On the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries
(December 1950 – October 1951)

In dealing with counterrevolutionaries, pay attention to hitting steadily, accurately, and relentlessly, leaving society at large with nothing to say. [1]
(December 19, 1950)

In twenty-one counties of western Hunan, a number of bandit chieftains, local tyrants, and special agents have been executed, and preparations are being made for local authorities to execute another batch this year. I consider this action very necessary. Only thus can the enemy’s arrogance be lowered and the people’s morale be greatly boosted. If we are indecisive and overindulgent, tolerating evildoers, we will bring calamity upon the people and alienate ourselves from the masses.

By hitting steadily, we mean paying attention to tactics. By hitting accurately, we mean avoiding wrongful executions. By hitting relentlessly, we mean resolutely executing all counterrevolutionaries who deserve to be killed (those who do not, of course, are not to be killed). As long as we avoid wrongful executions, we need not fear the outcries of the bourgeoisie, even if they make them. [2]
(January 17, 1951)

To lower the enemy’s arrogance and boost the people’s morale, we should boldly execute several batches of bandit chieftains, habitual bandits, local tyrants, and important special agents and heads of secret societies against whom there is solid evidence. To avoid mistakes and passivity, we should investigate agents and heads of secret societies against whom evidence is
still lacking, obtain evidence, and refrain from making arbitrary arrests or executions. It is necessary to distinguish clearly the boundaries between these two kinds of situations. [1]
(January 24, 1951)

The phrase “accomplices under duress shall go unpunished” refers to those who were forced to participate but committed no misdeeds, or committed no major misdeeds. As for those proven to have aided the evildoers—that is, accessories—they should be convicted. If the principal offender is sentenced to death, an accessory should at least be sentenced to imprisonment; some accessories guilty of serious crimes should be sentenced to death and do not fall under the provision of “accomplices under duress shall go unpunished.” [2]
(February 28, 1951)

Comrade Huang Zuyan, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Shandong Military Area Command, was shot and killed by the counterrevolutionary Wang Jumin at a meeting on March 13. The assassination of a high-ranking Party cadre by a hidden counterrevolutionary within the Party is something rarely seen in the past and should arouse the vigilance of the entire Party. Wang Jumin was Deputy Section Chief of the Propaganda Section of the Political Department of the Huimin Military Sub-district in Shandong. He infiltrated our Party in 1941. His family were local tyrants and were struggled against during the land reform. Wang turned violent and committed suicide on the spot. Telegrams from the Shandong Sub-Bureau and the Military Area Command indicate this incident was clearly an act of revenge by counterrevolutionaries at a time when our Party and People’s Government are resolutely suppressing counterrevolutionaries. This notice is hereby issued for your attention:

(1) Strictly guard against retaliatory acts by counterrevolutionaries. It must be affirmed that retaliation by counterrevolutionaries is inevitable; preventive measures must be taken in advance, and negligence is absolutely impermissible. Besides strengthening security protection, the most important
thing is to take active measures to uncover counterrevolutionary organizations, destroy counterrevolutionary nests, and resolutely and swiftly execute all counterrevolutionaries who deserve execution, catching the counterrevolutionaries off guard and rendering them incapable of carrying out retaliation. (2) It must be recognized that a small number of counterrevolutionaries have already infiltrated the Party, the government, and the army; we must never assume all is peaceful and secure. We must now begin to pay attention to this problem, investigate suspicious individuals, and gather materials. Within organs at the level of the prefectural Party committee and special administrative commissioner’s office or above, within organs at the level of the military sub-district and division or above, and within municipal and district-level organs in cities, special attention must be paid to investigating such suspicious elements. As soon as material is available, appropriate measures should be taken to ensure the purity and safety of the leading organs of the Party, government, and army at all levels. We absolutely must not be indecisive and overindulgent, tolerating evildoers. This is of the utmost importance. [1]
(March 18, 1951)

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries is a great struggle. Only when this task is done well can political power be consolidated. The suppression of counterrevolution includes: (1) counterrevolutionaries in society at large; (2) counterrevolutionaries hidden among old personnel in the military and administrative systems and among the new intellectuals; (3) counterrevolutionaries hidden within the Party. In suppressing counterrevolutionaries in these three domains, there must naturally be steps and they cannot all be conducted simultaneously. However, for certain most important departments of the Party, government, and army, particularly public security departments, it is entirely necessary to carry out timely screening, preemptively handling suspicious elements so that these organs are in the hands of reliable personnel. Where conditions permit, the first and second categories can be addressed simultaneously; for example, the screening work in organs directly under the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee is already underway and has yielded results. [2]
(March 24, 1951)
In some places in Shandong, there is a tendency toward lack of vigor, and in others, a tendency to act rashly. These are two kinds of deviations that generally exist to some extent in all provinces and cities nationwide, and attention should be paid to correcting both. The deviation of acting rashly is particularly dangerous. Because where there is lack of vigor, education and persuasion will eventually boost the vigor; it matters little whether counterrevolutionaries are executed a few days earlier or later. Only acting rashly, arresting and executing innocent people by mistake, has a very bad impact. Please exercise strict control over the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries, be sure to proceed prudently, and be sure to correct all tendencies toward rash action. We must definitely suppress all counterrevolutionaries, but we must definitely not make mistakes in arrests and executions.

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries must always be accurate, meticulous, planned, and step-by-step, and entirely under control from above.

The quality of the work in all cases should be judged by the reaction of the masses. [1]
(March 30, 1951)

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries, whether in cities or in villages, must be carried out with great fanfare and extensive publicity, making it known to every household. All localities are requested to emulate Beijing’s methods uniformly. The suppression of counterrevolutionaries must be strictly limited to the categories of bandit chieftains, habitual bandits, local tyrants, special agents, heads of reactionary secret societies, and the like. It cannot include petty thieves, drug addicts, ordinary landlords, ordinary members of the Kuomintang Party or its Youth League, or ordinary KMT military officers. Those sentenced to death must be those guilty of severe crimes. Imposing light sentences for serious crimes is wrong, and imposing heavy sentences for minor crimes is also wrong. Most importantly, the power to approve the arrest and execution lists must be controlled at the level of the prefectural Party committee. It can now be said that the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries has been launched nationwide. The attention of Party committees at all levels should focus
mainly on these two points: meticulously examining the lists and carrying out extensive propaganda. By grasping these two points, no mistakes will be made. The Beijing Municipal Party Committee achieved great success precisely because it grasped these two points. [1]
(April 2, 1951)

Executions should not be too numerous. Too many will cause a loss of social sympathy and also squander labor power. The principle is: those who have incurred blood debts or committed other major crimes where execution is necessary to assuage popular anger must be resolutely executed to assuage popular anger and facilitate production. Those who have not incurred blood debts or committed other major crimes arousing popular anger, but who are guilty of capital crimes—such as some special agents or spies, some counterrevolutionaries in educational or economic circles—may be sentenced to death, but with a suspended execution of one or two years, compelling them to labor, to observe their future conduct. If they can reform through labor, the sentence may be commuted, as a second step, to life imprisonment, and as a third step, to fixed-term imprisonment. (Generally, all those sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment should be organized to labor; they should not eat idle bread.) In this way, the initiative remains in our hands; however we wish to handle matters later will be possible. [2]
(April 30, 1951)

The Central Committee has decided that, concerning counterrevolutionary elements ferreted out within the Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Government system, educational circles, industrial and commercial circles, religious circles, various democratic parties, and various people’s organizations—except those whose crimes do not warrant death and should be sentenced to fixed-term or life imprisonment, or placed under surveillance—for those who deserve execution, only those who have incurred blood debts, those who have committed other major crimes that arouse mass indignation (such as raping many women or plundering much property), and those who have most seriously harmed state interests shall be executed. For the rest, the policy is uniformly to sentence them to death with a two-year suspension of
execution, compulsory labor during the suspension period, and observation of future conduct. This policy is a prudent policy; it can help avoid mistakes. This policy can gain the sympathy of broad sections of the public. This policy can split the counterrevolutionary forces, facilitating the thorough elimination of counterrevolutionaries. This policy also preserves a large amount of labor power, benefiting the nation’s construction efforts. Therefore, it is a correct policy. It is estimated that among the counterrevolutionaries deserving execution ferreted out from the aforementioned Party, government, military, educational, economic, and mass organization circles, those with blood debts, other crimes arousing mass indignation, or those who have most seriously harmed state interests constitute only a very small minority, perhaps roughly no more than ten to twenty percent. Those sentenced to death with suspended execution may constitute eighty to ninety percent. That is to say, eighty to ninety percent of capital criminals can be spared execution. They differ from the bandit chieftains, habitual bandits, and local tyrants in the countryside; they also differ from the local tyrants, bandit chieftains, habitual bandits, major hooligan leaders, and heads of superstitious societies and secret societies in cities; and they also differ from certain special agents who have most seriously harmed state interests. That is, they have neither blood debts nor other major crimes that arouse popular hatred. The degree to which they have harmed state interests is serious, but not the most serious. They are guilty of capital crimes, but the masses have not been directly victimized. If we were to execute these people, it would be difficult for the masses to understand, people in society at large would not fully sympathize, moreover, we would lose a large amount of labor power, fail to effect a split among the enemy, and possibly make mistakes on this issue. Therefore, the Central Committee has decided to adopt the policy of sentencing such individuals to death with a suspended execution, compulsory labor, and observation of future conduct. If some of these individuals prove incapable of reform and continue to commit evil, they can still be executed later; the initiative remains in our hands. All localities are requested to handle the counterrevolutionaries ferreted out from Party, government, military, educational, economic, and mass organizations in accordance with the above principles. For those very few individuals (approximately ten to twenty percent of capital criminals) whose execution should be carried out, as a measure of caution, approval must be sought from the greater administrative region or greater military region in all cases. Important figures related to the united front must be reported to the Central Committee for approval. Furthermore, concerning counterrevolutionaries in the countryside, also execute only those who cannot but be executed to assuage popular anger; do not execute anyone the people do not wish to see executed. For some of them, the policy of death sentence with suspended execution should also

be applied. Those whom the people demand to be executed must be executed, to assuage popular anger and facilitate production. [1]
(May 8, 1951)

The policy of two-year suspended execution must by no means be interpreted as sparing from execution criminals who have incurred blood debts or committed other major crimes and whose execution is demanded by the people. If done so, that would be a mistake. We must explain clearly to district and village cadres and the masses that those who are heinously guilty of heinous crimes and have provoked profound public indignation, whose execution is necessary to assuage popular anger, must be executed, to assuage popular anger. Only for those who have not provoked deep public indignation and whose execution the people do not demand, yet who are guilty of capital crimes, may we apply the sentence of death with a two-year suspension of execution, compulsory labor, and observation of future conduct. [2]
(June 15, 1951)

The entire work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries must be under the unified leadership of Party committees at all levels. All responsible comrades of public security organs and other organs related to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries must, as in the past, resolutely accept the leadership of the Party committees. [3]
(September 1951)

The view is appropriate: let them move about, pay attention and observe—there is great potential to be tapped. They are in the palm of the Tathagata Buddha’s hand and cannot jump out. You should treat this as a major task, actively and artfully carrying out the work of observation and investigation.
(September 18, 1951)

The counterrevolutionary forces have already suffered an extremely severe blow from us. But they still have remnant strength not yet eliminated; there
[1] This is the decision drafted by Mao Zedong for the CPC Central Committee on largely adopting the policy of sentencing counterrevolutionaries guilty of capital offenses to death with a two-year suspended execution.
[2] This is Mao Zedong’s telegram explaining the policy of “death sentence with reprieve” to all central bureaus for relay to sub-bureaus, provincial, municipal, and district Party committees, prefectural committees, and county committees.
[3] This is a passage added by Mao Zedong when reviewing the draft resolution of the Fourth National Public Security Conference.

are still constant infiltrations from outside, the remnant elements inside may still ferment and expand, and they are still carrying out frenzied activities, harming the people’s cause. If we lose our vigilance, if we stop here and no longer struggle against the counterrevolutionaries, we will fall completely into the trap of the counterrevolutionaries. Therefore, we must continue to heighten our vigilance, we must continue to strike at the counterrevolutionaries; as long as counterrevolutionaries still exist, we must thoroughly eliminate them. [1]
(October 1951)

--- Notes

[1] This was the main content of Mao Zedong’s telegram to Huang Kecheng, Secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee, concerning the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries.
[2] This was part of Mao Zedong’s telegram relaying a report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries by the 47th Army of the People’s Liberation Army to responsible comrades of the East China Bureau, the Central-South Bureau, the Southwest Bureau, the Northwest Bureau, the North China Bureau, the Northeast Bureau, and the South China Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.


[1] This is the main part of Mao Zedong’s instructions to add to a telegram relaying the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee’s message on issues needing attention in suppressing counterrevolutionaries to the Fujian Provincial Committee.
[2] This is part of Mao Zedong’s telegram relaying a report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries by the Party Committee of the Southwest Military Region to the major military regions in East China, Central-South, Northwest, North China, and Northeast.


[1] This is a notification drafted by Mao Zedong for the CPC Central Committee concerning the assassination of Comrade Huang Zuyan, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Shandong Military Area Command.
[2] This is part of Mao Zedong’s reply telegram agreeing to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s plan for suppressing counterrevolutionaries.


[1] This is the main part of Mao Zedong’s instructions written to accompany the relaying of a work report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries by the Shandong Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.


[1] This was written by Mao Zedong to accompany the relaying of a report by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee of the CPC on its experience in suppressing counterrevolutionaries.
[2] This is the main part of Mao Zedong’s instructions written to accompany the relaying of instructions from the Southwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on suppressing counterrevolutionaries to the North Sichuan District Party Committee.


[1] This is a passage added by Mao Zedong when reviewing the draft report by Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on the current situation of counterrevolutionary activities and our countermeasures.