Telegram to Peng Dehuai [1] Regarding the Successful Execution of the Third Phase Campaign and Preparation for the Spring Offensive (December 29, 1950)

Comrade Peng Dehuai, with a copy to Comrade Gao Gang [2]: We have received your telegram of 8:00 p.m. on December 28 [3] and approve your plan. If this campaign [4] proceeds smoothly, the 66th Army or the 42nd Army should occupy Chuncheon and Hongcheon, while a portion of the Korean People’s Army takes up positions at Xiangyang and Jiangling, stockpiling food and ammunition in preparation for the spring offensive. The remaining units, once the campaign is fully concluded and the enemy’s new dispositions are clearly understood, should be deployed to areas where supply lines are relatively convenient—regardless of whether north or south of the 38th Parallel—for a two-month period of rest and reorganization. The old mental image of the 38th Parallel will, after this battle, no longer exist. It makes no difference whether our forces rest south of the 38th Parallel or north of it. However, had we not fought this battle—if, since early December, our entire army had remained inactive throughout the winter—we would certainly have aroused considerable speculation among the capitalist countries. Even some members of the democratic camp might have expressed disapproval, leading to much debate. If, as you now propose, our forces can achieve a decisive victory in the first half of January, annihilating several ROK divisions and a contingent of U.S. troops, and then take two months to rest and prepare for the spring offensive, the impact on the broad masses in both the democratic camp and the capitalist countries would be highly positive. At the same time, it would deliver another blow to imperialism, intensifying its pessimistic and defeatist mood. Comrade Filippov [ ] regards the leadership of the Chinese People’s Volunteers as correct. He has criticized many erroneous views, fully understands the difficulties inherent in the Korean theater of operations, and has voluntarily proposed the allocation of an additional two thousand vehicles to help resolve your logistical challenges. The Military Commission has issued an order to all units nationwide (except Xinjiang and Xikang) to select twenty veteran soldiers from each company. If this process goes smoothly, the first batch of over forty thousand men could be assembled by February to reinforce the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The new commander of the enemy forces, Lieutenant General Ridgway [ ], has arrived in Seoul to replace the late Lieutenant General Walker [7]. Upon his arrival, he immediately ordered all U.S. and ROK units to hold their ground and forbade any retreat, which greatly facilitates our efforts to locate and destroy elements of the ROK army and portions of the U.S. forces. Should he choose to fortify Seoul and refuse to withdraw following this campaign, that would be even more advantageous for us. We are not concerned about the enemy holding Seoul and the area north of the 37th Parallel; what we fear is that they might abandon that line and concentrate their defenses in the narrow region between Daegu and Busan. Nevertheless, such a scenario remains possible, and you should be prepared to deal with it.

Mao Zedong December 29 Based on the manuscript publication.

Notes [1] Peng Dehuai was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. [2] Gao Gang was then Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army. [3] Refers to Peng Dehuai’s telegram of 8:00 p.m. on December 28, 1950, conveying his views on occupying the 38th Parallel to Mao Zedong and Gao Gang. [4] Refers to the Third Phase Campaign that the Chinese People’s Volunteers were preparing to launch on the Korean battlefield. [ ] Filippov was Stalin’s code name. [ ] Ridgway was the newly appointed commander of the U.S. Eighth Army at the time. [7] Walker was the former commander of the U.S. Eighth Army.