--- Notes

Telegram to Deng Zihui [1] et al. Regarding the Suppression of Bandits in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hunan Provinces and Guangdong’s Defense (December 29, 1950)

Deng, Tan, Zhao, and Su [2]:   (1) Your report dated December 24 on summarizing the experience gained during the autumn campaign to suppress bandits has been received and carefully studied. It is most satisfactory and reassuring. A copy has already been sent to the East China, Southwest, Northwest, and Central-South Military Regions for their reference.

(2) We continue to urge intensified efforts in the suppression of bandits in Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hunan, with the aim of completely concluding this task by May 31. This will enable one army from Guangxi—perhaps the 45th Army—to be concentrated in the Wuzhou area in early June, together with the 21st Corps, awaiting orders to move into Guangdong in order to deal with any possible contingencies [3]. Hunan should likewise prepare to concentrate one army along the Chenzhou–Hengyang line no later than May, preferably in March or April, and keep it on standby.

In short, should trouble arise in Guangdong, the Fourth Field Army will bear sole responsibility for handling the situation, ensuring victory over any invading bandit forces from Taiwan and consolidating Guangdong’s defenses. We hope that you will plan the bandit-suppression operations and troop deployments in accordance with this policy.

Mao Zedong  December 29    Printed from the manuscript.

Notes  [1] Deng Zihui was at the time the Second Political Commissar of the Central-South Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

[2] Tan refers to Tan Zheng, who was then the Third Political Commissar of the Central-South Military Region; Zhao refers to Zhao Erlu, Chief of Staff of the same region; and Su refers to Su Jing, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central-South Military Region.

[3] Refers to the possibility of a landing and invasion by Nationalist forces from Taiwan in Guangdong. ７£´