang, Hunan, then serving as Third Political Commissar of the Central South Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Zhao refers to Zhao Erlu (1905–1967), from Guo County (now Yuanping), Shanxi, then serving as Chief of Staff of the Central South Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Su refers to Su Jing (1910–1997), from Haicheng (now Longhai), Fujian, then serving as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central South Military Region.
[2] Chen refers to Chen Yi, then serving as Commander of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Tang refers to Tang Liang (1910–1986), from Liuyang, Hunan, then serving as Deputy Director of the Political Department of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Zhang refers to Zhang Zhen, born 1914, from Pingjiang, Hunan, then serving as Chief of Staff of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Zhou refers to Zhou Junming, then serving as Deputy Chief of Staff of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
[3] Jianying refers to Ye Jianying, then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Guangdong Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Shushi refers to Rao Shushi, then serving as Political Commissar of the East China Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
Tao Zhu (1908–1969), from Qiyang, Hunan, then serving as Director of the Political Department of the Central South Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.
[4] Feng Baiju (1903–1973), from Qiongshan, Guangdong (now part of Hainan), then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Hainan Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army.