COMMENTS ON THE WORK OF SUPPRESSING AND
LIQUIDATING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES
(1950-1951)
In this struggle against secret agents. It is imperative that we adhere
to a policy of not killing even a single agent and not arresting the majority
of them. If we do not kill even a single agent, then the other agents will
dare to make confessions. If we do not arrest the majority of the agents,
then security organs will have to deal with only a small number of agents
and the various government offices and schools can deal with the majority of
them. Party committees everywhere must adhere firmly to this policy.^
The leadership role of the party must be emphasized in security work.
In practice, it must be put under the direct leadership of party committees.
To do otherwise is dangerous.
(27 September 1950)
In regard to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, please strike
steadily, accurately, and fiercely so that there will be no complaints from
the various circles of society.
(19 December 1950)
To strike steadily is to say we must pay attention to strategy. To
strike accurately is to say we must not kill by mistake. To strike fiercely
is to say we must firmly kill all those reactionary elements who deserve to be
killed (Those who don't deserve to be killed, of course, we must not kill).
!
(17 January 1951)
^In the 1967 volume this comment is dated 9 October 1943.

As to those secret agents and headmen of religious sects against whom
we have not obtained any evidence, in order not to make a mistake and put our
selves on the defensive^ we should conduct investigation to gather conclusive
evidence and not arrest people or kill people at will.
(24 January 1951)
Persons under coercion are those who were coerced into taking part in
a wrongdoing but did not commit a wrongdoing or a serious wrongdoing. As to
people against whom we have evidence to show that they have abetted a wrong
doing, they are accessories to a crime and therefore subject to punishment.
If the chief culprit is given capital punishment, then the accessories must
be sentenced at least to imprisonment. Certain accessories who have committed
bigger crimes should receive the death penalty. They are not in the same
category as those who were under coercion.
(28 February 1951)
it
Those areas which have realized the general policy of total suppression
should stop this activity for a while and not arrest or kill more people. All
areas should formulate plans, have a strategy, conduct propaganda, and not
kill people by mistake. All this is a matter of course.
(9 March 1951)
The suppression of counterrevolutionaries is a great struggle. It must
be done well before our government can be consolidated.
(24 March 1951)
The suppression of counterrevolutionaries consists of; 1) the counter
revolutionaries in society; 2) the counterrevolutionaries hidden among old
personnel and new intellectuals in the military and administrative systems;
and 3) the counterrevolutionaries hiding in the Party. To suppress the
counterrevolutionaries in these places, we must without question proceed step
by step. We cannot do it in all places simultaneously. However, in the most
important departments in the Party, the government, and the army, particularly
in the public security departments, it is absolutely necessary to promptly
deal with the suspicious elements so as to place these organs in the hands of
reliable personnel.
(24 March 1951)
Please exercise strict control over the work of suppressing counter
revolutionaries. You must act cautiously. You must correct tendencies
toward carelessness. We certainly must suppress all counterrevolutionaries,
but we must be sure not to arrest or kill people by mistake.
(30 March 1951)2
2In the 1967 volume this comment is undated.

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries always must be carried out
precisely, cautiously, and in a planned and methodical way. Besides, it must
be controlled from above.
(30 March 1951)
Whether this work is done well or poorly should be measured by the
way the masses react to it.
(30 March 1951)
The suppression of counterrevolutionaries must be strictly limited
to such categories of people as bandit chiefs, bandits with long records,
local tyrants, secret agents, and headmen of reactionary religious sects.
We cannot include among them petty thieves, opium addicts, ordinary land
lords, ordinary members of the Kuomintang and the [San-min Chu—i] Youth
Corps, and ordinary officers of the Kuomintang army. Those sentenced to
death must be"^people who have committed serious crimes. It is a mistake to
deal lightly with a person who has committed a serious crime. It is equally
a Tn-fatsV" to deal harshly with a person who has committed a small offense.
(2 April 1951)
The policy of "suspending a sentence for two years" should under no
circumstance be explained as not wanting to execute a criminal who has
committed a capital crime or other serious offenses and of whom the people _
demand death. If we do this, it will be a mistake. We must explain this
..clearly to the cadres and the masses in the districts and villages. Those
who have committed heinous crimes and aroused popular wrath so deep that it
cannot be calmed without execution must be put to death. Only those who
have committed capital crimes, but against whom popular wrath is not deep and
of whom the people do not demand death, can we sentence them to death, put
them on two years' probation. Implement reform through labor, and watch over
the consequence.
(15 June 1951)
If the measures of watching over them are sound, let them engage in
their activities. If we are careful in our observations, then our purposes
will be served. They are in the palm of "Thus-Come Buddha" and cannot leap
out. You should treat it as a big thing and carry out observation and
inspection work enthusiastically and artistically.
(18 September 1951)^
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Unless we take steps to wipe out the activities of counterrevolutionaries, the people's country will be in jeopardy.
(1 October 1951)^
^In the 1967 volume this date is given as 18 September 1959.
^This comment is not included in the 1967 volume.
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